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Abstract 
Over the last decade, we have seen that social media services have been widely adopted to 
communicate with friends or family members, and to generate and consume information. It is 
not a surprise, therefore, that social media services are also used as powerful communication 
platforms during disasters and other emergency extreme events.  
 
This thesis explores the utilisation and integration of social media services into emergency 
management organisations (EMOs) for the purpose of day-to-day as well as emergency and 
disaster management operational modes. EMOs such as fire services, use social media to 
provide information to, and engage with, the general public and as a source of relevant 
information to support their situational awareness during an extreme event.   
 
Social media services have been adopted by EMOs as an important additional communication 
channel during times of emergency and disaster management, where EMOs are central and 
trusted participants within emerging and dynamic social communication networks. Still, for 
EMOs, social media is a newly adopted technology which is not yet fully understood for this 
purpose.  
 
While some research has analysed social media data to learn how EMOs are communicating 
with the general public and non-government institutions through their social media channels, 
little is known as to how EMOs embed social media services into their organisational structures 
and processes.  
 
This research contributes to closing this research gap through an explorative and interpretive 
case study which highlights how EMOs utilise and integrate social media services into their 
day-to-day operations, processes and structures as well as into their operational mode during 
emergencies and disasters.  
 
This study analyses five different EMOs, in two different jurisdictions that have adopted and 
utilise social media services. This research focusses on the integration of social media services 
within these EMOs and how these EMOs use social media depending on their mode of 
operation, i.e. day-to-day or emergency management, for:  
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1) internal EMO communication;  
2) interaction with other EMOs; and  
3) communication with the general public and media organisations.  
 
The analysis of these cases is used to develop a framework of social media utilisation in 
emergency management organisations for emergency and disaster management. It also 
contributes to our existing body of knowledge about social media utilisation in emergency and 
disaster management scenarios. The results of this research project further provide EMOs with 
a basis to improve their existing approaches to social media utilisation. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“People today can use social media to organise in ways that were difficult, if not impossible, 
just a few years ago, which has substantial implications for business, and society” (Kane et al. 
2014). In this thesis, I explore the integration and utilisation of social media services within 
emergency management organisations for the purpose of emergency and disaster management. 
This exploration is done through an analysis of five Australian emergency management 
organisations which are utilising social media to supplement their emergency management 
activities.  
 
However, before I progress to the core argument of the thesis, I would like to provide some 
background information in order to draw a clear picture of social media and the changes it 
brings to emergency and disaster communication; this picture highlights the motivation to 
explore the phenomenon. I outline this research motivation and background in the following 
section. 
 
Subsequently, in Section 1.2, I explain the research objectives of this study and the research 
questions this thesis provides answers to. Then I describe the research methodology and 
approach in Section 1.3, followed by an outline of research findings and their significance in 
Section 1.4. I conclude this introductory chapter with the outline of this dissertation.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Outline Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
1.4	Research	Findings	and	Significance
1.5	Dissertation	Outline
1.2	Research	Objectives	and	Questions
1.3	Research	Methodology	and	Approach
Chapter	1
1.1	Research	Motivation	and	Background
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1.1 Research Motivation and Background 
In western societies, social media services, such as Facebook and Twitter, are highly integrated 
into the daily activities of individuals (Whiting and Williams 2013). For some of us, these 
services are the first thing we check in the morning after waking up and the last thing in the 
evening before going to sleep. Social media is influencing how people communicate with 
friends and family members (Burke et al. 2011), consume news (Pentina and Tarafdar 2014), 
or even find their partners (Paul 2014). 
 
The access to social media services appears ubiquitous as it is facilitated by mobile devices, 
such as smartphones and other lightweight computer solutions; of course, however, this is an 
illusion. True, in urban areas the Internet and with it Social Media Services can be accessed 
from nearly everywhere since the necessary infrastructure is established. In these areas, there 
is a dense cell phone coverage, or accessibility to wireless hotspots, however, in more rural 
regions and the further out of towns and cities we go the coverage might get more and more 
patchy until it possibly fully disappears. The necessary underlying infrastructure is just not 
there, … yet.  
 
Social media services have not just disrupted the social practices in day to day life; these 
services have influenced social interactions in disaster and other extreme event scenarios, both 
positively and negatively. There are countless examples where social media has been used for 
self-organisation of help during or after an extreme event (e.g. Bunker et al. 2013; Procter et 
al. 2013; Shahid and Elbanna 2015) where people use the medium to mitigate the effects of an 
event. On the other side of the coin, however, we see countless examples where social media 
has been used for negative behaviour, such as scams (e.g. Bunker and Sleigh 2016; Subba and 
Bui 2017), organised lootings (e.g. Procter et al. 2013), or even in the support of coordination 
of terror attacks (e.g. Oh et al. 2010). 
 
Social media data is created nearly instantly after an extreme event occurs and messages diffuse 
rapidly through the emerging extreme event communication networks. Figure 1.2 (Munroe 
2010) illustrates the active utilisation of social media services during disasters and other 
emergency events. It illustrates the fast information flow possible through these 
communication channels, and illuminates how this might even surpass the extent of how the 
physical effects of an extreme event expand.  
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While this comic was written without a reference to a real event, the effects described in the 
diagram can be observed in real events. For example, on August 23rd in 2011 an earthquake 
occurred at the east coast of the United States which had its origin near Washington DC. Tweets 
about the earthquake could be read in New York more than 20 seconds before the seismic 
waves reached the city (Rogers 2011).  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Seismic Waves reproduced from Munroe (2010) 
 
The apparently ubiquitous access to social media creates the phenomenon where some 
witnesses of extreme events tend to share their impressions, photographic and video footage 
on social media services through the Internet within seconds and minutes after the impact of 
an extreme event. An example of how fast social media messages emerge after an occurring 
event is the Boston Marathon Bombing of 2013. Just seconds after the first bomb had exploded 
the first tweet emerged in the unfolding communication network (Ehnis and Bunker 2013). 
This Tweet only stated "Holy Shit! Explosion!", however, shortly after Tweets with the first 
images and videos were circulated which were showing what was happening on the scene of 
the event.  
 
The modern information and communication technology has growing influence on the 
dynamics and the media coverage (Reese et al. 2007) of disasters and their management (Bruns 
et al. 2012; Bunker et al. 2013; Ehnis and Bunker 2013). Social media, and with it particular 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, with their user-generated content (Kaplan and 
Haenlein 2010), changed how information is created and shared through the Internet. 
Emergency managers realised that social media could be a powerful tool to communicate 
directly and engage with the public during emergency and other extreme events and embedded 
these platforms into the communication structure of their organisations (Latonero and 
Shklovski 2013).  
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Emergency management organisations (EMOs), such as the police or fire services, have started 
to integrate social media services into their operations and structures (Fosso Wamba and 
Edwards 2014; Heverin and Zach 2010; Latonero and Shklovski 2010; Queensland Police 
Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 2011), especially with the intent to use these 
services during extreme events to communicate with parts of the general public.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Sign at Fire Station 
 
Social media allows one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many communication. For 
individuals, the one-to-many and many-to-many communication behaviours were not easily 
accessible before social media, at least not in this form. Communication practices have now 
been enabled that were difficult if not impossible before social media. Naturally, this has 
substantial implications for organisations and society (Kane et al. 2014). Initial integration of 
social media into organisations is rather inexpensive. Past influential information technologies, 
such as ERP and other Enterprise Systems, were expensive, and in the beginning, only large 
organisations could afford to adopt them; social media, on the other hand, can be readily used 
by all kinds of organisations strategically without a large upfront investment (Kane et al. 2014). 
 
Yet, the social media utilisation within EMOs can be classified as a relatively new 
phenomenon. While several EMOs already used social media prior 2011, the Queensland 
Floods of 2011 acted as a catalyst in which the social media utilisation of EMOs became part 
of the consciousness of the general public. In this extreme event the Queensland Police Service 
(Queensland Police Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 2011) utilised social media as 
a part of their communication strategy to communicate with the general public. This 
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organisation highlighted that social media is a beneficial additional communication channel. 
After this event, EMOs across the country broadened their social media activities. 
 
So far, EMOs are using their social media services mainly to broadcast information (Ehnis and 
Bunker 2012; Heverin and Zach 2010). But social media presence is not limited to just being 
used as “megaphone” to bring information to a large audience; it can also be used to interact 
with the audience, or to gather information (Artman et al. 2011; Power and Kibell 2017), which 
makes the social media presence a valuable two-way communication channel during extreme 
events. Previous research has shown what kind of information EMOs are broadcasting during 
different phases of a disaster event (e.g. Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Ehnis and 
Bunker 2013; Subba and Bui 2017). Unfortunately, not much is known about how EMOs have 
integrated and are using social media services to communicate with the general public from a 
perspective inside the organisations (Heverin and Zach 2010; Procter et al. 2013; Sutton et al. 
2012). To date, our knowledge has been limited as to how these services are integrated into the 
organisational structures or processes of EMOs.  
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
The objective of this research is to create a better understanding of the utilisation and 
integration of social media services within EMOs for the purpose of emergency and disaster 
management. This thesis explores, in particular, Australian EMOs. The research focuses on the 
following research questions: 
 
RQ 1: How are Social Media Services integrated into the structures of Emergency 
Management Organisations?  
 
RQ 2: How are Social Media Services utilised within Emergency Management Organisations 
for the purpose of emergency and disaster management?  
 
RQ 2.1: Is there a difference in the Social Media utilisation during the operational mode and 
the non-operational mode of an Emergency Management Organisation?  
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RQ 3: How are Social Media Services used as communication platforms in Emergency 
Management Organisations for the purpose of emergency and disaster management to:  
 
RQ 3.1: interact with the public? 
 
RQ 3.2: interact with other Emergency Management Organisations? 
 
RQ 3.3: interact with their own organisational members? 
1.3 Research Methodology and Approach 
In order to answer these questions, the research is designed as a case study approach where the 
utilisation and integration of social media services in five Australian EMOs is analysed. These 
organisations are operating in two different Australian states. Two of the organisations are 
responding to bushfire related events; with one of these bushfire response organisations being 
situated in Case State I and the second bushfire response organisation in Case State II. Two of 
the case organisations are responding to flood-related events. One of these organisations is 
situated in Case State I and the other organisation in Case State II. Additionally, a response 
coordinating organisation has been analysed. This organisation is responsible for ensuring 
interoperability between EMOs when necessary during larger extreme events.  This 
organisation is situated in Case State II. 
 
The general research approach of this thesis is outlined in Figure 1.4, where the utilisation of 
this “fluid” communication technology, i.e. social media, in the very hierarchical context of 
EMOs is explored. The overall premise of the research is theory extension; where a framework 
has been developed, which can help to better understand utilisation of social media by EMOs 
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during disaster scenarios. I describe this framework in more detail in the following section and 
in Chapter 7.    
 
 
Figure 1.4 Outline Research Approach 
 
Five EMOs have been analysed as comparative case studies with the level of analysis being at 
the organisational level. As ontological underpinning, I presume a ‘weak’ social constructivism 
(Urquhart 2012) and the epistemological approach is within the Interpretivist paradigm. 
 
Critical data sources within these organisations were interview informants. These informants 
are social media operators within the organisations. Additional data sources include social 
media data, documents from the organisations, case notes and workplace observations.  
1.4 Research Findings and Significance 
From a theoretical perspective, the analysis of the data revealed twelve themes which cover 
different aspects of social media utilisation and integration within EMOs. These twelve themes 
have been refined into a framework of Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management 
Organisations for Emergency and Disaster Management. The framework is shown in Figure 
1.5. Prior to this study, we had very little knowledge of how social media has been used within 
EMOs, and this study makes a significant and unique contribution to this body of knowledge. 
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Figure 1.5 Framework – Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management Organisations 
for Emergency and Disaster Management 
 
From a practical perspective, the framework provides a tool through which the social media 
utilisation of an EMO can be systematically analysed and explained. The framework provides 
EMOs which have not yet implemented social media into their structure some guidance on how 
such technology can be used. For organisations which are already utilising social media 
services, this framework can help to analyse the existing social media processes and help to 
improve the social media utilisation of the organisation.  
1.5 Dissertation Outline  
This thesis consists of a total of eight chapters. Chapter 1, this chapter, provides an overview 
of the dissertation. The research background is introduced, and the motivation for the study is 
provided. Research questions, the methodological approach used within the thesis, the findings 
and their significance, and structure of the dissertation are also outlined.  
 
Chapter 2 is intended to provide the necessary background of different concepts used within 
the thesis. The chapter is not meant as an in-depth literature review, but rather to introduce and 
discuss the major background concepts used in this thesis as well as the issues at the core of 
the research motivation. This is done in order to familiarise the reader with the context of the 
research. Three main concepts are covered: emergency management relevant events, EMOs, 
and social media. 
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Within the section of emergency relevant events, a discussion of how emergency management 
practitioners refer to different emergency events is outlined. Furthermore, the different phases 
of emergency management and disasters are discussed. In this context, different event 
classification approaches are discussed along with the Prevent, Prepare, Respond, and Recover 
Model. This model is a cornerstone of many processes within EMOs, in general, and within 
the case organisations explored in this thesis in particular.  
 
EMOs and their specific characteristics as a special form of hierarchic systems are also 
explored within this chapter. Koestler’s concept of holonic systems (Koestler 1967) is used as 
a framing device to better understand the semi-autonomous and independent structure of such 
organisations. Special emphasis is made regarding the two modes of operations of EMOs, i.e. 
the operational mode, and the non-operational mode. The operational mode refers to the mode 
of operation when an EMO is responding to an extreme event; the non-operational mode refers 
to the day-to-day operation of an EMO. 
 
In the last part of the chapter, social media in general and its relevance for EMOs is discussed; 
Specific social media technologies and their application in emergency management are also 
briefly outlined.  
 
The results of the literature analysis of social media in emergency and disaster management 
are discussed in Chapter 3. The literature review approach is outlined, and then the body of 
literature is explained. The literature review is structured in four different parts: Potential of 
social media in emergency and disaster management, structure and behaviour of emergency 
social media communication networks, general public utilisation of social media during 
emergency events, and emergency management use of social media. The framework for social 
media utilisation in disaster management (Ahmed 2011) was used to frame the initial research 
and, therefore, this framework is discussed in section 3.4. At the end of Chapter 3, the research 
aims and questions are articulated from the literature analysis. 
   
The research methodology is outlined in Chapter 4. This description includes the general 
research approach and strategy, the ontological and epistemological underpinnings, the case 
study approach, the data collection approaches, and the data analysis approach.  
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In Chapter 5, detailed case study descriptions of the five case organisations which were 
analysed for this thesis are provided. The case organisations are situated in two federal states 
in Australia. Case Organisation A and B are located in Case State I, Case Organisation C, D, 
and E are situated in Case State II. In the first half of the chapter Case State I and the case 
descriptions for Case Organisation A, and B are provided. In the second half of the chapter 
Case State II and the case description for Case Organisation C, D, and E are described. Each 
case description includes an overview of the organisation, the general structure of the 
organisation, and the social media utilisation structure.  
         
The results of the data analysis are described in Chapter 6. The analysis of the data revealed 
twelve themes of social media utilisation and integration into EMO for the purpose of 
emergency and disaster management.  
 
In Chapter 7, the findings of the data analysis are discussed. Themes identified in the data are 
used as a basis for the development of a framework of Social Media Utilisation in Emergency 
Management Organisations for the Purpose of Emergency and Disaster Management.  
 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of this study and its significance. After a brief overview of the 
findings, the methodological, theoretical and practical contributions are highlighted. 
Limitations and further research are then explored to conclude this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 – Background on Emergency Events, Emergency 
Management Organisations, and their use of Social Media 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the utilisation of social media in emergency and disaster management, 
it is important to understand what emergency and disaster events are; to know about the specific 
characteristics and composition of EMOs; and to understand the concept of social media. In 
this chapter, I outline these different concepts to embed them into the context of this thesis. The 
purpose of this chapter is to give the necessary background information and define concepts in 
order to understand the research performed for this thesis. It is not the purpose of this chapter 
to explore the current literature on the topics discussed. Chapter three will provide a literature 
review of social media in disaster and emergency management.  
 
The current chapter is divided into three parts which cover each one of the major concepts: 
emergency events (2.2); EMOs (2.3); and social media (2.4). In Section 2.2, I describe and 
define emergency events and disasters; This includes different phases of such events and the 
phases in their management. Afterwards, I discuss some characteristics of EMOs as a subset of 
hierarchically structured organisations. The case organisations in this thesis are large-scale 
volunteer organisations. Therefore, I will focus in section 2.3 on large-scale volunteer 
organisations as a specific category of EMOs. These organisations have specific characteristics 
and are structured in relatively autonomous sub-units. Koestler’s concept of holonic systems 
(Koestler 1967) is introduced in this section as a lens to better understand these characteristics. 
Section 2.4 of this chapter is used to build an understanding of the concept of social media. I 
first define what I mean by social media in the context of this thesis, then I provide an overview 
of specific social media technologies and their current application in emergency and disaster 
management. 
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Figure 2.1 Outline Chapter 2 
2.2 Incidents, Emergency Events, and Disasters 
Members of EMOs use specific terms and jargon when they refer to emergency events. In order 
to have the necessary background to understand the utilisation of social media services within 
EMOs, it is important to understand what members of these organisations mean when they are 
referring to a type of an event. The terms range from “incident”, to “emergency event“, and 
“disaster event”. Sometimes terms are used interchangeably, on other occasions they have a 
specific meaning within the context. In this section, the meaning of the different types of 
emergency management relevant events for the context of this thesis are defined. In particular, 
the focus is on: “incidents”, “emergency events”, and “disasters”.  
 
As the case organisations are situated in Australia, the focus is on the terms utilised in the 
Australian emergency management sector. However, the essence of this classification can also 
be transferred to an emergency management context of other countries.  
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Emergency Management Social Media communication is also often referred to as social media 
for crisis communication in the literature. Within this thesis, I avoid the term “crisis 
management” or “crisis communication” as these terms typicalluy refer to operations in 
commercial organisations (Stieglitz and Krüger 2011). In the context of commercial 
organisations, these terms usually refer to reputation management, rather than crisis 
communication performed by EMOs. Crisis communication of EMO focuses on keeping 
people safe and alive, not on the reputation management of the particular emergency response 
organisation. 
 
Emergency events are referred to and influenced by (1) the event size, (2) the event 
characteristics, and (3) the disrupting impact of an event towards the community or 
environment. These terms build a hierarchy of impact. Incidents, in this hierarchy, are on the 
smaller scale where the responding organisations are prepared to manage the event, while 
disaster events are the most disrupting events which might bring the coordinated response of 
EMOs to failure.  
 
For EMOs, the most common relevant event type is an incident. Incidents are localised events 
toward which an organisation responds to. The Australian Emergency Management Glossary 
defines an incident as “an event, accidentally or deliberately caused, which requires a response 
from one or more of the statutory emergency response agencies” (Koob 1998, p. 64). Members 
of EMOs usually refer to an event as an incident when it is within the usual responsibilities of 
the organisation and the organisation is prepared to respond to such an event.  
 
Emergency events are usually more severe in comparison to incidents. An emergency event 
can be defined as “an event, actual or imminent, which endangers or threatens to endanger life, 
property or the environment, and which requires a significant and coordinated response” (Koob 
1998, p. 38). Members of EMOs utilise the term emergency event when the response to a 
particular event needs a more coordinated response, especially when more organisations are 
involved. Furthermore, emergency events have more devastating effects, in comparison to 
incidents, and might cause casualties.   
 
A disaster or disaster event is the most severe form of an emergency management relevant 
event. The emergency management sector in Australia attempts to avoid the term disaster when 
responding to large-scale emergency events (Koob 1998, p. 32). The term disaster is reserved 
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for the most disrupting extreme events which pushes the coordinated response to potential 
failure. The Australian Emergency Management Glossary defines a disaster as “a serious 
disruption to community life which threatens or causes death or injury in that community 
and/or damage to property which is beyond the day-to-day capacity of the prescribed statutory 
authorities and which requires special mobilisation and organisation of resources other than 
those normally available to those authorities” (Koob 1998, p. 32). Such an event is serious 
enough that it pushes the day-to-day response capacity to failure and a more integrated and 
organised response is necessary.  
 
A disaster, to be referred to as a disaster, needs to be declared as such by the government 
through a disaster declaration. The disaster declaration is a statement that the commune or a 
state cannot respond towards the event without additional assistance (McEntire 2007, p. 471).  
 
A disaster can also be described as “deadly, destructive, and disruptive events that occur when 
a hazard interacts (or multiple hazards interact) with human vulnerability” (McEntire 2007, p. 
22). Hazards are, in this case, natural, technological, or civil incidents. Natural incidents can 
be floods, earthquakes, or wildfires. Technological incidents can have an industrial, or nuclear 
character, or can be caused via transportation. Civil incidents are incidents like panic 
behaviours, riots or terrorism attacks. This reference shows the different potential causes of 
emergency extreme events. 
 
For social media in emergency and disaster management, several human (civil) caused 
emergency extreme events are different to natural occurring extreme events in the sense that a 
potential perpetrator in the human-caused extreme event could change their behaviour based 
on the social media communication. There are cases where the perpetrators actively utilised 
social media to coordinate their behaviour. For example, the Mumbai terror attacks in 2010 
(Oh et al. 2010) or the London Riots in 2011 (Procter et al. 2013). 
 
EMOs need to structure their social media communication in such events so that they do not 
accidentally warn the perpetrators about their counteractions (Ehnis and Bunker 2013). On the 
other hand, they need to inform the general public enough to keep them safe. In natural extreme 
events, this particular problem does not occur since the event itself does not change through 
the social media communication. The involved EMOs just need to be careful that they do not 
accidentally cause additional cascading events such as panics.  
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This thesis focuses on EMOs that respond to natural emergency and disaster events, such as 
earthquakes, floods, or bushfire. This particular selection of case organisations makes it 
possible to exclude organisations such as police forces which use social media to communicate 
information during human-caused extreme events, such as terror attacks.  
 
To summarise this section, whether an event is referred to as an incident or an emergency event 
depends on the size and impact of a particular event. Disasters, on the other hand, are a specific 
type of extreme event which push the usual emergency management procedures and systems 
to failure, because of unforeseen consequences, or because the procedures and systems are 
pushed across their limits. Inter-organisational collaboration and coordination above the 
normal organisational levels of collaboration are central to manage the effects of a disaster 
event. 
2.2.1 Event Typology 
Not every emergency management event is the same. It could be argued that all of these events 
have differences. The differences manifest themselves not only through the event severity, as 
discussed in the previous section; there are various differences caused by characteristics of an 
event type. The emergency management events exhibit event characteristics through which 
they can be classified and compared. Table 2.1 shows different event types with some of the 
relevant characteristics such as medium, agent, elapsed time to full effect of the event, lead 
time, area, etc.  
 
The characteristics of an emergency event influence how an event can be managed by EMOs. 
For example, an event such as a bushfire or a flood can have a relatively long lead time from 
the time the event emerges up to when the full effect on communities or the environment is 
felt. This lead time gives EMOs the opportunity to warn and prepare communities that might 
be affected. In other event types such as tsunamis or earthquakes, there is either minimal to no 
lead time to the full effect of the event. A short lead time potentially results in the inability to 
warn communities, or a shortened warning period.  
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Table 2.1 Emergency Incident Types and Characteristics – reproduced from Bunker (2010) 
 
 
Large-scale emergency events, such as disasters or other extreme emergency events, are 
dynamic, emergent events that involve diverse stakeholders. Complex decision-making is 
required by these stakeholders. The disaster response systems, which support the decision-
making and coordination of an event, need to account for the different characteristics of the 
emergency event. (Bunker et al. 2014).  
 
The different emergency event characteristics also result in different requirements for 
Community Warning and Emergency Incident Response Systems (Bunker 2010), which are 
operated by different EMOs. As social media establishes itself as an additional communication 
channel between EMOs and their communities, these platforms are then used as additional 
community warning channels (Ehnis and Bunker 2012).  
 
There are indications in the social media data of previous events that the event typology 
influences how EMOs are utilising and can utilise their social media channels to communicate 
with the individuals from the general public which are following the social media channels of 
these EMOs (Ehnis and Bunker 2013). 
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2.2.2 Phases of Disaster and Emergency Management 
Large-scale emergency events have different phases in their manifestation. In a simplified 
form, an emergency event can be split up into the “pre-event” phase, the “event” itself and the 
“post-event” phase (Brian Houston 2012). Disaster and Emergency Management occurs in all 
three of these phases. The organised actions of EMOs are different in all of these distinctive 
phases. In the pre-disaster phase, the Risk Management and the preparation for a potential 
disaster takes place. In the “event” phase the organisations respond towards the effects of the 
event. Disaster Relief and the Disaster Recovery Management occurs typically in the “post-
event” phase (Shaw and Krishnaumrthy 2009). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Simplified phases of an emergency event 
 
2.2.2.1 Disaster Stage Taxonomy 
Debate over the stages of an extreme event, such as a disaster, and its management can also be 
a matter of granularity. Powell and Raynor (Powell and Raynor 1952) identified seven different 
phases which they combined into a taxonomy. The taxonomy is shown in Figure 2.3. The 
identified phases are: Warning; Threat; Impact; Inventory; Rescue; Remedy; and Recovery.  
 
The first two phases, “Warning” and “Threat” do not occur during in all disasters. Some large-
scale emergency or disaster events could occur suddenly without any visible warning signs. 
For example, earthquakes or terror attacks. Other event types, such as the frequent bushfire and 
flooding events in Australia, do have a “Warning” and a “Threat” phase.  
 
In the first phase, the “Warning” phase, there are signs that an emergency extreme event will 
most likely occur. EMOs prepare the public through information and warnings about the 
incoming event. In this phase, it is still not entirely clear whether the event will really occur or 
whether it is in the end much smaller than anticipated or it might not occur at all. 
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The “Threat” phase is seen as the phase right before an emergency event will happen. While 
the event has not yet occured, it is clear that an event will happen. During this phase, the 
emergency response organisations continue to warn the public about the event and are 
preparing a specific response to the event.  
  
Figure 2.3 Disaster stage taxonomy by Powell and Raynor (1952) 
 
The “Impact” phase represents the impact of the event itself. Dependent on the event typology, 
this impact can be sudden or build up over time. Within this typology, there is no management 
of the event associated with this phase.  
  
The emergency management starts in the fourth phase of the taxonomy, the “Inventory” phase. 
In this phase, exactly what happened is investigated, and the extent of the damage which was 
caused by the event is assessed.  
 
The fifth phase (“Rescue”) is the response towards the event. EMOs attend to the effects of the 
event. In this phase, the visible emergency response takes place.  
 
The following phase is called “Remedy”. In this phase, the non-life-threatening effects are 
addressed and responded to by EMOs.  
 
The last and seventh phase is the “Recovery” from the event. In this phase, attempts are made 
to recover from the event to a state similar to how it was before the event. This phase can take 
a long time and is typically not supported by the organisations which actively responded to the 
event.  
1.	Warning
2.	Threat
3.	Impact
4.	Inventory
5.	Rescue
6.	Remedy
7.	Recovery
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When focusing on the classification of pre-event, event, and post-event, then phase 1 and 2 
would fall into the pre-event phase, the event phase would cover phases 3, 4, and 5 of the 
taxonomy; Phase 6 and 7 would be in the post-event phase. In all of these phases, there are 
important emergency and disaster management relevant activities. For this thesis, awareness 
about different phases of a disaster or extreme event is an important concept as social media is 
used for different purposes during these different phases by EMOs.  
 
The phases in Powell and Raynor’s (1952) taxonomy are not clear cut in most extreme events. 
One phase does not necessarily end when another phase begins. This is especially the case for 
events which take place over a large area such as floods or bushfires, or for cascading events 
which build upon the effects of the event; for example, a potential health crisis caused by a 
flooding event.  
2.2.2.2 Prevent, Prepare, Respond and Recover Model 
EMOs typically structure their activities around the Prevent, Prepare, Respond and Recover 
(PPRR) model (Cronstedt 2002). The PPRR model evolved in the 1970s in the United States 
and defines a disaster in three phases: pre-event, event, and post-event. In Australia, this model 
backgrounds many processes of EMOs and their view of the emergency management domain 
(Bunker and Smith 2009).  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Prevent Prepare Respond Recover (PPRR) Model as sequential phases in 
emergency management  
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The PPRR model is often seen as a sequential model. However, the model is intended as a 
comprehensive all-hazards approach towards emergency management, which takes into 
account that it is not enough to just wait for an emergency event to occur and then react towards 
the effects of the event (Koob 1998). The PPRR model is often represented in a sequential stage 
model, as shown in Figure 2.4, in which two stages of the model are in the pre-event phase, 
and two stages of the model take place in the post-disaster phase.  
 
However, the PPRR model is intended to be seen as an integrated approach, or comprehensive 
approach towards emergency and disaster management. In this view, the PPRR model shows 
different aspects of emergency and disaster management in order to be effective in the 
countering of such disrupting events (Koob 1998, p. 24).   
 
 
Figure 2.5 PPRR Model as important aspects of emergency management 
 
The first component “Prevent” sometimes also known as “Mitigation”, refers to EMOs putting 
measures in place to prevent emergency events, or at least mitigate the effects (Koob 1998, p. 
89). Such measures can be, for example, community education about different events and how 
they occur. Or in the case of bushfire prevention, there are back-burning operations in which 
the plant fuel load is reduced through controlled fires before the main bushfire season starts.  
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The second component of the PPRR model is “Prepare”. On the one hand, this component 
refers to the preparedness of EMOs so that all the resources and services which are needed 
during emergency events are in place to respond towards an event when needed. On the other 
hand, it refers to measures ensuring that the communities which might be affected by an event 
are able to cope with such an event. For example, this is supported through community 
education measures (Koob 1998, p. 88).   
 
“Respond” refers to the classical emergency management. Depending on the event 
characteristics, the emergency response usually takes place immediately after an emergency 
event occurs or while such an event is still unfolding. Emergency management response and 
other EMOs try to counter the effects of an event and minimise these effects on the environment 
or the affected communities (Koob 1998, p. 94). Furthermore, the EMOs attempt to provide 
immediate relief towards the members of the community who were negatively affected by an 
event.  
 
The last component of the PPRR model is “Recover”. This refers to a coordinated process to 
support affected communities in rebuilding the physical infrastructure back to a level as it was 
before an emergency event disrupted a community or multiple communities (Koob 1998, p. 
92). However, recovery goes deeper than that. It also focuses on the support to ensure regaining 
emotional and economic wellbeing of communities.  
2.3 Emergency Management Organisations 
Emergency Management can be defined as “the discipline and profession of applying science, 
technology, planning and management to deal with extreme events that can injure or kill large 
numbers of people, do extensive damage to property, and disrupt community life” (Hoetmer 
1991). 
 
Emergency management and emergency response organisations are the organisations which 
perform most of the activities of government-led emergency and disaster management. These 
organisations are structured hierarchically and have command and control systems and 
processes in place. 
 
The previous section, outlined some of the activities and responsibilities of these organisations 
during the different phases of the PPRR model which underlie most of these organisations. In 
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this section, EMOs are defined and some concepts which are important to understand their 
specific needs and constraints when it comes to the utilisation of social media for disaster 
management are described. In particular, large-scale volunteer organisations are outlined, as 
the case organisations in this study are of this particular type. Large-scale volunteer 
organisations are defined where a large amount of the members of the organisations volunteer 
their time to be part of the organisation.  
 
Volunteers in this context are trained volunteers who are affiliated members of the organisation 
(Ranse and Carter 2010). This form of volunteering is in sharp contrast to untrained 
spontaneous volunteers who often attempt to provide their help after an emergency incident 
occurred (Shahid and Elbanna 2015). In the context of EMOs, volunteers are trained 
individuals who specialise in the core work of their specific organisation, for instance, fighting 
bush fires.     
 
The EMO volunteers are required to complete a basic training course to become full members 
of their organisation. Over time and with increasing experience in their extreme event type, the 
members normally undertake additional specialised training. In order to ensure high training 
standards, the volunteer members of such organisations meet on a periodical basis to train 
together in order to stay prepared to respond to emergency events (Ranse and Carter 2010).  
 
In the following three sub-sections, I outline the holonic nature of EMOs, focus on two modes 
of operation, and provide an introduction to the shift towards community resilience and 
community engagement.  
2.3.1 Emergency Management Organisations as Holonic Systems  
EMOs can be seen as hierarchically structured social systems with command and control 
mechanism in place. The whole organisation consists of several organisational units which in 
themselves consist of sub-organisational units.  
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Figure 2.6 Structure of Emergency Management Organisations 
 
Each sub-system when observed by itself can be seen as a complete and confined system. 
However, when seen in the context of the overarching organisation, it is just a small part of the 
organisation and not whole in itself.  
 
To illustrate this, let us observe a simplified fire organisation. The organisation has a brigade 
which is part of a small rural town or village. A brigade is a fire station with firefighters and 
fire trucks. This particular brigade responds to the fire events associated with this town. When 
the fire events are not too big, the brigade responds to these events without support from other 
brigades of the organisation. From the perspective of the headquarters of the organisation, this 
particular brigade only receives the order to respond to a particular event. The brigade is thus 
a completely confined system with firefighters and fire trucks able to respond to emergency 
events. 
 
To drill down a bit further, the brigade uses a fire truck to respond to the emergency event. This 
fire truck is also a complete and confined system which can respond to the fire. This system 
consists of the equipment and the different firefighters trained to fulfil their function. However, 
when we look at the overarching organisation, the fire truck is just a small part of the 
organisation, one unit under many. In other words, it is a subsystem of the overarching system. 
The fire truck belongs to a fire brigade in which a commander commands several fire trucks. 
The brigade is most likely part of a fire district. Several of these districts are structured into a 
region. Several regions themselves are then coordinated and controlled through the 
headquarters of the organisation.  
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On the other hand, the fire truck is also not atomic and consists of several subsystems. On this 
fire truck, we have several teams of firefighters, a driver and the truck commander, which are 
themselves a confined system. At the lowest level of the organisation, we have a firefighter 
trained in a specific way. So, in the system of a fire organisation, a single fire truck is both a 
confined system consisting of subsystems, and at the same time a subsystem itself. 
 
The systems are a hierarchically structured emergency response organisation, with command 
and control patterns in place. The higher up we go on this hierarchy, the more the system has 
coordinating functions during an emergency event. While at the lower level of the hierarchy, 
the actual physical response towards a crisis event takes place and the command and control 
structures are stricter. Arthur Koestler created the term Holonic Systems to refer to systems 
which are constructed through hierarchically structured sub-systems (Koestler 1967). 
 
Koestler used a parable of the two watchmakers1, which can be found in the footnote, to 
illustrate the view that parts of systems are at the same time components of an overarching 
                                                        
1 The Two Watchmakers 
“There once were two watchmakers, named Bios and Mekhos, who made very fine watches. 
The phones in their workshops rang frequently; new customers were constantly calling them. 
However, Bios prospered while Mekhos became poorer and poorer. In the end, Mekhos lost his 
shop and worked as a mechanic for Bios. What was the reason behind this? 
The watches consisted of about 1000 parts each. The watches that Mekhos made were designed 
such that, when he had to put down a partly assembled watch (for instance, to answer the 
phone), it immediately fell into pieces and had to be completely reassembled from the basic 
elements. On the other hand, Bios designed his watches so that he could put together sub-
assemblies of about ten components each. Ten of these subassemblies could be put together to 
make a larger sub-assembly. Finally, ten of the larger subassemblies constituted the whole 
watch. When Bios had to put his watches down to attend to some interruption they did not 
break up into their elemental parts but only into their sub-assemblies. 
Now, the watchmakers were each disturbed at the same rate of once per hundred assembly 
operations. However, due to their different assembly methods, it took Mekhos four thousand 
times longer than Bios to complete a single watch.”  
Herbert Simon (adapted from Ghost of the Machine) (Koestler 1967) 
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system and a system itself. Koestler argues that this is valid for all systems when we look 
closely enough, but especially for social systems. Arthur Koestler defined this type of system 
as an Holonic System.  
 
The word Holon refers to something which is at the same time a part of something and a whole 
in itself. “Holon” is constructed from the Greek word “holos”, which means whole, and the 
suffix “on”, which indicates that it is a part of something, as in “proton”. 
 
Koestler argues that a system consists of structured sub-systems. He further argues that the 
system in itself is part of an overarching system. It only depends on the current viewpoint of 
the observer whether a system is seen as a complete system or rather as a subsystem. This 
characteristic of a holon is described by Koestler as Janus-faced. Derived from the Roman two-
faced god of beginning and ending who looks up and down at the same time. Similar to Janus, 
the holon looks up being part of something bigger, and looks down into its sub-systems.  
 
The individual sub-systems are autonomous units that operate independently to some extent. 
In the example of the volunteer EMOs, we could look at different units or brigades that respond 
to the effects of an event on the ground without the help of the central organisation. However, 
holons are still under the control of the overarching system.  
 
When we observe EMOs, the structure of a holarchy is especially evident. Such organisations 
are typically constituted out of autarkic systems which are structured into the larger 
organisation. This is especially evident in the large volunteer organisations. For example, the 
state emergency services or rural fire services in Eastern Australia. 
2.3.2 The two modes of operation of Emergency Management Organisations 
EMOs operate in two different modes of operation: The day-to-day function, and emergency 
event operation wherein they respond to an event. The interview informants within the Case 
Organisations called the modes of operation the (1) operational mode, and the (2) non-
operational mode. I am using this terminology when I refer to these two different modes of 
operation and their influence. 
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The operational mode refers to the classical emergency management activities necessary when 
an organisation responds towards an event. The activities would be clustered under the 
Respond dimension of the PPRR model 
 
The non-operational mode refers to the normal day-to-day function of the organisation. These 
include the activities necessary to run the organisation. For example, human resources, asset 
management, or finance activities, but also training and preparation for emergency events. 
Most staff members in the headquarters of the organisations have different responsibilities in 
the two modes of operation. One responsibility is their day-to-day job in the non-operational 
mode, and then they have responsibility relevant to emergency management during the 
operational mode.  
 
It is important to highlight that not all parts of the organisation are in the operational mode at 
the same time. The different sub-systems, or holons, in the organisation operate to a certain 
extent independently and in autarkic fashion. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that whole 
organisations switch from the non-operational mode into the operational mode. With the 
example of the fictional fire organisation used in the previous section, it is possible that there 
is a localised fire to which one brigade is responding. In this case, the brigade switches from 
its non-operational mode into the operational mode. However, the rest of the organisation is 
still in the non-operational mode. In the case that the fire is expanding and more resources are 
necessary to counter the event, more parts of the organisation switch into the operational mode.   
2.3.3 Paradigm shift towards Community Engagement and Community 
Resilience 
In the recent years, there has been a shift in the Australian Emergency Management sector from 
seeing the general public as something that needs to be protected to strengthening communities 
as a valuable resource to mitigate the effects of an emergency event.  
 
In the past, Emergency response organisations in Australia only had a minor role in the 
recovery phase of emergency extreme events. The traditional role of the EMOs involved 
containing an emergency incident and reducing the effects of such an incident. Their focus was 
ensuring the least loss of life and property in emergency events (Bunker and Sleigh 2016). This 
42 
view has changed in recent years towards community resilience. A catalysing event to advance 
this shift of focus were the Black Saturday Bushfires in Victoria in 20092.  
  
The Victorian 2009 Bushfire Royal Commission analysed the event and its management 
(Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010). The Commission and its report had a 
significant impact on the Australian Emergency Management sector (Bunker and Sleigh 2016). 
Following this report, the emergency management paradigm shifted more towards community 
support for and during emergency extreme events.  
 
This shift resulted in community resilience and education projects in which the community is 
actively prepared for potential emergency events. It is clear that communities need to lead their 
own recovery. In addition, the state and EMOs have assisted the communities with financial 
and other resources as well as with advice (Bunker and Sleigh 2016).  
 
Social media services are one aspect through which EMOs are supporting community 
resilience. These EMOs are utilising their social media communication channels to educate the 
community and to provide emergency relevant information and advice (Ehnis and Bunker 
2013). 
2.4 Social Media  
In the previous sections, the background for the concepts of emergency management used 
within this thesis were provided. This included an outline of emergency events, and 
characteristics of large-scale volunteer emergency response organisations as a subset of 
hierarchically structured organisations. In the following section, specifics of social media 
technology are focused on. Social media is firstly defined, examples of specific social media 
technologies are provided which could be and are currently in use within the emergency 
management field.  
                                                        
2 The Black Saturday bushfires were one of the most devastating bushfire disasters in Australia. The event brought 
the existing disaster and emergency management structures to failure and in its aftermath the coordination between 
emergency management organisations in the state Victoria was reformed. The Black Saturday Bushfires were one 
of the most devastating bushfire disasters in Australia. The event consisted of a series of bushfires in the state of 
Victoria in February 2009. The most damaging fire events occurred at Saturday the 7th of February 2009. In total 
173 people lost their lives, and 414 people were injured during the fires. More than 2000 buildings were destroyed 
during the extreme event (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010). 
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2.4.1 The Concept of Social Media  
Social media as we know it in its current form started to emerge with the shift in thinking from 
the Internet as a channel to distributed static information, to the so-called Web 2.0 in the early 
2000s (O'Reilly 2005) where the user is not a passive consumer, but rather a co-creator of 
information. Social media in itself is an umbrella term which includes a variety of different 
technologies and design practices; all of which have their core in the creation and exchange of 
user-generated content (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010).  
 
The underlying structure of social media is nothing new; as Kane et al. (Kane et al. 2014) 
outline, it is difficult to clearly categorise social media technologies from pre-descending 
collaborative Information System technologies such as USENET (Butler 2001), group decision 
support systems (Poole and DeSanctis 1989), or knowledge management systems (Alavi and 
Leidner 2001). The core concept of social media technology is user-generated content (Kaplan 
and Haenlein 2010). The previously mentioned technologies also focus on user-generated 
content within their core. It can be argued that social media is not a technological advancement, 
but rather, a specific shift in design principles of how social platforms are designed and used.  
 
The two large platforms which are closely associated with the term social media are the 
microblogging platform Twitter and the social networking site Facebook; Twitter was 
established in 2006 and Facebook in 2004. The technologies have been only around for the last 
decade in these forms, but are largely influenced by how we in western society consume news 
(Gil de Zúñiga 2012), interact with friends and families (Boyd and Ellison 2008), share 
information about our personal life's (Boyd and Ellison 2008), interact with people we do not 
have existing offline relationships such as celebrities (Kane et al. 2014), or create and consume 
information (Kane and Fichman 2009). 
 
So what do we actually mean when we talk about social media? The term “social media” as we 
know it emerged with the so-called Web 2.0 in the early 2000s (O'Reilly 2005). It is less a 
specific technology but rather design principles for internet based platforms (Kaplan and 
Haenlein 2010). The integral part of social media is the user-generated content (Kaplan and 
Haenlein 2010).   
 
Social media has been widely adopted, however, the specific understanding of the 
technological impact for organisational purposes is only still in its infancy (Kane et al. 2014). 
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Social media technologies, especially with the advent of smartphones and other mobile devices, 
highly influenced how people communicate in day-to-day interactions and during extreme 
events (Chew and Eysenbach 2010; Mirbabaie et al. 2014). EMOs have started to integrate 
social media services (Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2013; Latonero and Shklovski 
2013; Potter 2016; Procter et al. 2013) into their communication practices. The early adoption 
in the emergency management sector began after social media services were widely adopted 
around 2007 (Latonero and Shklovski 2010; Sutton et al. 2008).  
 
In Australia, the early adoption for the case organisations started around 2009. The Queensland 
Floods in 2011 (Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2012) were a defining moment for social 
media utilisation in the Australian Emergency Management sector. During this extreme event, 
the Queensland Police Service (Queensland Police Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 
2011) demonstrated that social media is a valuable tool to communicate information towards 
the general public during times of emergency. Afterwards, the remaining larger Australian 
emergency response organisations intensified their social media engagement. It is not a surprise 
that the utilisation of social media services for emergency management purposes is still in its 
infancy, however, as social media technologies are fast-changing and evolving. We still do not 
fully grasp or understand the implications for EMOs and their practices on how they respond 
to extreme events and disasters.  
 
While EMOs are aware of different social media channels, their main utilisation for emergency 
management are the social microblogging platform Twitter and the social networking site 
Facebook (Fosso Wamba and Edwards 2014); remaining social media technologies have a 
supporting role. In the following section, an overview of social media technologies is described 
and their link to the emergency management field is outlined.  
2.4.2 Relevant Social Media Technologies 
Figure 2.7 shows different manifestations of social media technologies as particular platforms. 
Nowadays, it can be difficult to classify a particular social media platform to a specific social 
media technology. The technological boundaries between platforms are disappearing. As 
different providers introduce features into their platforms, boundaries showing the core of a 
social media technology are being blurred (Kane et al. 2014). For example, Twitter has several 
capabilities which would be associated with social networking sites; Facebook, on the other 
hand, has broad microblogging capabilities. Both platforms have capabilities for content 
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sharing, such as the sharing of images and videos. These factors make it more difficult to 
classify what can be counted as a specific social media technology and what cannot (Kane et 
al. 2014). Different examples of social media technologies are now discussed and the link to 
their usage function in the emergency management field is described.   
 
Figure 2.7 Selection of Different Social Media Technologies 
2.4.2.1 Social Networking Sites 
Originally social networking sites referred to websites, but with the ascent of mobile 
technology such as smartphones, social networking sites extended themselves into integrated 
platforms which are not bound to the form of a website (Ellison and Boyd 2013). 
 
Social networking sites can be defined in several different ways. It becomes more difficult over 
time to show what the core functionalities of such social networking sites are since the 
platforms continue to add additional functionalities. Kane et al (Kane et al. 2014) build their 
definition of social networking sites around the definition described by Boyd and Ellison 
(2008). This particular view defines social networking sites as Internet-based services, which 
allow their users: to (1) have a unique user profile constructed by the user, by members of their 
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network, and by the platform; (2) access digital content and protect it from various search 
mechanisms provided by the platform; (3) can articulate a list of other users with whom they 
share relational connection; and (4) view and traverse their connections and those made by 
others on the platform (Kane et al. 2014).  
 
Social networking sites are platforms on which users create a representation of their social 
network; these social networks do not necessarily represent the offline social networks of the 
particular users. A participant on a social networking platform can interact with other users of 
their particular social network through that social networking platform. The connections 
between users of the platform are normally bidirectional; this means that one user is instigating 
a connection between two user accounts. The user who receives a request to build a connection 
between the user accounts needs to agree to it. After the connection is established both users 
receive the information the other person is sharing on their user profile. This, of course, is 
ignoring the privacy settings and filtering capacities of the particular social media platform.  
 
Social networking sites often have a second type of user profile intended for organisations, 
interest groups, or celebrities. On Facebook, this type of user profile is called “Pages”. For 
simplification, this special user profile can also be described as a ‘page’ in the more general 
concept of social networking site in general. These types of profiles have a unidirectional 
connection. When a particular user is interested in receiving the shared information from a 
page, they can establish a connection with this special user profile. Afterwards, the user who 
established the connection will receive all shared information from the page, but not the other 
way around.  
 
EMOs which are active on social networking sites have established one or multiple pages for 
their organisations. The users who are interested in information which is provided by the EMOs 
through the social networking site are following the pages of the particular EMO. The users 
who are following an EMO are referred to as the “listening community” within this thesis since 
they have actively requested to receive information from the organisation (Ehnis and Bunker 
2013).  
2.4.2.2 Microblogging Platforms 
The intention of microblogging is to share short messages, often restricted in their size. The 
most famous example of a social microblogging platform is Twitter which is a platform where 
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users can share short messages with a limit of 140 characters. Twitter also has a lot of 
capabilities of a social networking site, such as profiles or the ability to connect with other 
users; however, the platform’s main focus is the sharing of the short messages and can, 
therefore, be classified as a microblogging service. The other social networking capabilities, 
such as user profiles, have less dominant roles within this platform (Kwak et al. 2010). 
 
The user connections are often one-way, and not two-way as in several classical social 
networking sites. On Twitter, users follow another user, which means they establish a one-way 
connection with this user. When the followed user shares a particular message, then the 
followers of this user will receive this message on their personal Twitter interface or connecting 
client. However, the followed user will not see the messages of the following users. If both 
users want to receive messages of the other user, they need to follow each other.  
 
Twitter data has favourable characteristics for conducting social media research studies 
(Stieglitz et al. 2014). For example, Tweets are generally visible to everyone on the Twitter 
platform since Twitter has a much more simplified privacy model than, for example, Facebook. 
This makes it relatively easy to collect Twitter data and analyse the datasets. Facebook, in 
contrast, has very detailed privacy settings of who can receive specific messages. For example, 
“friends” only, or also “friends” of “friends”, or only specific “friends”. This makes it very 
difficult to collect large datasets for research purposes.  
 
The social microblogging platform Twitter and the social networking site Facebook often build 
the core of the social media capabilities of EMOs (Ehnis et al. 2014; Fosso Wamba and 
Edwards 2014; Heverin and Zach 2010; Potter 2016; Procter et al. 2013); as shown in Chapter 
6, all the Case Organisations within this thesis are utilising these two platforms as their primary 
platforms for emergency management. The remaining social media services are seen as 
supplementary support platforms. EMOs are not focused on the social networking capabilities 
of Facebook, but rather on the microblogging capabilities to send emergency management 
relevant messages and other information towards their listening communities (Ehnis and 
Bunker 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2013). 
2.4.2.3 Image and Video Sharing Platforms  
Image and video sharing platforms are platforms which are used to share media content such 
as photos or video material (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010).  
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For emergency management, there are broad applications for such technologies. On the one 
hand these platforms are used by the public to share event relevant images or videos. On the 
other hand, EMOs are utilising such platforms to share information about their organisations 
and for emergency management purposes, such as community education.   
 
One of the biggest video sharing platforms is YouTube. Examples for image sharing platforms 
are Instagram or Flickr. 
2.4.2.4 Wikis  
Wikis are platforms for knowledge management. These platforms consist of collections of 
often interlinked webpages, which refer to each other. Users of Wikis can not just access the 
information which is stored in the wikis; they can also change or contribute to this information. 
The most famous example for a Wiki is the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. 
 
For emergency management wikis can be utilised for internal and external knowledge 
management. Internal knowledge management would refer to information which is shared and 
managed within the organisations; external knowledge management would refer to information 
which is shared with other organisations for example the public. EMOs utilised wikis to share 
knowledge between different organisations during the management of the effects of the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010 (Yates and Paquette 2011). 
2.4.2.5 Collaborative Maps  
Collaborative web maps is a crowdsourcing (Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-De-
Guevara 2012) approach where users create and annotate maps through specialised social 
media platforms (Shahid and Elbanna 2015). The Ushahidi project is one the best-known 
initiative of crowdsourced collaborative mapping (Morrow et al. 2011). This project was 
initiated during the Haiti earthquake in 2010 (Morrow et al. 2011; Yates and Paquette 2011) in 
support to provide maps for the emergency response. 
 
Another very successful crowd mapping project was that which was created during the 
Typhoon Haiyan response. The typhoon hit the Philippines in November 2013. The maps 
created during this mapping initiative were used in the coordinated response and recovery of 
the event (Shahid and Elbanna 2015).   
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Case organisations studied in this project are interested in crowd mapping approaches and data, 
however, these approaches, or maps resulting from these approaches, are not currently being 
utilised within the case organisations for emergency management purposes.    
2.5 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a background of relevant concepts for emergency 
management used in this thesis. The chapter was structured in three parts: A section on 
emergency events and their different phases (section 2.2); a section on EMOs (section 2.3); and 
a section on social media (section 2.4). 
 
Emergency events are referred to by different names, such as incidents, emergency event, or 
disaster. How an event is referred to depends on its size as well as on the event typology. 
Different ways of how the various phases of emergency and disaster management are structured 
have also been described: Brian Houston’s (2012) three phase model, Powell and Raynor 
(1952) more detailed disaster stage taxonomy, and the broadly used Prevent, Prepare, Respond 
and Recover Model (PPRR).  
 
The PPRR model is often seen as a disaster stage model, however, it is actually intended as a 
comprehensive underlying model addressing the different aspects of emergency management. 
The PPRR model is used as a basis for most emergency management relevant activities in 
Australian EMOs.   
 
EMOs are hierarchical organisations with strict command and control systems in place. 
Koestler’s (Koestler 1967) concept of Holonic Systems was introduced as a lens to highlight 
the partially independent autarkic sub-systems of such organisations, which are still highly 
integrated and depended on the overall organisation (system). 
 
Emergency organisations operate in two modes of operation: the ‘operational mode’, and the 
‘non-operational’ mode. The ‘operational mode’ is the mode in which the organisation is 
responding towards an emergency event, and the ‘non-operational’ mode is the mode of the 
day-to-day operation. The switch from one mode of operation into the other can be fluid, and 
not all parts of the operation are necessarily in the same mode of operation at the same time. 
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Social media services are Internet-based platforms with the focus on user-generated content 
(Kane et al. 2014; Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). These platforms are less specific technologies, 
but rather, design principles on how to develop internet based platforms (Kaplan and Haenlein 
2010). Nowadays, social media platforms are difficult to classify into specific categories as the 
borders of capabilities of these platforms are getting blurred through the introduction of similar 
features (Kane et al. 2014). Different social media technology types are used in different ways 
by EMOs for emergency and disaster management. 
 
In the next Chapter, the results of the literature review about social media in disaster 
management are described, with the focus on the utilisation of social media services in EMOs. 
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Chapter 3 - Literature Review and Research Objectives 
The progress of science is strewn, like an ancient desert trail, with the bleached skeleton of 
discarded theories which once seemed to possess eternal life. 
Arthur Koestler (1959) 
3.1 Introduction  
In the endeavour to create knowledge, it is inevitable to engage with the existing literature 
contributing to the relevant body of knowledge; in other words, to know where we are going 
we need to understand where we are coming from.  
 
In the third section of the previous chapter, the concept of social media is linked to emergency 
and disaster management operations. In this chapter, the relevant literature describing of what 
we know about social media utilisation in emergency and disaster management and particular 
how EMOs utilise social media technologies is outlined. From the literature, a research gap 
and the research questions are identified, which are later answered in this thesis. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the Chapter is structured as follows. First, in section 3.2 the approach 
used to analyse the literature is described. Afterwards, in section 3.3 an overview of the current 
literature of social media in disaster management is outlined. The literature review resulted in 
four clusters of distinct research areas. These four research areas include: the potential of social 
media for disaster management (section 3.3.1); structure and behaviour of whole occurring 
communication networks during disasters and other extreme events (section 3.3.2); the 
investigation of why and for what the general public is using social media in extreme events 
(section 3.3.3); and research about social media utilisation of EMOs (section 3.3.4). The 
intention of the first three clusters is to outline the research context, while the fourth cluster is 
used to unwrap our current understanding of how EMOs have integrated social media services 
into their organisations. Furthermore, this fourth cluster also highlights the gap in our current 
knowledge.  
 
Following the results of the literature review, in section 3.4 a framework of social media in 
disaster management, which was created by Ashir Ahmed (2011) is closely analysed. This 
framework was used as an underlying lens during this research, and is extended through the 
result of the data analysis in Chapter 7.    
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The last section (3.5) of the chapter highlights the research aims of this thesis and shows the 
research questions derived from the literature analysis.  
 
Figure 3.1 Outline Chapter 3 
3.2 Literature Review Approach 
 
There are several approaches on a how literature review could be conducted (Boell and Cecez-
Kecmanovic 2014; vom Brocke et al. 2015). All of these approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, in structured literature reviews (vom Brocke et al. 2015), it is 
possible that the researcher is overburdened by the vast amount of available literature and it is 
not possible to analyse the collected articles in a meaningful way (Boell and Cecez-
Kecmanovic 2015). On the other hand, in a hermeneutic literature review (Boell and Cecez-
Kecmanovic 2014) approach it is possible that the researcher misses an important piece of 
relevant literature.   
 
For this thesis, a hermeneutic literature review approach as described by Boell and Cecez-
Kecmanovic (2014) was followed. The basic idea behind this approach is that the literature 
review is divided into two intertwined iterative hermeneutic cycles, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The first cycle is the search and acquisition, and the second circle is the analysis and 
interpretation.  
3.2	Literature	Review	Approach
3.3	Results	– Literature	Review	of
Social	Media	in	Emergency	and	
Disaster	Management
3.3.1	Potential	of	Social	Media	in	Emergency	and	
Disaster	Management
3.3.2	Structure	and	Behaviour of	Emergency	Social	
Media	Communication	Networks
3.3.3	General	Public	Use	of	Social	Media	during	
Emergency	Events
3.3.4	Emergency	Management	Organisations Use	of	
Social	Media	
3.4	Framework	– Social	Media	in	Disaster	Management
3.5	Research	Aims	and	Questions
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Figure 3.2 Hermeneutic framework for the literature review process reproduced from Boell 
and Cecez-Kecmanovic (2014) 
 
The researcher already has some idea or preconceived understanding about the research area 
before a project is started. With these preconceived ideas, the researcher then acquires relevant 
literature. The initial search for literature is typically done through keyword searches in 
relevant literature databases. Relevant literature is selected and acquired then more literature is 
selected as a result of analytical reading of the already selected literature.  
 
By analytical reading of the relevant literature, the researcher can switch into the second 
hermeneutic cycle of analysing and interpreting. There the literature is mapped and classified 
and critically assessed. With the help of the literature, the argument is further developed, and 
the research problem is further defined. The researcher switches back into the first hermeneutic 
cycle to search and acquire more relevant literature to define the argument further. The 
researcher leaves the hermeneutic cycles when the acquired additional literature becomes no 
longer helpful in refining the argument.   
 
The initial literature acquisition was done through keyword searches in the literature databases 
Scopus and Google Scholar. These searches were repeated on a periodical basis throughout the 
project to ensure that important literature published while the research was being conducted 
was included. From this set of literature, a snowballed analysis of the literature was conducted 
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approaches, findings and knowledge claims in individual texts. Through reading we develop better understanding of 
each text and embark on a route of clarification and insight into different texts and how they relate, that is, the wider 
analysis and interpretation circle. It is analytical reading, mapping and classification as well as critical assessment of 
the selected publications that address the problem of confusion and a lack of understanding of the emerging whole – 
the body of literature. Furthermore, developing clarification in this circle goes beyond sorting, comparing, and 
contrasting. It involves the creation of a distinct (ideally original) perspective on the literature that arises from the 
dialogical engagement and the fusion of horizons among researcher and numerous texts. A particular perspective 
on literature thus enables the researcher to grasp and critically asses the state of knowledge in the targeted domain 
and reveal important shortcomings or failures in dealing with the research problem. This also allows the 
development of new linkages among concepts and theories and new synthesis.  
The Wittgensteinian view of the two hermeneutic circles – seeking information and clarification/insight – reminds us 
that they need to be harmoniously intertwined. Overemphasizing the searching for literature will lead to increasing 
confusion, while overemphasizing the literature analysis and interpretation at the expense of searching will lead to 
ignorance.  
 
 
Figure 1. A hermeneutic framework for the literature review 
process consisting of two major hermeneutic circles 
 
The process of developing understanding of the relevant literature through the hermeneutic circles seems never-
ending. New sources and ways of interpreting and developing meanings that hang together somewhat differently 
can always emerge. This raises the question: how does literature review as a hermeneutic enterprise converge and 
eventually produce a well grounded, novel and interesting outcome? We answer this question by going deeper into 
the hermeneutic circles of the literature review process and by discussing the challenges in individual activities and 
potential strategies to cope with them within both circles. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION – THE WIDER CIRCLE 
The analysis and interpretation circle starts with more or less clear ideas about a research problem or a topic, and 
continues within the ‘search and acquisition’ circle, from which at some point the reading progresses to mapping and 
classifying, critical assessment, and argument development, often leading to the revised research problem and a 
new circle of literature searching, reading, mapping and classifying, and so on. Typically a literature review 
document is produced through several iterations through this circle. We describe here the analysis and interpretation 
circle first and then proceed with a d scription of the search and acquisition circle in the next secti n. An overview of 
the analysis and interpretation circle is provided in Table 1.  
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following the hermeneutic literature review framework as described above. The results of the 
literature review are presented in the following section.  
3.3 Resulting Literature Review of Social Media in Emergency and Disaster 
Management 
Social media services are already an established component in the emerging extreme event 
communication practices even though their integration into EMOs is not well understood. 
Social media in extreme event communication could be already observed on a local scale 
(Sutton et al. 2008) shortly after Facebook and Twitter established themselves over a decade 
ago.  
 
On a global scale, interest on social media as a relevant crisis communication media for 
emergency and disaster management emerged in 2010 through the Haiti earthquake (Yates and 
Paquette 2011). The defining event for the Australian emergency management sector were the 
2011 Queensland Floods which showed that social media services are useful and integral 
communication channels to communicate relevant event information from emergency 
organisations towards the public (Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Queensland Police 
Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 2011).  
 
Social media communication accompanies every major extreme event. Scholars are analysing 
the communication behaviours around such events. Events in which social media data were 
studied include, but not limited to, the 2007 Southern California Wildfire (Sutton et al. 2008), 
Virginia Tech shootings in 2007 (Palen et al. 2009; Vieweg et al. 2008), the 2008 Mumbai 
Terror Attacks (Goolsby 2010; Oh et al. 2010), the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Starbird and Palen 
2011; Yates and Paquette 2011), the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Sutton et al. 2012), the 
2011 Queensland Floods (Bruns 2011; Bruns et al. 2012; Cheong and Cheong 2011; Ehnis and 
Bunker 2012),the 2011 London Riots (Procter et al. 2013), the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes 
(Bunker et al. 2013), the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing (Ehnis and Bunker 2013), Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012 (Lachlan et al. 2014), the Nepal earthquakes in 2015 (Subba and Bui 2017), or 
the Brussel Terror Attacks in 2016 (Stieglitz et al. 2017). 
 
The review of the literature resulted in four distinct groups of research areas: (1) the potential 
of social media for disaster management, (2) structure and behaviour of emerging emergency 
social media communication networks, (3) research of why and for what purposes the general 
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public is using social media in extreme events, and (4) research about social media utilisation 
of EMOs. In the followings sections, these research streams are outlined and discussed. 
3.3.1 Potential of Social Media in Emergency and Disaster Management 
Overall, there is a broad potential for social media services in EMOs for the purposes of 
emergency and disaster management. Social media has the possibilities of one-to-many, one-
to-one, many-to-one, and many-to-many communication; this is a valuable contribution for the 
classical communication channel, which is either one-to-one communication or a one-to-many 
broadcasting channel. Social media is not restricted to be used as a one-way information 
“megaphone”, but can be as well used as two-way information dissemination and 
communication channel (Ahmed 2011; Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Palen and Liu 2007; Potter 
2016). Furthermore, this information technology has the structure to be used as a peer-to-peer 
citizen participation platform (Bruns 2011). The crowd-sourced distributed mapping platform 
Ushahidi (Morrow et al. 2011) is a good example of such a participation platform (Bruns 2011). 
Social media can contribute to community emergency preparedness and response to emergency 
events (Palen and Liu 2007). For disaster management purposes, social media technology is 
not limited to be used for long-term follower relationships, but also to support disaster 
management as an ad-hoc crisis communication and collaboration platform (Goolsby 2010).  
 
Social media can assist EMOs with the opportunity to gather information from the affected 
area of the disaster event and evaluate this information outside the disaster zone. This 
information, which can come from witnesses and first responders, can be available at a very 
early stage of the disaster response, but possibly may not be fully correct. Nevertheless, this 
information can give the EMOs an initial detailed impression of the event (Underwood 2010). 
A threat is that rumours can spread like wildfires over these channels, but research has shown 
that virtual social networks tend to favour valid information over rumours while suppressing 
rumours and false information over time (Castillo et al. 2011). 
 
Ashir Ahmed (Ahmed 2011) developed a framework on the use of social media in disaster 
management. This framework was built with the help of interim results of a research in progress 
study about the potential of the use of social media in natural disasters in Australia. The view 
on social media concentrates on microblogging and image and video sharing platforms. Social 
media is seen as a communication and information dissemination channel. The relevant social 
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media communication is divided into three communication dimensions: agency-to-agency, 
community-to-community, and agency-to-community.  
 
The agency-to-agency dimension refers to communication between agencies through social 
media. The dimension of social media in the community-to-community interaction refers to 
the communication between the general public. This kind of communication emerges during 
every major extreme event. The community often interacts in self-organising practices during 
the extreme event; an example of social media for self-organisation would be the Christchurch 
Student Volunteer Army, which started to use publicly available social media services as a 
platform to create an organised volunteer relief after several local earthquake events (Bunker 
et al. 2013). The third dimension, the agency-to-community interaction, refers to the 
communication between EMOs and the community. An example for agency-community 
interaction would be the social media usage of the Queensland police service during the 
Queensland floods in 2011 (Bruns et al. 2012). In this thesis, the agency-to-community and 
agency-to-agency communication dimensions are explored. Ahmed’s (2011) framework is 
used as an underlying lens for this research and is looked at in more detail in section 3.4 and 
later in Chapter 7.     
3.3.2 Structure and Behaviour of Emergency Social Media Communication 
Networks 
There is a broad research stream that investigates the emerging communication networks 
occurring through social media during extreme events. This research focuses on different 
interaction patterns of the participating actors and explores why these patterns are in place. As 
a data source, most of these studies investigate Twitter datasets collected during different 
extreme events. The reason for using Twitter as a data source is the relatively simple privacy 
structure of this platform (Stieglitz et al. 2014); Tweets can either be private or public. 
Facebook, on the other hand, has a very complex privacy structure underneath in which a user 
can decide what kinds of posts are visible for which user-groups.  
 
Vieweg et al. (2010) analysed and compared Twitter messages broadcasted during two 
emergency events in 2009; One of the events was a grassfire event, and the other one was a 
flooding event. The aim of the study was to understand to what extent microblogging data 
could be used for situational awareness for both EMOs and the general public. Only a small 
number of tweets have geo-location data added with latitude and longitude; still, the study 
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showed, that the geo-location in additional tweets could be crudely inferred through 
information from the message in a tweet itself. The tweets were coded into different situational 
categories, which indicated that social media messages have a high potential to be used to build 
situational awareness about ongoing emergency events. Herfort et al. (2014) found that Tweets 
which were posted geographically close to an emergency event are often more emergency 
management relevant. While the further away from an event a Tweet is posted, the more it 
contains only commentary information. 
 
The floods of Eastern Australia in 2011 is a well-studied event. These were serious flooding 
events that happened in all three Eastern States in Australia (Queensland, New South Wales, 
and Victoria). The most prominent flood events were the floods in Queensland, which are often 
referred to as the 2011 Queensland Floods. Social networking analysis techniques were applied 
to identify active social media actors and their opportunity to disseminate information in order 
to examine the emerging online networks during the Australian floods in Queensland, New 
South Wales and Victoria in 2010/2011 (Cheong and Cheong 2011). The study showed that 
local authorities, especially the Queensland Police Service, were very active in the distribution 
of relevant information about the emergency event, in contrast to the local authorities in New 
South Wales and Victoria which were rather inactive. Cheong and Cheong (2011) suggested 
that social media should be more integrated into EMOs in Australia. The Twitter and Facebook 
activity of the Queensland Police Service during the Queensland floods showed other 
Australian EMOs that social media services can be an effective tool to communicate and 
interact with the general public during an emergency event and was an active driver for further 
adoption of social media in Australian EMOs. 
 
Content and network analysis techniques were also applied in a study about the Queensland 
floods of 2010/2011 to understand the shape of the emerging communication network and the 
communication practices (Bruns et al. 2012). During the time of the extreme event, the 
Queensland Police Service (Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Queensland Police 
Service - Media and Public Affairs Branch 2011) had an active account, from which messages 
were extensively shared through the evolving communication network for the entire duration 
of the extreme event. The study showed that more Tweets were re-tweeted (between 50% to 
60%) than original Tweets were created. Members of the general public are tending to share 
information rather than create it; this pattern can also be found in other studies (Fraustino et al. 
2012). A significant amount of Tweets (30%-40%) contained links to information sources 
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outside of Twitter, and a lot of users tried to act as amplifiers of information actively. These 
users tried to aggregate and share trustworthy information about the event. In the dataset, media 
organisations and EMOs were the most visible actors. The mainstream media not only used 
Twitter as a tool to broadcast its news, but also as a tool acting as a news source.  
 
The online information exchange behaviour of different US state and federal organisations 
during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster was analysed by Sutton et al. (2012). The 
study used an extensive Twitter dataset as a data source (Sutton et al. 2012). The study showed 
that the re-tweet ratio of information from other organisations was very low, which is an 
indicator that most of the organisations do not use Twitter to gather information. It could be 
shown that most of the organisations used their Twitter account to broadcast internally sourced 
information (Sutton et al. 2012), this is in contrast to what we expect to see from user accounts 
from the general public who tend to share information from others instead of creating such 
information (Fraustino et al. 2012) themselves.  
 
Ehnis et al. (2014) and Mirbabaie et al. (2014) analysed the communication behaviour around 
the 2013 Labour Day marches at the first of May in Germany. This planned public event was 
studied as a proxy for an extreme event. The study showed that: EMOs and media organisations 
are the most visible actors during such an event; EMOs are contributing, in comparison to other 
actors in the network, relatively little content in the communication streams; and that the 
content they are contributing is then rapidly shared. Media organisations are also contributing 
and consuming extreme event communication. These organisations use social media 
communication in their reporting and add additional information, through their reporting 
messages, towards social media. Media organisations actively distribute the information from 
EMOs. Social media has the potential to build new user roles, such as citizen journalists, and 
other hubs of information aggregators, however, traditional roles in a non-digital world are 
present and highly valued by the users in these communication networks. Swift trust is built 
through role attributes that emerge from a non-social media presence. The authors are using 
their analysis as a basis for further research in unplanned extreme events to better understand 
whether these patterns can also be found in these slightly different types of extreme events.  
 
Another problem with emerging social media communication networks is that rumours and 
false information can spread like wildfires (Castillo et al. 2011; Mendoza et al. 2010). Over 
time, these rumours and false information tend to be self-corrected by the different 
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communities on the social media platforms (Mendoza et al. 2010). However, one aspect of the 
EMO utilisation of social media services is to correct such rumours and false information 
(Ehnis and Bunker 2013; Subba and Bui 2017). Since rumours and false information can have 
devastating effects on the outcome of an emergency event, there are broad research initiatives 
focusing on the identification of such rumours (Bunker and Sleigh 2016; Gupta et al. 2013; Jin 
et al. 2014; Jong and Dückers 2016; Liu et al. 2014; Lukasik et al. 2015; Ma et al. 2015; Tanaka 
et al. 2013; Zubiaga et al. 2015). 
3.3.3 General Public use of Social Media during Emergency Events  
For the general public, social media has an integral function to satisfy information needs during 
extreme events. Why the general public uses social media in normal times and times of crisis 
is highlighted in a report (Fraustino et al. 2012) published by the US National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). This report reviews the existing 
literature on the topic. According to the report, there are three different active social media user 
types: “social media creators”, “social media followers”, and “social media inactives”. The first 
group creates original content, the second group mainly consumes the available content, and 
the final group does not use Social Media services during extreme events. Members of the 
public tend to prefer sharing information from other accounts and sources instead of creating 
original information in Social Media. 
 
One of the major reasons why individuals use social media during a crisis is to check on their 
family and friends. For example, after the 9/11 Terror Attacks in 2001, there were attempts to 
create Wikis by individuals from the public to find missing relatives and friends (Palen and Liu 
2007). Also, individuals use social media to fulfil their information needs by seeking 
information about the on-going crisis event. When the classical media coverage is not 
sufficient, social media is used to close the coverage gap (Sutton 2010). This could be 
demonstrated in the case of the 2007 Southern California Wildfire (Sutton et al. 2008) and the 
2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks (Goolsby 2010; Oh et al. 2010). The general public seems to not 
only be passive in receiving information; it appears they also want to engage and contribute in 
solving crises or disasters. By projecting theory about self-organising to the case of the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, behaviours and mechanisms of self-organisation of “digital volunteers” were 
highlighted in a study (Starbird and Palen 2011). Self-organisation of community groups during 
extreme events appears to be a common phenomenon. Further examples include the London 
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Riots 2011 (Glasgow and Fink 2013) and the Student Volunteer Army during the Christchurch 
earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 (Bunker et al. 2013). 
3.3.4 Emergency Management Organisations use of Social Media 
Government organisations have developed a social media presence (Alam and Walker 2011; 
Mergel 2012) to interact with their communities online. This is also the case for EMOs which 
also have started to adopt social media services (San et al. 2013) as a part of their 
communication portfolio. This adoption is often only partially voluntary. There are internal and 
external factors that can drive the decision for such an organisation to adopt social media. An 
important internal factor is the perceived benefits of utilising social media services; the 
platforms can be used to communicate directly with a large audience. External factors are 
factors which the organisation has no influence on, such as when the general public uses Social 
Media during disasters even without the presence of EMOs. When official information is not 
available, the public will fulfil their communication needs through other means (Fosso Wamba 
et al. 2012; Sutton 2010) which can make false information more impactful. EMOs are better 
able to guide and moderate social media communication through their participation on these 
platforms since they are seen as a trustworthy source of information.  
 
It can be argued that EMOs have unique features which are absent in commercial organisation 
using social media services (Fosso Wamba et al. 2012). Therefore, the knowledge of social 
media adoption in commercial organisations cannot be directly transferred to EMOs. Different 
types of organisations have different needs and requirements. EMOs are responsible for 
warning and informing the general public during emergency events, with a particular focus on 
the trustworthiness of social media information as well as the potential impact. Additionally, 
social media activity needs to support the aims of EMOs in different phases of the PPRR model. 
Many larger EMOs, such as the case organisations in this study, have a large volunteer member 
base. Social media activity needs be moderated to suit the holonic nature of these specific types 
of organisations. 
 
Social media is seen by many organisations as “an experiment in an unknown problem space” 
(Mergel 2013) the best practices have not yet emerged, and still need to be explored. Social 
media activities provide a lot of potential benefits to EMOs, such as the ability to communicate 
directly with large numbers of the general public or the media, however, there are also many 
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risks associated with the social media utilisation. EMOs are historically risk averse and view 
new technologies critically.  
 
We are still in the process of developing our understanding of the impact of social media 
technology on EMOs; we need to explore how social media technology is utilised in the daily 
operations of EMOs and during extreme events. San et al. (2013) explored through survey 
research what knowledge about social media exists in US emergency services organisations 
and whether these organisations are using social media services in their operations. Most of the 
respondents of the survey were at least familiar with the concept of social media services for 
EMOs. Most of the participating organisations had their own social media presence, however, 
most of these social media activities were built in an ad-hoc fashion, and the organisations had 
only basic posting capabilities. Social media services as a data source to build situational 
awareness is rare. In the few cases that it is done, it is a highly manual endeavour and cannot 
be scaled up for bigger events. Fosso Wamba and Edwards (2014) had similar findings in their 
study about social media adoption in an Australian EMO. 
 
Artman et al. (2011) argue that EMOs need to adjust their communication strategies towards 
the medium in order to be effective in the social media domain. Their paper introduces two 
concepts: dialogical emergency management and strategic awareness. Dialogical emergency 
management refers to the active monitoring of messages in the social media communication 
network to actively adjust the communication strategy dependent on these posts. Strategic 
awareness refers to being aware of the understanding of the receivers of the emergency 
information available as well as the emergency event itself. EMOs would need to see the 
receiver of the message, in other words, the general public, as a co-creator of the emergency 
communication and not just a recipient.  
 
Yates and Paquette (2011) investigated the use of knowledge management technology by 
EMOs. The study was based on the case of the 2010 Haitian earthquake. The organisations 
were using Wikis and Microsoft’s SharePoint for internal knowledge management. These tools, 
when used properly, can be beneficial to build collaborative knowledge that can be shared and 
reused. This still does not come without significant challenges; the data needs to be constantly 
validated and checked. With a large amount of data flowing into the systems of EMOs, this can 
be a difficult task to implement.  
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Several studies have investigated how EMOs utilise social media by analysing the social media 
communication of the organisation during extreme events (Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 
2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2013; Procter et al. 2013), or in times of normal operations (Crump 
2011; Heverin and Zach 2010). These studies analyse the social media utilisation from outside 
of the organisation and not from within the organisation. While this helps us better understand 
how EMOs utilise their social media presence, it gives only a very limited account on how the 
social media services are embedded within the communication portfolios of the organisation.  
 
In times of normal operation, it was analysed what kind of information police departments 
share on their Twitter accounts by examining the use of Twitter from different US (Heverin 
and Zach 2010) and UK police departments (Crump 2011). The organisations share incident 
information about their specific emergency type, utilise social media to educate and inform the 
public about emergency events, and they utilise the channels to engage with the public in a 
two-way communication.   
 
As shown in Chapter 2, EMOs operate in two modes of operation, the operational mode and 
the non-operational mode. We only have limited knowledge from the literature about how 
EMOs use their social media channels in the non-operational mode, however, we know more 
about the operational mode utilisation of social media communication through several studies. 
In Australia, the communication of the Queensland police service during the 2011 Queensland 
floods was analysed from different perspectives (Bruns et al. 2012); (Ehnis and Bunker 2012). 
Bruns et al. (2012) focused on the influence of the Queensland Police Service on the overall 
communication network on Twitter. A study by Ehnis and Bunker (2012) analysed the specific 
information dissemination behaviour of EMOs by applying genre analysis as a lens. In a further 
study, this dataset was compared with the broadcasting behaviour of the Boston Police 
Department in the aftermath of the 2013 Boston Marathon (Ehnis and Bunker 2013). EMOs 
utilise social media microblogging services as a distribution channel for information and event 
specific warnings, to influence the behaviour of the media and the general public, to request 
specific information from the public, and to fight rumours through providing corrected 
information. These studies show that EMOs are mostly utilising their social media channels as 
broadcasting channel to push information to the public. Social media is used predominately as 
a one-way one-to-many communication channel, which can be compared to a “megaphone” 
(Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Potter 2016). 
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Chatfield al. (2014) explored the involvement of government organisations in social 
microblogging communication during extreme events based on Hurricane Sandy which struck 
the East Coast of the US in 2012. The analysis was based on Twitter data; their specific focus 
was on how government organisations actually engage their citizens through microblogging 
platforms and how the benefits of social media are realised by such organisation’s 
communications. Citizens are not passively waiting for information from the relevant 
organisations. They actively co-create and request information if it is not present. Furthermore, 
it was shown in the unfolding of the event that emergency phone numbers, the relevant 
channels for the citizens to ask for help, were completely overwhelmed with the numerous 
requests for help; individuals then turned to Twitter to ask the fire departments directly for 
help. In response to this phenomenon, the New York Fire Department started to dispatch based 
on requests for help received from Twitter. The realisation of the potential benefits of social 
media in government organisations, with their changing communication and information flows, 
are still seen as a major operational challenge.  
 
These studies observe how social media channels are used by emergency services agencies 
based on data available on the social microblogging channels of an organisation. These studies 
say very little about how these social media services are integrated into the operations and 
practices of the organisations. The following studies specifically focus on the integration of 
social media services within EMOs, by analysing and observing the social media 
communication within an organisation.  
 
Latonero and Shklovski (2011; 2013), analyse organisational innovation through the changing 
role of the Public Information Officer within the Los Angeles Fire Department. The role is 
changing through the use of the social microblogging platform Twitter and through this 
facilitated interaction with the general public. The study was conducted in 2009 when the social 
media utilisation for such organisations was still completely new, and it was still exceptional 
that such an organisation would use such services and platforms. The utilisation of the social 
media channel in the fire department was driven by the individuals who pushed for it’s use. 
The organisation was using Twitter as a one-way communication channel to push information 
to the general public, as well as to respond to individual comments from the public, and in a 
minimalistic way to “listen” what the general public had to say. The use was ad-hoc and centred 
around an individual who drove the adoption of the service within the organisation.    
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Using the example of the NSW State Emergency Service, Fosso Wamba and Edwards (2014), 
investigated the factors related to social media adoption used in emergency services operations. 
The organisation was aware of a broad spectrum of social media services, however, the main 
focus of the study was on the utilisation of Facebook and Twitter to distribute information to 
the general public in different phases of the emergency management cycle. While there was a 
two-way interaction on social media channels, the organisation mainly utilised their social 
media channels as a one-way push medium to broadcast relevant information to the general 
public. There was no evidence that the organisation was utilising their social media channels 
to gather information from the general public. 
 
Potter (2016) explored the social media utilisation of an Australian Fire Response Organisation 
through two years of ethnographic research. The researcher was embedded in the social media 
team and supplemented the study with relevant interviews across the organisation. The social 
media team was situated in the Media and Corporate Communications team. The organisation 
uses their social media channels mainly to disseminate information to the public, but not to 
gather information from the public. The study shows the tension between operational members 
of the organisation on the ground, who actively responds to extreme events, and the members 
of the communications team who want to inform the public about the event. These two groups 
have a different focus on how they respond to the disaster. The media team wants to inform the 
public so that they have the information they need to make good decisions during the 
emergency event; the responders on the ground intend to remove the threat as quickly as 
possible.  
 
Mergel (2013) analyse innovation strategies in the public sector through Social Media.  They 
identified, through studying several US government organisations, that these organisations use 
three different strategies when it comes to the social media utilisation: representation, 
engagement, and networking. Representation refers to a push strategy, in which information is 
broadcast through social media channels, but feedback from the public is ignored. social media 
in this strategy is used as a one-way communication channel.  The engagement strategy refers 
to a push and pull strategy, in which the organisation actively seeks interaction with the general 
public. In this strategy, the social media utilisation switches from a one-way communication 
channel for a large audience to a two-way communication channel in which the audience can 
communicate with the organisation. Such communication can have many forms, from 
answering questions to requesting images and anecdotes from the public. However, in this 
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strategy, social media is still seen as a pure communication platform and not a platform from 
which information can be gathered. The networking strategy refers to a two-way 
communication strategy in which the organisation also uses social media as a source of 
information. This information can then either be used in the operational part of the organisation, 
or can be used to improve the communication content of the organisation.  
 
Meijer and Thaens (2013) explored how different police departments arrive at their social 
media strategies. Interview data and social media data from three police departments, with 
exceptional social media utilisation, were analysed and compared to understand how these 
government organisations arrive at their social media strategy. All three departments were 
using different strategies and could be clustered under Mergel’s (2013) taxonomy  from push, 
to push and pull, to a networking strategy. Meijer and Thaens (2013) conclude “Social Media 
strategies of police departments build upon pre-existing strategic choices in communication 
strategies and situational differences and therefore, in spite of access to similar technologies, 
conversion in these strategies is limited.” 
 
Hiltz et al. (2014) investigated how different US emergency managers experience social media 
services within different US EMOs. The study identified three barriers responsible for the slow 
adoption of social media in such organisations: lack of personnel resources, lack of policies 
and guidelines for social media use, and potential issues with the trustworthiness of the social 
media information. Effective social media utilisation is time-consuming and also requires 
technical resources besides human resources. This is especially the case when social media is 
also used as a resource of information for the organisation and not just a channel to provide the 
public relevant information. The interview informants highlighted that besides the need for 
more trained personnel, there is a need for more advanced software which can help the 
emergency managers gather information from Social Media, analyse this information for 
trustworthiness and credibility and also be able to display this information in a meaningful way.  
 
Disasters and other large-scale crisis events happen infrequently. When they occur, there is a 
high need for human resources to mitigate the effects of the event. Many EMOs are dependent 
on trained volunteers to have a large enough force to respond to a high impact event. Some of 
these organisations are structured entirely with volunteers; others have a core of paid members 
supported by volunteers.  Volunteers cannot be treated the same way as paid staff. It is 
important for the organisation that these volunteer members stay engaged and motivated. For 
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such volunteer organisations, social media integration can be accompanied by different 
obstacles and barriers in training and available human resources. Munkvold et al. (2015) 
investigated several volunteer emergency response organisations in Norway. The study showed 
that these organisations are in the early stages of exploring the capabilities of Social Media. 
The organisations use their social media channels mainly before and after and extreme event, 
but not during. The channels are used as one-way communication towards the public, or in 
private groups for internal communication. The organisations do not use social media to gather 
information from the public, but they monitor the channels of other public organisations, such 
as the police. The social media utilisation depends on motivated members of the organisation. 
During an event, the members of the organisation are needed to perform the core business of 
the organisation and do not have the time to also operate the social media channels.  
3.3.5 Summary of the Literature 
We have seen from the literature that many EMOs have integrated social media into their 
organisation for the purpose of emergency and disaster management.  
 
Social media is not only useful as a channel to communicate to the general public, but it can 
also be used as a channel to engage with the general public in a two-way stream of 
communication.  
 
Social media includes a vast selection of different technologies; however, EMOs often see 
social media as just the microblogging platform Twitter and the social networking site 
Facebook. Other types of social media technologies are known but not integrated into the 
practices of organisations.  
 
Social media presences are often used as a broadcasting tool to push information towards the 
general public. The literature indicates that the emergency management sector is also interested 
in using social media as a channel to gather relevant extreme event information from the public, 
but these approaches are still in the early stages of development. 
 
We know what EMOs are broadcasting on their social media channels through the analysis of 
emergency and disaster event social media communication networks. We also have an 
understanding what these organisations communicate through their social media channels in 
the non-operational mode. This gives us an outside perspective on their social media 
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communication only, since this knowledge is derived from analysing communications on these 
social media channels. 
 
What we are currently lacking information about is how EMOs have actually integrated social 
media services into their organisations. We need to better understand this perspective, in order 
to improve the social media practices of EMOs. This research study, is making a contribution 
to close this particular gap in our knowledge. 
 
In the next section, Ahmed’s (2011) framework of social media in Disaster Management will 
be revisited as this framework is used as an underlying lens for this study.  
3.4 Framework – Social Media in Disaster Management 
Figure 3.1 shows Ahmed’s (2011) model on Social Media in Disaster Management. On the one 
hand, this model shows the potential of social media services in emergency disaster 
management. On the other hand, this model provides a framework of social media interaction 
dimensions of different participants in disaster and other emergency extreme events. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Social Media in Disaster Management reproduced from Ahmed (2011) 
 
Social media utilisation is divided into three dimensions of communication interactions (see 
3.3.1). These three dimensions are: social media communication and interaction between 
emergency services agencies (A-A), interaction and communication between an emergency 
services agency and the community (A-C), and the interaction and communication within the 
general public, community to community (C-C). 
 Ahmed / Social Media in Disaster Management 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 9 
 
Methodo ogy nd Future Direc ions 
This paper aims to explore the potential of Social Media in Australian natural disaster management. 
During disaster management process, interactions involving disaster management agencies and 
communities are examined in this paper. It is further discussed that the disaster management agencies 
and the communities h ve their specific functional n eds to interact with each other during various 
phases of disaster management process. Moreover, the role of communication media during mitigation, 
response and recovery phases is also reported in the above sections. While the significance of Social Media 
has been already conceptualized and reported above, it is equally important to empirically validate the 
potential of Social Media in Australian natural disasters. In order to do so, this research will analyze the 
data collected by two methods. The first method will be the semi-structured interviews that will be 
conducted with five disaster management agencies within Australia. The selection of these agencies will 
be intended to get a good mix of cases based on their expertise and operations domains. The objectives of 
these interviews are as follows: 
• To explore the functional needs of disaster management agencies to interact with other agencies and 
communities during mitigation, response and recovery phases. 
• Advantages and disadvantages of using Social Media by disaster management agencies to interact with 
other agencies and communities during mitigation, response and recovery phases. 
The second method will be focus groups with members of the community. Three focus groups will be 
undertaken with approximately 10 to 15 people per group. Each focus group will include a group of people 
who have recently been affected with or experienced any natural disaster in Australia. The objectives of 
these focus groups are as follows: 
• To explore the functional needs of the communities to interact with disaster management agencies and 
other member of the community before, during and after disaster. 
• To explore the types of Social Media that can be used by community members during various phases of 
disaster management life cycle along with their associated advantages and disadvantages. 
The data collected from both methods (semi-structured interviews with disaster management agencies 
and focus groups with community members) will be transcribed in full and will be used for data analysis 
by using a qualitative data analysis tool such as NViVo. Findings drawn from the collected data would be 
used to revise the existing framework (if necessary) and highlight the potential of Social Media in disaster 
management and will facilitate in further enhancing the resilience of Australian disaster management 
agencies and communities to better deal with natural disasters. 
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The reviewed literature showed that we know much about the left hand side of the model; we 
already know how the community utilises social media during disasters and other extreme 
events (Bunker et al. 2013; Fraustino et al. 2012; Glasgow and Fink 2013; Mirbabaie et al. 
2014; Palen and Liu 2007).  
 
From the agency-to-community interaction (A-C) dimension, we know how EMOs are 
communicating through the analysis of their social media channels (Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis 
and Bunker 2013; Mirbabaie et al. 2014; Procter et al. 2013).  
 
What we do not yet sufficiently understand is the right hand side of the model. We need to 
better understand how social media services are embedded into EMOs and how they influence 
these organisations (Meijer and Thaens 2013; Potter 2016). For instance, we currently do not 
know much about how EMOs utilise social media channels to interact with each other during 
emergency events and disasters (Sutton et al. 2012). 
 
This model is used within this research project as a guiding framework to further investigate 
the two communication dimensions, agency-to-community (A-C) and agency-to-agency (A-
A). This is approached by exploring how the case organisations in this study use social media 
services within their organisations. In the following section, research aims and questions are 
explained in more detail. 
3.5 Research Aims and Questions 
The literature shows how social media services in general, and social microblogging services 
in particular, have had an impact on emergency extreme events and their management. We 
know that social media has changed the information flow and public information expectations 
to a shorter timeframe. For the purpose of emergency management, social media technologies 
in themselves are not intrinsically beneficial or threatening; the technology can support the 
management of disasters or other extreme events, but it also adds further dimensions of risks 
and threats to an event. These risks and threats did not exist in times before the advent of social 
media technologies. 
  
The London Riots in 2011 (Glasgow and Fink 2013) are an excellent example which shows 
that both aspects, risks and potential benefits are two sides of the same coin. The social media 
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communication around the event was full of rumours and false information, which rapidly 
spread through the communication networks; social media services were used by perpetrators 
to organise riots and looting. On the other hand, social media communication was widely used 
to fulfil information needs and provide moral support. After the destructive riots, Twitter was 
used as a platform to self-organise clean-ups and help shop owners who had to deal with the 
damage caused by the riots.  
 
We know that a majority of the larger EMOs utilise social media channels to communicate and 
interact with their listening communities for disaster and emergency management. This social 
media engagement is not always fully voluntary and can be driven by external factors (Fosso 
Wamba and Edwards 2014); the EMOs are aware that social media communication will happen 
whether these organisations are participating or not, however, through participation in the 
communication at least organisations can influence the social media communication. 
 
While social media services as we know them today have been around for more than a decade, 
these services are relatively new technologies for EMOs. Social media adoption is mainly 
driven by individuals who operate social media channels in these organisations (Latonero and 
Shklovski 2011). Social media has the potential to be used as a two-way communication 
channel. However, the literature reports that organisations are predominantly using it as a push 
medium to send out information to the public (Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Potter 2016). EMOs 
thus use social media as a one-way channel for broadcasting information towards the general 
public. However, EMOs have only started to explore how social media can be used as an 
intelligence-gathering tool to collect relevant information from the general public and support 
situational awareness about unfolding events (Power and Kibell 2017).  
 
We understand that EMOs have adopted social media services and why they adopted these 
services into their practices (Fosso Wamba and Edwards 2014; Hiltz et al. 2014; Potter 2016). 
What we still insufficiently understand is the integration and alignment (Leonardi and Barley 
2010) of social media technologies into EMOs. The alignment of social media in organisations 
depends on several factors, which include the organisational norms and structures, the norms 
and structures of the social media communication networks, the technology itself, as well as 
the members of the organisation who operate the social media channels in their day-to-day 
work activities.  
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On one hand technology influences and is influenced by the institutional properties and norms 
within an organisation. On the other hand, there are properties of norms and behaviour brought 
through the different adopted social media platforms and their specific user groups. Social 
media utilisation within an EMO means the alignment of a technology that is alien and in some 
aspect hostile to the structure and institutional properties of the organisation. This thesis 
explores this interplay of technology, human participants, and institutional properties in 
hierarchically structured command and control organisations.  
 
The research objective is to create a better understanding of social media services within EMOs 
to communicate and interact with the general public for the purpose of emergency and disaster 
management. In particular, this thesis explores the integration and utilisation of social media 
services into the organisational structures and core activities of large-scale volunteer EMOs. 
As an underlying lens to explore this utilisation and integration of social media services, 
Ahmed’s model of social media in Disaster Management (Ahmed 2011) has been used. The 
utilisation of social media in the interaction dimension community-to-community (C-C) is not 
within the research interest of this thesis. Only the interaction dimensions involving the EMOs: 
agency-to-community (A-C), and agency-to-agency (A-A) are used to understand the social 
media integration in EMOs better.  
 
Based on the analysis of the literature and the knowledge of EMOs as hierarchical structured 
holonic systems, the research questions are driven by our lack of understanding on how EMOs 
actually embedded social media services into their structures. Therefore, research question 1 
asks: 
   
RQ 1: How are Social Media Services integrated into the structures of Emergency 
Management Organisations?  
 
The literature showed what kind of social media services EMOs typically use. However, this 
knowledge comes predominantly from analysing the communication of the social media 
channels from a somewhat outside perspective. To get a better understanding of the rationale 
of EMOs, the second research question asks: 
 
RQ 2: How are Social Media Services utilised within Emergency Management Organisations 
for the purpose of emergency and disaster management?  
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As shown in Chapter 2, EMOs have two different modes of operation, the non-operational 
mode and the operational mode. Therefore, research question 2 has the following sub-question: 
 
RQ 2.1: Is there a difference in the Social Media utilisation during the operational mode and 
the non-operational mode of an Emergency Management Organisation?  
 
The third research questions focuses on the utilisation of social media services as a 
communication platform with different communication participants. From Ahmed’s model, it 
can be deducted that organisations use social media to communicate with the public and other 
organisations. Since this study analyses large volunteer organisations, it can be assumed that 
these organisations utilise social media to also communicate with their volunteers. Therefore, 
the third research question asks: 
 
RQ 3: How are Social Media Services used as communication platforms in Emergency 
Management Organisation for the purpose of emergency and disaster management to:  
 
RQ 3.1: interact with the public? 
 
RQ 3.2: to interact with other Emergency Management Organisations? 
 
RQ 3.3: to interact with their own organisational members? 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter shows the result of the review of current literature about social media in 
emergency and disaster management. It also outlines the relevant gap in knowledge and shows 
the research aims and questions addressed in this thesis.  
   
A hermeneutic literature approach as described by Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic (2014) was 
used to review and analyse the literature. The results of the literature review are structured into 
four clusters of different research areas: (1) the potential of social media for disaster 
management (Section 3.3.1): (2) structure and behaviour of emerging emergency social media 
communication networks (section 3.3.2); (3) research about why and for what purposes the 
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general public is using social media in extreme events (section 3.3.3); and (4) research about 
social media utilisation of EMOs (section 3.3.4). 
 
The literature showed that social media services influence extreme events with both positive 
and negative effects. Individuals can fulfil their information and emotional needs with these 
technologies. Social media is used to find individuals and find out whether friends or family 
members are safe. It can serve as a platform for volunteers to self-organise during an event. 
However, it is still possible that rumours and false information spread uncontrolled on social 
media platforms, which increases the threat of an extreme event rather than mitigate it. 
Furthermore, the self-organisation of social media is not always a positive thing. For example, 
during the London Riots in 2011, some of the riots were organised through social media 
technology. Therefore, social media in itself acts as an information infrastructure; whether it 
has positive or negative effects towards an event depends on the different user groups and how 
they utilise the media. It is important to be kept in mind that the majority of social media 
services were not designed for emergency management and that they are at their core 
commercial communication platforms. Still, social media has the potential to contribute to the 
emergency management sector positively but it also brings challenges which need to be 
acknowledged and managed.  
 
There is active on-going research in the area of social media in emergency and disaster 
management. We are starting to understand better how social media technology impacts and 
influences disaster events and specifically, the emergency management sector. However, the 
research is still in its beginning. Gaps in the existing knowledge need to be better investigated. 
We know how the general public utilises social media during extreme events and are aware of 
emerging communication patterns in the social media communication networks created during 
the progress of an extreme event. However, patterns emerging across different events need to 
be further investigated. 
 
A substantial amount of the existing research only investigates social media utilisation in single 
extreme events and reduces social media to one specific platform. For example, the 
microblogging platform Twitter or the social networking site Facebook. Thus the umbrella term 
social media is often used as an equivalent for these platforms. Potential interdependencies 
between different communication platforms are rarely investigated.  
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We know the patterns of social media utilisation by EMOs in extreme events and in times of 
normal operations. EMOs utilise social media channels as an additional communication 
channel to communicate to the general public, however, while social media technology has the 
potential to be used as a two-way communication channel, EMOs predominantly utilise their 
social media presence as a “megaphone” to push information towards the general public. It is 
not well understood, therefore, how social media is integrated into EMOs. 
 
In the following chapter, the research methodology used to answer the proposed research 
questions is discussed in detail.   
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Chapter 4 - Research Methodology 
Einstein's space is no closer to reality than Van Gogh's sky. The glory of science is not in a 
truth more absolute than the truth of Bach or Tolstoy, but in the act of creation itself. The 
scientist's discoveries impose his own order on chaos, as the composer or painter imposes his; 
an order that always refers to limited aspects of reality, and is based on the observer's frame 
of reference, which differs from period to period as a Rembrandt nude differs from a nude by 
Manet. 
Arthur Koestler The Act of Creation, London, (1970) p. 253. 
4.1 Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 3, EMOs have embedded social media services within their organisations 
for the purpose of emergency and disaster management. However, we still do not sufficiently 
understand how such organisations have actually embedded these social media services into 
their structures and activities. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to closing this gap in our 
knowledge. The thesis is designed as an explorative qualitative case study which uses empirical 
material from five different cases of EMOs, which have embedded social media services into 
their communication portfolio. The aim of the thesis is to build on the current theory of social 
media in disaster management in order to extend our knowledge about the phenomena. In this 
chapter, the research approach and methods that have been applied in order to answer the 
research questions are outlined.  
 
The structure of this chapter is shown in Figure 4.1. Firstly, the general research approach and 
research strategy of this research project (section 4.2) is discussed. Afterwards, the ontological 
and epistemological underpinnings of this thesis (section 4.3) are then outlined. Subsequently, 
in Section 4.4 the applied case study approach is described, which includes an outline of the 
structure of each case (section 4.4.1). Further, the different case organisations selection (section 
4.4.2) is also explained. In section 4.5, the different data sources used in this research project 
are discussed. In section 4.6, the chapter closes with a description of how the data was analysed.     
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Figure 4.1 Outline Chapter 4 
4.2 Research Approach and Strategy 
Figure 4.2 outlines the general research approach of this thesis. The thesis explores how EMOs 
implement social media into their organisational structures. The thesis is an explorative 
qualitative study with the overall premise of building on and extending the current theory of 
social media in disaster management.  
 
The ontological underpinning of this thesis presumes a ‘weak’ social constructivism (Urquhart 
2012). To make claims about the intersubjective meaning systems within social media in 
disaster management, the epistemological stance is within the Interpretivist paradigm.  
 
4.4	The	Case	Study	Approach
4.3	Ontology	and	Epistemology
4.2	Research	Approach	and	Strategy
4.5	Data	Collection
4.6	Data	Analysis
4.5.4	Workplace	Observation
4.5.2	Documents
4.5.3	Research	Site	Visits
4.5.1	Interviews	
4.5.5	Social	Media	Data	
4.4.1	Structure	of	a	Case
4.4.2	Case	Selection
4.5.1.5	Interview	Data
4.5.1.2	Selection	of	Interview	Informants
4.5.1.3	Description	of	Interview	Informants
4.5.1.4	Interview	Process
4.5.1.1	Development	of	the	Interview	Instrument
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Figure 4.2 Outline Research Approach 
 
I use Ahmed’s (2011) model of social media in disaster management as an underlying framing 
device. In this framework, the social media utilisation in the case organisations would be 
described as agency-to-community social media interaction (A-C) and agency-to-agency social 
media interaction (A-A). The thesis does not focus on how other members, for example, the 
general public or mainstream media are participating in the emerging social media 
communication networks during extreme events. The framework would define such interaction 
as community-to-community (C-C) social media interaction. 
 
The methodological approach is an exploration of the integration of social media technology 
into EMOs, which act as a specific form of hierarchical command and control organisation. 
This particular form of organisation is seen in this thesis as a hierarchical structured holonic 
system (see section 2.3.1). 
 
The specific method to explore the social media technology appropriation is that of a 
comparative case study of five revelatory cases of Australian EMOs which have embedded 
social media services in their communication portfolio for emergency and disaster 
management. 
 
 
Methodological	approach
Overall	PremiseTopic
Social Media utilisation by
emergency management
organisations for the
purpose of disaster and
emergency management
Epistemology
Interpretivism
Focal	Level
Emergency	Management	
Organisations
Method
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case	studies
Exploration	of	technology	
appropriation
Theory	extension	in	
social	media	in	disaster	
management
Ontology
Social	Constructivism
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4.3 Ontology and Epistemology 
The philosophical underpinnings, both ontological and epistemological, of a research study are 
essential to understand the researcher’s assumptions. Ontology attends to the questions on how 
reality is constituted; Epistemology, on the other hand, is concerned with how knowledge about 
a reality can be acquired. Both philosophical branches are closely intertwined when research 
about a phenomenon is conducted. The ontological stance underpinning this thesis is a ‘weak’ 
social constructivism. The epistemological stance is within the Interpretivist paradigm 
(Urquhart 2012).  
 
The ontological assumption of this study is that social reality is neither given nor can an 
objective underlying reality be measured, but rather social reality is a construct of the 
participants within this social reality. The individuals within a social setting create and 
reproduce their reality through ongoing actions and social practices. This infers that claims 
about this social reality cannot be made in isolation to its context, because this social reality 
does not exist independently from the participants who are instantiating this reality (Orlikowski 
and Baroudi 1991).  
 
Social reality does not exist in isolation from individuals in social settings. Ideas, norms, 
values, and beliefs drive human action (Leonardi and Barley 2010). The individuals share 
ideas, norms values, and beliefs which result in intersubjective meaning systems (Urquhart 
2012). The thesis explores the shared intersubjective meaning systems of social media 
utilisation of EMOs.   
 
The epistemological stance to explore and make claims about the phenomena is within the 
Interpretivist paradigm. Researchers within the Interpretivist paradigm study phenomena 
within its social setting through an in-depth examination of that field (Urquhart 2012) to 
construct a representation of how the social participants within the phenomena interpret their 
social reality.  
 
Within this thesis intersubjective meaning systems around social media utilisation of EMOs 
for the purpose of emergency and disaster management are explored through how social 
participants within this system interpret this particular meaning system; i.e. the employees and 
other members of EMOs. This is done through multiple case studies of EMOs which are 
utilising social media services. 
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4.4 The Case Study Approach 
To understand how EMOs are utilising social media services, we must study in detail how these 
organisations integrate these kinds of services into their structures. This can be done through 
in-depth case studies. Five cases were documented in order to explore the phenomena of social 
media utilisation in EMOs.  
 
There is a multitude of different approaches and definitions of what a case study is and how 
such a study is constituted such as Eisenhardt (1989); Piekkari et al. (2009); Walsham (1995); 
Yin (2013). Some of these case study designs are better used within the positivist research 
paradigm (e.g. Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2013), and other case study approaches cater better for 
interpretive research practices (e.g. Piekkari et al. 2009; Walsham 1995).  
 
A case study can be defined as a “research strategy that examines, through the use of a variety 
of data sources, a phenomenon in its naturalistic context, with the purpose of ‘confronting’ 
theory with the empirical world” (Piekkari et al. 2009). This definition is used for this particular 
research project.  
 
The phenomenon under study in this thesis is the utilisation of social media technology within 
EMOs for the purpose of emergency and disaster management. The naturalistic contexts are 
the EMOs within their operational area. Data sources are predominantly interview data which 
is supported by documents, workplace observations, research site visits, and social media data. 
The purpose of the thesis is to build a better understanding of the phenomena through extending 
existing theory of social media in disaster management, and in particular Ahmed’s framework 
of social media in disaster management (Ahmed 2011).  
 
A comparative multiple-case study design was utilised, in which five cases of EMOs utilising 
social media services for disaster management were compared and analysed. All of these 
organisations already have extensive experience in the use of social media for this purpose 
‘Revelatory’ cases were chosen as it was expected that these cases will tell us more about the 
underlying phenomena (Urquhart 2012). 
 
A common critique against case studies is the lack of generalisability of cases. Generalisability 
is a concept from positivist research which is not applicable and aimed for in the Interpretivist 
research paradigm. The underlying ontology for this thesis is a ‘weak’ social constructivism. 
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This means that social realities are the result of the intersubjective meaning making between 
the particular members of these realities, in my case the members of the EMOs. The knowledge 
we can derive from these realities are always highly contextual. This does not mean that the 
knowledge from this thesis cannot be applied in different organisations. However, it is then a 
knowledge transfer, and we need to make ourselves aware where the social realities differ, such 
as in terms of culture and norms. 
4.4.1 Structure of a Case 
Case boundaries are shown in Figure 4.3. Included within the case boundaries are the EMOs 
and their interaction with social media channels. The underlying framework (Ahmed 2011), 
includes the agency-to-community social media interaction (A-C) and the agency-to-agency 
social media interaction (A-A), but not the social media interaction dimension community-to-
community (C-C). The channels used by emergency management are predominantly Twitter 
channels, and/or Facebook pages, however, it must be noted that the organisations are also 
utilising other social media platforms. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Case Boundaries 
 
The social media audience is, as the receiver of emergency management communication, an 
important social participant in the social media in emergency management communication. 
Different audiences may interact with social media channels of EMOs or utilise the 
communication for different purposes, however, the audience is outside of the boundaries of a 
case; I examine how the EMOs utilise their social media channels, but I do not analyse how 
the community interacts with this communication.   
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4.4.2 Case Selection and Case Organisations 
Five EMOs in two federal states in Australia were selected for this study. The main selection 
criteria was that the organisation is involved in the active response to large-scale emergency 
events in Australia and that the organisation is actively utilising social media services as a 
communication channel. During the project, it became evident that not all of the organisations 
which are actively involved in the response to large-scale emergency events, were using social 
media services in all phases of disaster management. Some of the organisations utilise social 
media services mainly to prepare the general public for the eventually of emergency events 
while some other organisations were utilising social media services in all phases of the PPRR 
model.3  
 
In context of this research project, interviews were conducted in a total of nine different EMOs 
utilising social media services in all phases of disaster management. From these initial nine 
organisations, five organisations were selected for this thesis. The selection was based on the 
similarities of responsibilities, members size, structure, and organisational culture of all of the 
selected organisations. The five organisations selected all have a leading role in the response 
to large-scale emergency extreme events: two of the organisations are responding 
predominantly to large-scale fire events; two other organisations are responding to large-scale 
flood events; and the last organisation has an all-hazards responsibility and acts as an umbrella 
organisation which incorporates other response organisations during major extreme events to 
ensure their interoperability.   
 
While all of the organisations use the same microblogging technologies, the five case 
organisations differ in their social media utilisation and integration patterns. In the following, 
a brief overview about the case organisations is given and shown in Table 4.1.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 As shown in Chapter 2.2, the Prevent Prepare Respond Recover model (PPRR) is a model 
that can be used to distinguish between the different phases of disaster management. The model 
is an underlying framework for most of the emergency management processes and activities in 
Australian emergency management organisations. 
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Table 4.1 Selected Case Organisations 
Organisation Member Structure 
Emergency 
Responsibility 
Operation 
Area Jurisdiction 
Organisation 
type 
Organisation A 
Volunteer members 
and paid staff 
members 
Bushfire events Whole state  Case State I 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
Organisation B 
Volunteer members 
and paid staff 
members 
Flood and 
storm-related 
events 
Whole state  Case State I 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
Organisation C Only paid staff members 
All-hazards 
approach Whole state  Case State II 
Coordinating 
umbrella 
organisation 
Organisation D 
Volunteer members 
and paid staff 
members 
bushfire events 
and structural 
fires 
Outside state 
capital  Case State II 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
Organisation E 
Volunteer members 
and paid staff 
members 
Flood and 
storm-related 
events 
Whole state  Case State II 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
 
 
The case organisations in Case State I are Case Organisation A and B. Organisation A is 
responsible for large-scale bushfire events. The member base consists of highly trained and 
specialised volunteers and paid staff members, however, the majority of the organisation 
members are volunteers. The volunteers are responsible for the operations on the ground, while 
most of the paid staff have coordinating and managing responsibilities. The operational area of 
the organisation is the whole state. The extreme event social media utilisation is centrally 
organised.  
  
The responsibilities of Organisation B are large-scale flood or storm extreme events. Like 
Organisation A, it is also a large volunteer organisation consisting of paid staff members and 
highly skilled professional volunteers. The trained volunteers operate on the ground, while the 
paid staff members of the organisation have primarily coordinating and managing 
responsibilities. The organisation is centrally organised and operates all over the state.  
 
The organisations in the Case State II are the Organisations C, D, and E. Organisation C is 
different in comparison to the other organisations. It resembles something which could be 
termed an ‘umbrella’ organisation. The brief of the organisation is to ensure interoperability 
between different EMOs during large-scale extreme emergency events. In such large-scale 
extreme events, Organisation C incorporates Organisation D and Organisation E, which then 
operate and act on behalf of Organisation C.  
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This practice is in contrast to the organisational structures in Case State I. In Case State I there 
is a lead organisation assigned based on the event type, for instance, in the case of a bushfire 
event Organisation A would be leading the response while organisation B may be active in a 
supporting role. The lead organisation is thus organising the response, and the remaining EMOs 
support the lead organisation.  
 
Organisation C is relatively young. It emerged as an overarching organisation after a major 
bushfire disaster in which it became evident that the response organisations were not working 
as closely together as it would have been deemed necessary in such an unprecedented extreme 
event. In its beginnings, Organisation C had a sole bushfire focus and was responsible for 
warning the general public in order to keep them safe. A second disastrous extreme event 
highlighted that major extreme events have multiple effects on the safety of a community and 
that a fire-only focus is too short-sighted. The organisation then transformed into an all-hazards 
focus. Organisation C consists of paid staff in its non-operational mode. In the operational 
mode, the organisation is supplemented by members of other response organisations. The role 
of the organisation is to warn the community and to coordinate the response organisations. The 
organisation itself does not own response units, such as fire brigades.  
 
Organisation D is a large volunteer organisation responsible for fighting bushfires and 
structural fires in rural areas. The organisation consists of trained volunteers and paid staff 
members, however, in contrast to Case Organisations A, B, and E, part of the paid staff are also 
responsible for responding to fire events on the ground. The organisation is centrally organised. 
When Organisation C is changing into the operational mode based on a fire event, Organisation 
D suspends its social media activity, and its social media activity is then orchestrated by 
organisation C.   
 
Organisation E is a large volunteer organisation responsible for responding to the effects of 
flood and storm events. The organisation has a base of highly trained volunteers and paid staff 
members. The responsibilities of the paid staff are mainly managing and coordinating 
responsibilities. The volunteers of Organisation E respond to the effects of extreme events on 
the ground. Similar to Organisation D, when Organisation C is changing into its operational 
mode based on an extreme event Organisation E would otherwise be responsible for, then 
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Organisation E suspends its social media operations, and its social media activity is then 
organised by organisation C. 
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4.5 Data Collection 
It is common in qualitative research that the phases of data collection and data analysis inform 
each other. This research project was not any different, the phases of data collection and data 
analysis often took place at the same time, and there was not always a clear boundary where 
the data collection phase had ended before the analysis phase started. While the data collection 
informed the data analysis, data analysis also informed what kind of information that was still 
missing to build a better understanding of social media in disaster and emergency management.  
 
Within this chapter the kind of empirical material that was collected is discussed and also how 
this material was analysed. This separation is partially artificial as both approaches informed 
each other while the study was ongoing.  
 
The main source of data for this study was interview data produced and collected from 
informants at all five case organisations. The interviews had the form of semi-structured 
interviews, which were supported with informal interviews with members of EMOs who are 
responsible or related to the social media utilisation within their organisation.  
 
The interview informants are either actively involved in the utilisation of the social media 
channels, or are involved in the strategic decision-making about the utilisation of these social 
media channels.  
 
The interview data was supplemented by information collected directly from the social media 
channels and profiles of the organisation, and relevant documents created by the organisations. 
These kinds of documents involve policies, internal case studies, social media manuals, social 
media training material, and the web pages of each organisation.  
 
Further, except for Organisation D, I visited the site of each case organisation to understand 
where and how the social media channels are operated by the members of the organisation. The 
members of Organisation D were interviewed through Skype, and from Case Organisation C 
sites. Organisation C houses the State Control Centre of this state from which the major 
emergency events are coordinated.  
 
In Case State II workplace observation were also conducted in the State Control Centre where 
observations about the social media officers of organisation C, D and E in operation during a 
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major emergency event could be made. The following describes in more detail how the 
necessary data was collected and analysed. 
 
Table 4.2 Sources of Empirical Material 
Data Sources  Description Applied in Cases 
Interviews Formal and Informal Interviews with members of the organisation All case organisations 
Documents 
Policies, Strategy Documents, 
Websites, Social Media training 
material, Social Media guidelines 
All case organisations 
(But particular documents vary from 
organisation to organisation) 
Research Site Visits 
Visits of the case organisations to 
observe from where the social 
media channels are operated 
Organisations A, B, C and E 
Workplace Observation 
Fieldwork in the State Control 
Centre of Case State II during a 
multi-day bushfire event 
Organisation C (indirectly D and 
E) 
Social Media Data Data from the social media channels of the case organisations All case organisations 
4.5.1 Interviews 
To get a clear account of how members of EMOs are utilising social media services, visits to 
these organisations were required to talk to its members in order to reconstruct together with 
them how they experience the utilisation and effects of social media technology. Therefore, the 
most valuable data in this study is interview data from the members of the organisation who 
are operating or are deciding on the utilisation of the social media services. In qualitative 
research in general, interviews are the most common and arguably one of the most important 
data gathering methods (Myers and Newman 2007).  
 
A semi-structured interview approach was used to conduct the interviews for this study; an 
interview guide, which was informed by the literature, gave the interview some general 
structure, however, the approach was still flexible enough to explore other facets of the social 
media utilisation which the interview informants were bringing up during the interviews.  
 
Myers and Newman (Myers and Newman 2007) built on Erving Goffman’s work (1961), about 
face to face interaction, and describe the interview process through a dramaturgical model as 
drama performance or a stage play. This model is shown in Table 1.  
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Table 4.3 The qualitative interview as a drama reproduced from Myers and Newman (2007) 
 
 
The metaphor of an interview as a stage play is used to describe the interview approach used 
in this study. In the next subsection, the script, or in other words the interview guide, is outlined. 
Afterwards the selection of interview informants, or in the words of Myers and Newman, the 
Actors and Audience, is explained. Then, the overall interview process itself, from preparation, 
over an entry in the scene, over the main performance, to exit of the scene and preparation of 
the next performance is outlined. The subsection ends with an overview of the collected data 
and a description how this data was analysed. 
4.5.1.1 Development of the Interview Instrument 
We already know from the literature that EMOs are utilising social media services for 
emergency and disaster management. It was shown in preliminary work (Ehnis and Bunker 
2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2013) and other studies (Bruns et al. 2012; Potter 2016; Procter et al. 
2013) that EMOs are utilising their social media channels to distribute emergency relevant 
3. The dramaturgical model
Erving Goﬀman developed a general theory of face-to-face interaction, a theory that
can be used to interpret any social exchange. This theory uses the metaphor of the theatre
to explore social life (Goﬀman, 1959, 1961; Manning, 1992). Social interactions are seen as
a drama where there are actors (individuals and groups) who perform on a stage (a variety
of settings and social situations) using a script (norms, rituals, expectations of how one
should behave). During the performance, the actor’s appearance, manner and props are
very important (Manning, 1996).
We believe this theory is especially applicable to one particular type of social interac-
tion: the qualitative interview. The interview is a social interaction. Goﬀman defines inter-
action as ‘‘the reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another’s actions when in one
another’s immediate physical presence.’’ He defines a performance as ‘‘all the activity of a
given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other
participants’’ (Goﬀman, 1959, p. 26).
he qualitative interview as a dram
Concepts Description
Drama The interview is a drama with a stage, props, actors, an audience, a
script, and a performance
Stage A variety of organisational settings and social situations although in
business settings the stage is normally an oﬃce. Various props might
be used such as pens, notes, or a tape recorder
Actor Both the interviewer and the interviewee can be seen as actors. The
researcher has to play the part of an interested interviewer; the
interviewee plays the part of a knowledgeable person in the
organisation
Audience Both the interviewer and the interviewee can be seen as the audience.
The researcher should listen intently while interviewing; the
interviewee(s) should listen to the questions and answer them
appropriately. The audience can also be seen more broadly as the
readers of the research paper(s) produced
Script The interviewer has a more or less partially developed script with
questions to be put to the interviewee to guide the conversation. The
interviewee normally has no script and has to improvise
Entry Impression management is very important, particularly first
impressions. It is important to dress up or dress down depending upon
the situation
Exit Leaving the stage, possibly preparing the way for the next
performance (finding other actors – snowballing) or another
performance at a later date (e.g. perhaps as part of a longitudinal
study)
Performance All of the above together produce a good or a bad performance. The
quality of the performance aﬀects the quality of the disclosure which
in turn aﬀects the quality of the data
M.D. Myers, M. Newman / Information and Organization 17 (2007) 2–26 11
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information and warning through these channels and as well that social media is utilised to 
engage with the general public in two-way communication. However, as discussed in Chapter 
3, it is currently unclear how social media services are utilised and are actually embedded into 
EMOs. 
 
Before data collection was conducted in the form of interviews within case organisations, it 
was known that the EMOs are utilising social media but how this technology was actually 
integrated within the structure of the organisation was still unclear. It was only possible to infer 
from observation of the social media channels and the available information from EMOs, such 
as policy and strategy documents, for what purposes social media was used in emergency 
management. The social media channels of the case organisations showed evidence that these 
channels are used as a two-way communication channel and in some of the organisations as an 
intelligence tool to gather information directly from an event. The literature indicated (Bruns 
et al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Fosso Wamba and Edwards 2014; Potter 2016; Wukich 
2015) that EMOs are utilising social media channels to distribute information towards the 
general public, but to what extent social media was used beside the form of a distribution 
channel is still unclear.   
 
The original interview guideline was structured into three sections: The first section included 
general questions about social media utilisation within the organisation; the second section 
focused on social media utilisation to distribute information towards the general public; the 
third section focused on questions in regards to how social media is used as a channel for 
intelligence within the organisation. These initial sections were derived from the different 
applications of social media in EMOs and through Ahmed’s framework of social media in 
disaster management (Ahmed 2011). As the interviews were semi-structured, at times 
interviews revealed important aspects of social media utilisation within EMOs which were not 
included in the interview guideline. When that happened, the interview guidelines were 
reviewed and extended so that relevant questions were asked in future interviews. The 
interview guide was thus not a static document. It was a document which actively changed 
during the process of collecting the relevant interview data.  
 
The first section of the interview guideline is intended to gather information about the general 
utilisation of social media within the case organisation. The first questions thus intended to 
understand the role the informant occupies within the organisation. Further, there is a question 
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to understand the involvement of the interview informant with social media and how the 
informant is utilising social media services to perform some of the tasks which are 
accompanied by the role of the informant in the organisation. This is followed by questions 
identifying what kind of social media services are utilised within the organisation and whether 
there is a difference in the utilisation during the operational phase and the non-operational 
phase. General questions were also asked about how many members of the organisation are 
operating the social media channels depending on the organisation's mode of operation. 
Furthermore, questions were asked to understand the strategy behind utilising social media and 
as well whether such a strategy is formalised.  
 
The second section of the interview guidelines focuses on how social media is utilised to 
distribute information towards the audience of these channels. This section was designed to 
better understand what the process of distributing information through social media to the 
public is. This included questions to better understand from where the social media officer was 
sourcing the information which is distributed. The questions were intended to reveal how the 
social media officer interacts with the information systems within the organisation, such as the 
dispatching, and warning systems.  
 
It is also relevant whether an organisation has specific aims when providing information over 
social media. The interview guide thus also includes questions for identifying whether different 
social media channels are used differently or whether there is one overarching approach on 
how to treat social media within the organisation. It is of relevance to better understand whether 
the audience is known and how the organisations interact with different groups, such as 
members of the general public and members of the media. This section also includes questions 
for probing how the organisation is interacting with their listening community; whether it is 
using social media as a one-way communication channel or whether it is utilising social media 
in a two-way form of communication which engages the listening community. The second 
section closes with questions for better understanding the perceived benefits and risks of the 
organisation with their utilisation of social media and the utilisation of social media in the 
emergency management sector in general.   
 
The third section of the interview guide focuses on how social media is utilised to gather 
information from the social media channels, in order to use this information to build better 
situational awareness about emergency events within the EMO. The aim of these questions is 
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to understand whether the organisation is utilising social media for intelligence purposes and 
how the process of information gathering is done. Further, how information gathered through 
social media is verified and used by the organisation. Finally, a question investigating what 
kind of software the organisation is using to perform these social media intelligence tasks was 
asked. 
 
As the interviews were semi-structured the interview guideline acted as a frame for the 
interviews. It was not “set in stone” and changed after an interview was conducted and when 
new information was uncovered. When interview informants provided information, which was 
not highlighted in previous interviews, questions about such information were added to the 
interview guideline to probe about the topic in further interviews.  For example, in an early 
interview, one of my informants outlined that from time to time members of the public request 
help through the social media channels of the organisation. The informant explained how the 
organisation is dealing with such requests, but as well indicated that in a large-scale event with 
many requests, such as it happened during Hurricane Sandy in the US (Chatfield et al. 2014), 
the current organisational practices might break down. Following this interview, a section about 
dispatching emergency response resources due to incidents reports on social media, was added 
to the interview guide.  
 
The second addition to the interview guide related to the utilisation of social media for 
communication with members within an organisation. Four of the selected EMOs rely on 
volunteers to respond to emergency events. These volunteers are in units/brigades scattered 
across the area the organisation is operating in. After this was revealed in an interview, a section 
was added to the interview guide asking questions about how the organisation is utilising its 
social media channels to communicate with its volunteer members.  
4.5.1.2 Selection of Interview Informants  
The informants for the interviews are members of the case organisations who are either 
operating the social media channels, or members of the case organisations who have an 
influence on how the social media channels are utilised. In all organisations the social media 
operators interviewed are also actively shaping the strategy for utilising social media in their 
organisation.    
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The selection of informants for interviews was deliberately set up in a way that it would make 
it possible to trace the actual utilisation of the social media services within the organisation; 
and not just based on assumptions about these services which many members of the 
organisation who are not directly in touch with the social media channel, hold about these types 
of communication services.  
 
The main requirement for the selection of the interview informant was that the informants are 
members of the organisation who are actively involved in the social media utilisation of their 
organisation. This involvement could either be in the way that the member of the organisation 
is operating the social media channels or that the member is participating in the decision 
process on how to utilise the social media services. All of the interview informants fulfil this 
requirement. 
 
While locating potential interview informants in the relevant organisation was not too difficult, 
access to these organisations was not straight forward. Most strategic and operational social 
media utilisation is centralised within the headquarters of the EMOs. The first approach to 
attracting interview informants was to “cold call” the relevant members of the organisation via 
email and this approach was rather unsuccessful. The organisational departments the social 
media operators are situated was identified and contacted via their department heads using 
email to request possibility for an interview. These emails were left unanswered.  
 
It was decided to approach these organisations through a range of research activities such as 
other disaster management research projects with EMOs; and attendance at local and national 
emergency management conferences; from these industry engagement activities, rapport was 
built with members of these organisations. Eventually introductions were made to potential 
interview informants.  
 
A snowballing approach was used to get in contact with further interview informants; one of 
the last interview questions asked was whether the informant could think about other relevant 
members in the emergency management field that could be interviwed. Social media is still a 
small and emerging field within the EMOs; the operators and decision makers know each other 
and are in contact to learn from each other. This approach helped with recruitment of the 
remaining interview informants from all five organisations.  
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4.5.1.3 Description of Interview Informants  
Different interview informants from the case organisations who were interviewed for this thesis 
are described in this section. Not included are the members of the organisations with which 
informal conversations were had about the topic.  
4.5.1.3.1 Interview Informants - Organisation A 
In organisation A, one member of the organisation was interviewed and informal talks about 
social media were had with four additional members of the organisation while visiting the 
research site. Two formal recorded research interviews were conducted and several informal 
interviews were not recorded. The informal interviews resulted in case notes. The first of the 
formal interviews were conducted through Skype; the second interview was conducted on site 
within the headquarters of the organisation. Furthermore, the interview informant was also 
informally interviewed on several occasions.  
 
The main interview informant is an online systems officer, who is responsible for the strategic 
utilisation of the social media services within the organisation and is operating the social media 
channels. Interview informant’s activities include the development of organisational policy, 
social media strategies, and coordinating the execution of social media within the organisation. 
When the organisation is responding to an extreme event, then the interview informant is 
overseeing the social media cell.   
 
To ensure the quality of the results, the interim results of the research study were presented to 
members of the organisation on several occasions to ensure that the findings represent the 
perceived reality of the social media operations within the case organisation. 
4.5.1.3.2 Interview Informants - Organisation B 
In organisation B, three formal interviews were conducted. Two of the interviews were 
conducted in the headquarters of the organisation. One interview was a video interview 
conducted through Skype. In total, three members of the organisation, who are operating the 
social media channels were formally interviewed. Two of the interview informants are staff 
members within the headquarters, and the third interview informant is a volunteer who is 
coordinating the social media activity in one of the units.   
 
The first interview informant is the web and social media coordinator of the organisation at the 
state headquarters. The responsibilities of the role include the coordination of the social media 
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presence and the governance of the social media accounts as well as maintaining and governing 
the web sites associated with the organisation. The role was a new role when the interview 
informant was recruited (which was about two years before the interview took place).  
 
The interview informant is part of the corporate communication unit within the organisation. 
In addition to the role of the interview informant, the unit consists of a manager, media officers 
and public affairs officers.  
 
The second interview informant is a community engagement coordinator for one of the regions 
in the organisation. The role is situated within the headquarters of the organisation. 
 
In the non-operational phase, when the organisation is not responding to an event, the interview 
informant is responsible for interacting with the community in order to build resilient 
communities. This includes helping the volunteer units to engage with their communities 
through training workshops or by helping to organise events and advertise these events to the 
relevant communities.  
 
In the operational phase, when the organisation is responding to an extreme event, the interview 
informant is utilising the region’s social media channels to engage with the public by providing 
emergency relevant information.  
 
The third interview informant is a volunteer in a unit which is active on social media. As part 
of the volunteer activity, the interview informant is managing the social media channel of the 
unit. The unit is using Facebook to inform their listening community about events and about 
emergency relevant information. 
 
The interim results of the research study were presented to members of the organisation to 
make sure that the findings represent the perceived reality of the social media operations within 
the case organisation. This was done once in the headquarters of organisation B, and one time 
in a workshop where several members of different EMOs were participating. 
4.5.1.3.3 Interview Informants - Organisation C 
Three interview informants were interviewed in organisation C. Interview informant one was 
interviewed twice, one time over Skype and one time in person in the headquarters of 
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organisation C. The second and third interview informant were interviewed at the headquarters 
of organisation C. During high bushfire risk days, I was an observer in the state control centre 
of state II, which is situated at the headquarters of organisation C. During this time, I observed 
the organisation in response to an extreme event. The observations and informal talks were 
recorded through case notes. 
 
The first interview informant in organisation C was a senior officer in media and 
communications. The interview informant is participating in the development of organisational 
policy, social media strategies, and coordinating the execution of social media within the 
organisation. During the operational mode, the interview informant is often responsible for 
leading the media cell within the State Control Centre of state II. The interview informant had 
a background in journalism and was involved in several government projects. I interviewed 
this particular interview informant formally twice and had several informal conversations about 
the social media activity with the interview informant. The first formal interview was 
conducted via Skype, and the second interview was in person at the State Control Centre of the 
State. Furthermore, I shadowed this interview informant for several hours while I was visiting 
the State Control Centre of State II during an active emergency event. 
 
The second interview informant was a senior officer in media and communication. Their 
responsibilities include the operation of the social media channels in both the operational and 
the non-operational mode of the organisation. Furthermore, the interview informant is involved 
in the creation of social media policy documents and training material. The interview informant 
had several roles as a social media officer in other EMOs before the interview informant was 
transferred to organisation C, and has, therefore, a vast knowledge about how different 
organisations are operating their social media channels.  
 
I shadowed both of these interview informants for several hours while I was conducting 
workplace observation in the State Control Centre while it was in full operation. 
 
The third interview informant has a high ranking senior leadership position within the 
organisation. The informant can be responsible for the coordination of an extreme event when 
the organisation is in its operational mode. In the non-operational mode, the interview 
informant is involved in planning the strategic direction of the organisation. The informant is 
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an advocate for social media and influences the policies and strategies which are used with 
these platforms within the organisation. 
 
Interim results of this study were presented to the first two interview informants and other 
members of the organisation while visiting the headquarters of the organisation for fieldwork.  
4.5.1.3.4 Interview Informants - Organisation D 
Three members of organisation D were formally interviewed. One of the interviews was 
conducted through Skype and two interviews were performed in the State Control Centre of 
Case State II. The Skype interview with the first interview informant and the face to face 
interview with the second interview informant were recorded. The interview with the third 
interview informant resulted in case notes being taken. In addition to the formal interviews, 
informal interviews with members of the organisation were conducted during a visit of the 
State Control Centre of Case State II for the workplace observations during an ongoing bushfire 
operation.  
 
The first interview informant has a background in journalism and is the digital media manager 
of the organisation. The responsibilities for this role include the strategic development of new 
media and web 2.0 capabilities to enhance internal and external communications. When the 
interview informant started to work for the organisation the main focus of the position was 
video production and photography; this evolved later into YouTube videos for the organisation 
and then into the broader social media operations. 
 
The second interview informant has a background in digital marketing and is a long-term 
volunteer of the organisation.  Before the interview informant was hired as a staff member of 
the organisation, he helped to manage the social media channels of one of the volunteer 
brigades, and he often helped other volunteers with the social media activities of their volunteer 
brigades through the organisation's internal social media channels. Through this social media 
activity, he got hired by the organisation as the senior digital engagement advisor of the 
organisation. The interview informant is responsible for advising the different departments of 
the organisation with their digital campaigns, both social media campaigns and non-social 
media campaigns. Together with the other interviewee from the organisation, he is also 
responsible for the main social media channels of the organisation; this includes messages 
during the non-operational mode and the operational mode.  
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The two interview informants manage the social media activity of the corporate channels of 
the organisation for both operational and non-operational communication. During weekends 
and after-hours (after 5pm before 9 am) there is a roster for which days each interview 
informant is responsible for monitoring the social media channels.   
 
The researcher shadowed both of these interview informants for several hours while conducting 
fieldwork in the State Control Centre of State II. 
 
The last formal interview informant has a senior role in the management of the organisation. 
The informant can be responsible for the management of a large scale extreme event during 
the operational mode of the organisation. The interview informant is not operating the 
emergency management relevant social media channels of the organisation, however the 
informant has strategic influence on how these channels can be used for this purpose. The 
interview informant is supporting the social media activity of the organisation.  
 
Interim results of the research study were presented to members of the organisation while 
visiting the State Control Centre of Case State II in order to ensure the quality of the results. 
4.5.1.3.5 Interview Informants - Organisation E  
In Case Organisation E, one member of the organisation was interviewed. The interview 
informant was interviewed within the headquarters of the organisation and informally in the 
State Control Centre of State II while fieldwork was conducted.  
 
The interview informant within organisation E is the digital communication coordinator of the 
organisation. The role is situated within the headquarters of the organisation, and the 
responsibilities include all of the digital channels. This includes websites and the intranet, as 
well as social media. The interview informant is developing and extending the online warning 
and emergency information capabilities of the organisation. Additionally, the interview 
informant develops the social media strategy of the organisation, and creates the social media 
training material for the organisation. The background of the interview informant is in media 
and communication where he worked previously for commercial organisations.  
 
Interim results of the research study were presented to members of the organisation while 
visiting the State Control Centre of Case State II in order to ensure the quality of the results. 
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4.5.1.4 Interview Process 
There were two types of interviews; Face to Face interviews directly at the organisations, and 
Skype video interviews. The procedure for both of the interview types was similar. After the 
potential informant had shown interest in participating in the study, they were provided with 
information about the interview process via email. An email was sent outlining the interview 
procedure and highlighting the rights of the interviewee, i.e. consent. Attached to this email 
was an “Interview Participation Statement” which explained the study and the interviewee 
rights in more detail; The statement also included the contact details of the Human Ethics 
Administration so that the participant had means to contact them in case they felt that 
something was in a breach of ethical procedures. A consent form was also attached for the 
Skype interviews. For the face to face interviews, a consent form was supplied on the day of 
the interview. 
 
The interview duration was between 60 and 90 minutes, depending on the social media 
integration within the organisation and themes the interview informant elaborated on. In 
addition to the interview there was a 10-15 minutes introduction and a few minutes of 
conversation and debriefing after the interview. In total, one interview took between 90 to 120 
minutes. Before the interview, the interview process was explained to the interview informant 
including their rights. Questions and concerns were answered. Interview informants were asked 
if they consent to note taking and audio recording. After the process had been explained, the 
consent form was read and signed. The Skype interview informants were asked to send the 
signed form in after the interview took place. When the interview informant agreed to audio 
recording, the recording was started after all general questions about the interview process were 
answered. 
 
After the interview, the interview informant was debriefed and asked whether they would 
provide the contact details of additional potential interview informants within the industry.  
 
An hour was spent after the interview reorganising the notes taken at the interview and 
combining them with additional information and observations made during the interview 
process.  
 
The day following an interview the participants were sent an email to thank them for their 
participation in the research project. 
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4.5.1.5 Interview Data 
Members of more EMOs were interviewed than were actually used in the final thesis (see 
4.4.2). Interviews were conducted with a total of 18 informants in nine emergency response 
organisations. From the nine emergency response organisations, five were selected as case 
organisations. The remaining organisations were not used in the thesis analysis because the 
focus and structure of these organisations differed from the profile of the organisations which 
were the focus for this research (see 4.4.2). For example, their operational area was on a city 
level in contrast to the operation area of the state; or the type of emergency event the 
organisation is responding to is very localised or having a short time frame, e.g.  structural 
fires, in contrast to the large-scale floods and bushfires. The interviews were still useful in 
understanding how social media is used in emergency and disaster management and helped to 
improve the interview guide used with the final case organisations.   
 
The interview informants of the five case organisations were twelve in total. These interviews 
resulted in 10 hours and 15 minutes of recorded material as well as interview notes. Table 4.4 
shows the number of interviews in each organisation and whether the interview was recorded. 
 
Table 4.4 Overview formal Interview within the Case Organisations 
Case Organisation # Interviews 
# Transcribed 
Interviews 
# Not 
Recorded 
# Interview 
Informants 
Organisation A 3 2 1 1 
Organisation B 3 3 0 3 
Organisation C 4 2 2 3 
Organisation C 3 2 1 3 
Organisation E 1 1 0 1 
 
All recorded interviews were transcribed in preparation for the data analysis. Documentation 
of unrecorded interviews was done through note taking during and shortly after each interview. 
4.5.2 Documents 
A further source of data were documents. These documents were either created directly by the 
case organisations, were legislative documents regulating the emergency management field, or 
were documents about the case organisation and their social media utilisation. The main 
documents used within the study are emergency management plans, policy documents, social 
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media training documents, social media handbooks, and internal case studies about social 
media utilisation within the organisation.  
 
Each Australian State has legislative documents such as emergency management plans which 
are sorted by emergency type (e.g. Bushfires, or floods, or storm events). These documents 
describe the roles each of the emergency response organisation take during specific extreme 
events and the emergency management related to these events. The emergency management 
plans related to the case organisations were used to better understand the responsibilities these 
organisations have during specific extreme events. 
 
All case organisations produced policy documents which are available to the public. These 
documents include, but are not limited to, social media policies for personal accounts, and the 
social media policies for official corporate accounts. The social media policies for personal 
accounts define how members of the organisations (both volunteer and staff members) can and 
cannot use social media for their personal accounts, since the members of the organisation are 
always representing the organisation itself. The social media policies for the official accounts 
of the organisation define how authorised members of the organisation should and should not 
use these official communication channels.  
 
There are training documents which are used to train members of the organisation in using 
social media. The majority of the training documents are PowerPoint presentation slides but 
might include other material as well. There are different audiences for these training 
documents. Some of the training is targeted towards volunteers, and other training is targeted 
towards members of the organisation at the headquarters. Not all of the case organisations had 
training documents. I obtained these training documents from the interview informants of the 
relevant case organisation.  
 
Some of the case organisations created social media manuals for their social media operators. 
These manuals explain how different social media services should be utilised during different 
circumstances. There are social media manuals for social media utilisation to engage with the 
relevant audience, and as well social media manuals which are focusing on social media 
intelligence. Not all case organisations created social media manuals. 
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Several of the case organisations created case studies about social media utilisation during past 
extreme events. These case studies document how the social media services were utilised by 
the organisation and what worked well and where there were issues with the utilisation. These 
case studies were provided by the informants from within the organisation.  
4.5.3 Research Site Visits 
All of the case organisations were visited, with the exception of Case Organisation D, to 
conduct face to face interviews at the headquarters of each organisation. Face-to-face 
interviews with interview informants from Case Organisation D were conducted in the State 
Control Centre in Case State II, which is located in the headquarters of Case Organisation C.  
 
After each interview, a tour was conducted of each case organisation. The informants showed 
where they were working during their normal day-to-day activities as well as their workplaces 
when the organisation switches into an operational mode to respond to larger emergency 
events. The interview informants explained their general tasks when it comes to social media 
in both the operational mode and the non-operational mode 
 
Organisation A and B have a small control centre within their headquarters from which they 
coordinate their response to larger emergency events. The social media activity is coordinated 
from these control centres during the operational mode.  
 
The control centre of organisation E is not within the headquarters but at a different location. 
When the organisation switches into an operational mode, the social media activity is 
coordinated from the headquarters. When the State Control Centre is activated, the social media 
activity is then coordinated from the State Control Centre. The same patterns are present in 
case organisation D.  
 
The observations made during the research site visits were documented in the form of notes in 
a paper notebook shortly after the visit of the research site. The visits provided valuable 
information about where and how the social media operators are utilising social media for 
emergency events in different phases of the emergency management lifecycle.   
4.5.4 Workplace Observation 
In Case State II, a visit of the State Control Centre was held during a major bushfire event. In 
the time of the visit, the centre was in full operation. The State Control Centre was observed 
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over a period of four days as to how the emergency response to a major event is conducted. 
Organisation C, D and E were involved in the response to this event and were coordinating the 
response from within the State Control Centre.  
 
The majority of the time activities of the media and communication team were observed; i.e. 
through shadowing multiple social media officers as they were coordinating the social media 
communication and observing the activities of other stations. The observations were 
documented in the form of observational notes within a paper notebook. Informal talks were 
also conducted about social media with different members of the Case Organisations C, D, and 
E in Case State II at the State Control Centre. 
4.5.5 Social Media Data 
We know from previous research how different EMOs are utilising their social media channels 
during extreme events (Bruns et al. 2012; Crump 2011; Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Ehnis and 
Bunker 2013; Ehnis et al. 2014; Heverin and Zach 2010; Queensland Police Service - Media 
and Public Affairs Branch 2011) from the perspective of how the listening community would 
perceive the social media interaction through analysing the social media channels in isolation. 
This thesis focuses on how EMOs have integrated social media services into their organisations 
for emergency management purposes.  
 
While the interview data collected from informants who are close to the social media channels 
of the organisation is the main source of the empirical data, the social media channels of the 
EMOs were also an important source of data. The different social media channels that the 
organisations are using were observed and data collected to better understand the social media 
practices of these organisations. By observing these channels, it was possible to triangulate and 
better understand practices and utilisation of social media that was referred to by informants in 
interviews.    
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4.6 Data Analysis 
As in most qualitative research, the data analysis in this study involved an iterative process. 
This section, outlines the analyses of the empirical data to produce the research results of this 
thesis. Figure 4.4 illustrates the analysis approach.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Data Analysis Approach 
 
The grey rounded rectangles show the data sources which were introduced in the previous 
sections of this chapter. The white rectangles show the empirical artefacts. The social media 
data and documents acted both as empirical artefacts and data sources. The grey arrows show 
NVivo
=	Empirical	Artefact
=	Data	Source
=	Indication	of	Iteration	
=	Research	Output=		both	Data	Source
and	Empirical	Artefact
=	Software	package	
NVivo
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the flow of the data analysis, while the black arrows indicate the iterative feedback loop. The 
blue rectangle indicates the theoretical outcome of this thesis which is the revised model of 
social media in disaster management as shown and discussed in Chapter 7.6. 
 
 
The data analysis began with the creation of the first iteration of the interview guide. This 
version of the interview guide was created with the help of the outcome of the literature review 
on EMO use of social media, as shown in chapter 3.5, Ahmed’s Framework of Social Media 
in Disaster Management (Ahmed 2011), as shown in Chapter 3.6 and 7.2, my two preliminary 
studies Ehnis and Bunker (2012) and Ehnis and Bunker (2013), and the social media data from 
the particular case organisations. 
 
The analysis of the empirical material was iterative and occurred in several phases. The main 
data sources for the data analysis were the interview transcripts and case notes which were 
created during and shortly after the interviews. This data was supplemented by relevant 
documents from the case organisations, the notes from the research site visits, the notes from 
the workplace observation, and social media data from the case organisations. 
 
The first step of analysing the transcribed interviews involved listening to the interview 
recordings to become re-familiarised with the specific interview and to ensure the quality of 
the transcriptions. The notes made during and after the interview, were also re-read.   
 
In a further step, a printout of the interviews was further annotated. These included thoughts 
about specific sections and broad categories.   
 
A software package called NVivo was then used to organise, categorise and further annotate 
the interviews and further selected documents, such as social media manuals and guidelines. A 
bottom-up coding approach (Urquhart 2012) was used to identify specific categories in the data 
set. Some of these categories were supported by the underlying framework of Social Media in 
Disaster Management (Ahmed 2011), and some of the categories were new.  
 
In a further step, categories in the dataset were combined into broader themes, these were 
further supplemented and supported with the help of the additional data sources: social media 
data, notes from research site visit, notes from workplace observation notes, and other selected 
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documents about the case organisations.  These themes are outlined in Chapter 6 – Analysis 
and Findings in detail. Throughout the different iterations, these themes influenced the coding 
categories as more data became available.  
 
As discussed in section 4.5.1.1 aspects of social media utilisation that emerged through the 
analysis of the interview data lead to a refinement of the interview guide if the analysis revealed 
areas of social media utilisation by EMOs that needed further probing.  
 
Over time, as the themes became more and more concrete they revealed different aspects of 
social media (SM in Figure 4.4) utilisation in EMOs (EMO in Figure 4.4). These themes are 
discussed at length both in Chapter 6 – Analysis and Findings, as well as in Chapter 7 – 
Discussion.  As the research progressed emerging aspects of social media utilisation in different 
EMOs were used to develop a framework of social media utilisation in EMOs for the purpose 
of emergency and disaster management as discussed in Chapter 7.6. 
4.7 Summary 
The purpose of this methodology chapter is to outline the research approach. This research is 
designed as a case study with five ‘revelatory’ cases of EMOs which have embedded social 
media services into their structures and emergency management practices. The aim of the 
research is to understand better how such organisations have appropriated social media 
technology for the purpose of emergency management and to extend the theory about social 
media in emergency and disaster management.  
 
Within this study, an Interpretivist research paradigm is followed and the ontological stance of 
‘weak’ social constructivism is taken.  
 
The case design and the boundaries of each case were also described and the data collection as 
well as analysis was explained. Interviews were used as the main data source and informants 
were generally operators of the social media channels in each case organisation. As 
supplementing data, documents, notes from research site visits, notes from workplace 
observations, and social media data were collected from each case organisation. In the last part 
of the chapter, the iterative process for analysing and interpreting the data was outlined.  
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In the following chapter, a detailed account of the five case organisations is given and the 
emergency management context in the two different case states in which these organisations 
are situated is discussed. 
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Chapter 5 – Case Study Description 
5.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, a more detailed account of the selected case organisations investigated in this 
study is provided. As established in Chapter 2 and 3, social media services are embedded into 
the daily lives of individuals, however, for EMOs, these types of services and platforms are 
still relatively new technologies which are getting more and more integrated into the structures 
and practices of these organisations.  
 
As stated in Chapter 4, only EMOs that already actively use social media services were selected 
for investigation.  All case organisations thus adopted social media services into their structure 
and practices to communicate and interact with the public for emergency management 
purposes. ‘Revelatory’ cases (Urquhart 2012) were chosen under the assumption that 
organisations with a well-established social media integration will tell us more about the 
underlying phenomena (see section 4.4 for further detail). Still, all case organisations are in the 
progress of further exploring how social media technology fits into the practices and structures 
of emergency management. Thus while all of the selected case organisations adopted social 
media services into their structures and communication processes, the appropriation and 
alignment with their structures, practices, and norms are ongoing.  
 
The case organisations will now be introduced and have been selected from two Australian 
federal states, which are similar in their risks of natural emergency events. Both of the case 
states experience a seasonal occurrence of bushfires and also storms that can result in large 
flooding events. The selected response organisations which are situated in these states are large 
volunteer organisations which are similar in size, and responsibilities. The organisations show 
similarities in their structure at first glance, however, the two case states have vast differences 
the organisations are coordinated during larger emergency events.  
 
While the organisations show similarities on various aspects in their social media utilisation, 
the selected case organisations show contrasting and prominent patterns in their social media 
activity and structure between these two case states. This allows a comparison of the social 
media utilisation patterns that emerged in organisations from two different jurisdictions.  
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Bushfires, flooding, and severe storms are the most common source for extreme events in both 
federal states. Large response organisations have more resources to explore social media as an 
additional communication channel for emergency management in contrast to small EMOs. 
Therefore, it is not a surprise that the larger organisations are more active in using social media. 
In each of the states, the lead organisation responsible for storms and flooding events, and the 
lead organisation responsible for large-scale bushfires was selected as case studies.  
 
Case State II shows a different structure of communication with the public and media during 
extreme emergency events, or disaster events. To account for this different structure, an 
additional case organisation in Case State II was selected which is an overarching umbrella 
organisation responsible for the emergency response coordination for all type of hazard events. 
This organisation coordinates the centralised social media communication during these large-
scale extreme emergency events.      
 
The Interview Participation Consent Form promised the interview informants that the case 
organisations are disguised in this write-up of the study. Furthermore, it was specified that no 
information about the interview participants would be disclosed in a way that would make it 
possible to identify the particular interview informant.  
 
Organisational members of the case organisations who coordinate the social media utilisation 
of their organisations were interviewed. Therefore, in order to disguise the case organisations, 
the sources for the case descriptions in this chapter are not directly referred to. The case 
descriptions were written with the help of documents from and about the organisations, the 
interview transcripts, and publicly available information, such as the websites of the 
organisations.   
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 
introduces the three selected case organisations situated in Case State I, and section 5.3 outlines 
the case organisations from Case State II. In State I there is Organisation A (section 5.2.1), an 
organisation focusing on the response to bushfires events, and Organisation B (section 5.2.2) 
which is responding to storm and flood-related emergency events. Section 5.3 provides an 
account of the case organisations in State II. For State II, three case organisations were selected: 
Organisation C, D, and E. Organisation C (section 5.3.1) is an umbrella organisation 
responsible for the coordination of the response in all kind of hazard extreme events. 
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Organisation D (section 5.3.2) is responsible for bushfires, and rural structural fires and 
organisation E (section 5.3.2) is responsible for storm and flood related events.  
 
Each case description is structured following the same blueprint. First, an overview of the 
organisation with a description of tasks and responsibilities is given. After this, the structure of 
the organisation is outlined, with a specific focus on the social media utilisation structure. 
Finally, the actors involved in the social media utilisation are described.  
 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the case organisations in section 5.4.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Outline Chapter 5 
5.2	Case	State	I
5.2.1	Case	Organisation A
5.2.2	Case	Organisation B
5.3	Case	State	II
5.3.1	Case	Organisation C
5.3.2	Case	Organisation D
5.3.3	Case	Organisation E
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5.2 Case State I 
Case State I is a federal state located on the East Coast of Australia. Similar to all Australian 
states, the case state experiences frequent naturally occurring emergency extreme events. The 
most frequent event types are bushfire events, which occur almost seasonally, and flooding 
events, which are caused by storms.  
 
The bushfire season lasts typically from October to the end of March. It is still possible that 
bushfires occur outside this season. Storms that result in flooding events typically occur in the 
first quarter of a year.  
 
Within the State I, two EMOs as case organisations were selected. Both of these organisations 
are large-scale volunteer emergency response organisations, of which member bases consist of 
both volunteers and paid staff members. Organisation A is a fire response organisation and 
Organisation B is response organisation which has a main focus on storm, flood, and tsunami-
related emergency events.  
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5.2.1 Case Organisation A 
Table 5.1 Overview Organisation A 
Organisation Name: Organisation A 
State: State I 
Size: 75,000 members (combined volunteers and paid staff members) 
Type of Events: Bushfire Events 
Structure: 4 regions <- 50 districts <- 2032 brigades 
Social Media adoption: Early 2009 (Corporate Social Media Channels) 
Social Media is used as: Communication Channel with Public/Media; Intelligence Channel 
5.2.1.1 Overview – Organisation A 
The first case organisation, Organisation A, is responsible for bushfire events in the rural areas 
of State I. The organisation has more than 75,000 members and is, therefore, one of the largest 
fire response organisations worldwide. The main member base of the organisation consists of 
volunteers, and less than one thousand members paid staff. 
 
This organisation is the lead organisation during bushfire events in Case State I. This means 
that Organisation A coordinates the response to the bushfire events, while the remaining 
response organisation in the state fulfils support roles during bushfire events. 
 
The organisation explored the potential of social media for emergency management early on. 
On the corporate (headquarters) level of the organisation, the social media activity on Twitter 
and Facebook started in 2009. In the early phases, this social media operation consisted of 
automated messages. The activity was transformed into a more engaging approach in 2011. 
Now the organisation utilises social media to engage with the general public through all phases 
of disaster management. Furthermore, the organisation uses social media as a source for 
intelligence gathering to support the situational awareness during unfolding events.  
5.2.1.2 Structure – Organisation A 
The organisational structure consists of volunteer roles and paid roles. The majority of the 
member base consists of volunteers while only a small portion of the organisational members 
are paid staff. Volunteers in this organisation are trained firefighters. This type of trained 
volunteer should not be confused with untrained volunteers; For example, spontaneous 
volunteers who show up after extreme events and offer help. Volunteers in EMO context refer 
to highly trained individuals who are specialised in the core work of their organisation; in the 
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case of organisation A, this is the actual extinguishing of bushfires. The organisation also has 
permanent paid roles responsible for the coordination of the volunteers, training, support, the 
strategy of the organisation as a whole, communication with the media, and the centralised 
management of emergency events.  
 
While the organisation has a presence all over the state, it is centrally organised and very 
hierarchically structured. The organisation operates in all rural areas of State I. The operation 
area is structured into four main regions. Each of these regions consists of several districts. In 
total, there are more than 50 districts. Each of these districts consists of several local fire 
brigades. In total, the organisation has 2032 brigades. A brigade is operated by volunteers and 
consists of at least one fire truck.  
 
The organisation operates in two different modes. These modes are generally called ‘the 
operational mode’ and ‘the non-operational mode’ by the organisation and the emergency 
management sector. Operational mode refers to when the organisation is responding to and 
managing an emergency event. The non-operational phase is the day-to-day operation in times 
where there is no emergency event present. The time in the non-operational mode is used to 
prepare for the next emergency event, which includes planning, training, and other tasks to 
keep the organisation running and prepared.  
5.2.1.3 Social Media Utilisation Structure – Organisation A 
In the non-operation mode, the day-to-day operation, there are currently six individuals that 
have access to the social media channels in the headquarters of the organisation. One person is 
mainly responsible for operating the different social media channels and creates content on a 
regular basis.  
 
In the operational mode, activities depend on the size of the event and how many members of 
the organisation operate the social media channels. In a small-scale event, one person is 
responsible for the social media channels. In a major event, it can be up to four members. In 
operational mode, there are two twelve-hour shifts per day. The day shift is often responsible 
for social media broadcasting and information gathering for intelligence purposes. Since there 
is less activity on social media during the nights, the night shift is typically smaller than the 
day shift and is responsible for both social media and updating the web page. Currently, there 
is not a lot of social media intelligence during the night shifts. The case organisation has a 
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control centre embedded into its headquarters from which this organisation coordinates the 
responses to larger bushfire events. The extreme event social media communication is operated 
from within this centre. There is a dedicated table used by the social media officers. The 
members of the organisation refer to this table as the ‘social media cell’.  
 
During extreme events, the state activates the state control centre of State I to support the 
coordination between the involved emergency response and other emergency support 
organisations. The headquarters-level social media channels of Organisation A are still 
operated from within the headquarters of Organisation A, even when the state control centre of 
the state is activated.   
 
The social media section is embedded in the corporate communication unit of the organisation. 
This unit is responsible for communicating with the media as well as with the general public, 
however, specific members of other departments have access to the social media channels too. 
 
Social media activity is binding highly trained human resources to operate the social media 
communication channels of EMOs; these resources are not available for classical emergency 
management activities of these organisations. There is only a limited surge capacity available 
when it comes to operating social media channels during the operational mode, as there are 
only a limited number of officers familiar with this specific type of communication to the public 
and media. To improve the capacity for large-scale events, Organisation A is currently 
developing and testing approaches to build volunteer supported capabilities. This approach is 
based on the VOST (virtual operational support team) concept (Denis et al. 2012). The 
organisation builds a capacity of volunteers who either come into the headquarters to support 
the social media activity, or operates the social media channels from where they are based. The 
VOST concept is in a development and test process at case Organisation A.  
 
Brigades are run by volunteers. The decision if a brigade operates social media channels is 
made on a brigade level and operated independently from the centralised social media channels 
operated from the headquarters. The organisation tries to achieve a consistent usage of 
terminologies of the different social media channels through a policy document; This includes 
the names of each of their volunteer pages. Before this policy document was in place, the 
terminology convention was not standardised, and several different naming practices were in 
place. 
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If a brigade decides to operate social media channels, then the volunteers within the brigade 
operate these social media channels. Since the volunteers are needed when the brigade enters 
into the operational mode, it is not uncommon that these local brigade social media channels 
cannot provide emergency relevant updates when the brigade is responding to an emergency 
event.   
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5.2.2 Case Organisation B 
Table 5.2 Overview Organisation B 
Organisation Name: Organisation B 
State: State I 
Size: ~ 10,000 members (volunteer roles and paid staff) 
Type of Events: Storm events; flooding events; tsunami events 
Structure: 17 regions; 200 units 
Social Media adoption: 2011 at the headquarters level 
Social Media is used as: Communication and engagement channel with the public and the media 
5.2.2.1 Overview – Organisation B 
The responsibility of Case Organisation B is to provide emergency and rescue services for 
disaster events. The main response activity of the organisation is storm and flood-related 
events. Organisation B is the lead organisation in such event types. This means that the 
remaining emergency response organisation of the state will have a support role during storm 
and flood events and Organisation B coordinates the response to the event. 
 
The organisation has a member base of about 10,000 members and is, therefore, significantly 
smaller than Case Organisation A. However, it is still a very large volunteer organisation that 
is supported and managed by a small core of paid employees.  
 
On the headquarters level, the organisation started using social media microblogging services 
in the second half of 2011. During this time, there were already several social media channels 
operated by different volunteer units, which have adopted social media much earlier. Since 
social media was established at the headquarters level, Facebook and Twitter are actively used, 
and these channels were more closely integrated into the communication structure of the 
organisation over time. The organisation primarily uses social media services to communicate 
with the public. Social media services are also used for internal communication among the 
volunteers. Currently, the organisation does not have the capabilities to utilise social media as 
a tool to gather information to support situational awareness during an extreme event.  
5.2.2.2 Structure – Organisation B 
The operational area of the organisation is the whole state including urban areas. To cover this 
area, the organisation is structured into regions and units. There are more than 200 different 
units structured into regions. The units are located in both urban and rural areas. A unit is an 
operational compound similar to the brigades of case organisation A. A compound of several 
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units is structured into a region. There are seventeen regions across the state. Some of these 
regions consist of more units than others. There is a centralised headquarter, which oversees 
the different regions within the state.  
 
Social media activity can be observed on all three of these structural levels: on the unit level, 
on the region level, and on a centralised headquarters level. Most of the emergency 
management related social media activity is centralised at the headquarters and on the region 
level.  
 
The organisation mostly consists of volunteers, but also employs paid staff members in 
administrative and senior operational roles. Most of the paid roles are situated within the 
headquarters or the regional centres. The unit roles are volunteer roles. The volunteers are 
specially trained for their primary tasks. When it comes to social media, there is no dedicated 
volunteer role for this task.  
5.2.2.3 Social Media Utilisation Structure – Organisation B 
The organisation mainly utilises microblogging platforms and social networking sites for their 
social media activity. Facebook and Twitter are the primary channels. There are also other 
channels such as LinkedIn, Google+, or YouTube, but these channels are rather static and used 
as a business card or in-support function to improve the engagement with the general public, 
but not for the primary tasks of emergency management.  
 
Similar to the remaining case organisations, the organisation operates in two modes of 
operation that influences how the social media channels are utilised. The first mode of 
operation is the non-operational mode and the second mode is the operational mode in which 
the organisation is responding to an extreme event. 
 
During the time the organisation is in the non-operational mode, multiple members of the 
organisation have the authority to broadcast information through the organisation's social 
media channels, however, the web and social media coordinator from within the headquarters 
of the organisation do most of the social media communication.   
 
When the organisation is in full operation and responds to a large-scale emergency event, the 
corporate social media channels can be operated 24 hours a day. During these times, the 
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organisation operates in twelve-hour shifts. During one shift, one person within the 
headquarters is responsible for the organisation’s social media channels and website updates. 
If necessary, an additional person can support the social media operator in communicating 
information towards the public and media organisations. The social media channels are 
generally not used to gather information about extreme events. 
 
The social media section at the headquarters is embedded within the corporate communication 
unit of the organisation. The responsibilities of this unit include communicating with the 
general public and the communication with media organisations.  
 
The social media responsibility on a regional level varies, however, generally, the community 
engagement coordinator for a specific region is responsible for most of the social media 
activity.  
 
The main accounts are situated at the headquarters level and managed from there. The region 
level accounts provide information more relevant to the specific regions.       
 
Many of the units operate one or multiple social media channels, but there are also many units 
who decide not to utilise social media channels at all. The units are run by volunteers, and the 
decision whether a unit is utilising social media is dependent on the volunteers in each unit. 
The extent to which social media services are utilised on a unit level varies. Similar to 
Organisation A, the social media activity of the units is very limited when the unit is responding 
to an emergency event as the volunteers are needed to perform their primary task of responding 
to the effects of an event. There is currently no dedicated social media role on a volunteer level. 
Therefore, most emergency relevant information is provided either through the central 
corporate social media channels operated by the headquarters or by the region social media 
channels of the organisation.  
 
The central structure of the organisation supports and advises the units on their utilisation of 
social media, however, the headquarters prefers if a unit is using social media only for internal 
communication in closed groups or channels, invisible to the public, and not for external 
communication. The reasoning behind this is that it would be preferable when the provided 
information to the public is not too fragmented over a myriad of channels. In addition, so that 
there is less room for conflicting information provided on the social media channels.  
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5.3 Case State II 
Case State II is located on the East Coast of Australia. The state is a neighbouring state of Case 
State I and is experiencing similar types of extreme events. The case state mostly experiences 
bushfires, and storms which can result in severe flooding events. The bushfire events occur 
under normal conditions during the summer months. The bushfire season typically lasts from 
early October to the end of March. The storm events resulting in severe flood events also 
commonly occur during the first quarter of a year. However, it is also possible that such an 
event occurs outside this time frame.  
 
In Case State II, three EMOs as case organisations were selected. The case organisations are 
organisation C, D, and E. Organisation D and E are large-scale volunteer emergency response 
organisations. Organisation D coordinates and responds to bushfire and structural fire-related 
events. Organisation E is responsible for the coordination and response to storms, floods, and 
tsunami related emergency events. Both of these case organisations draw on volunteer 
members and are closely embedded into the social fabric of the communities they are serving.  
 
Organisation C is different in comparison to the other selected case organisations in the sense 
that it is a relatively small organisation and does not have the large volunteer base. The 
organisation is an overarching coordinating organisation. The organisation does not have its 
own response assets on the ground with which it could directly manage an extreme event. It 
acts as an umbrella organisation with the focus to improve the communication and coordination 
of emergency response organisations when an emergency event requires extended 
collaboration either through the size of the event or that the event type needs the response of 
several different response organisations.  
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5.3.1 Case Organisation C 
Table 5.3 Overview Organisation C 
Organisation Name: Organisation E 
State: State II 
Size: Unclear (Between 50 and 200 paid employees) 
Type of Events: All-hazards approach 
Structure: Centralised in headquarters; support in regional control centres 
Social Media adoption: 2013 
Social Media is used as: Communication channel to engage with Public and Media; Intelligence Channel 
5.3.1.1 Overview – Organisation C 
Case Organisation C differs from the remaining case organisations in several aspects: This 
organisation is not a volunteer based organisation; the organisation is relatively young and was 
established in its current form in 2014; and the organisation is not a classical emergency 
response organisation with own emergency response assets.   
 
Organisation C is a governing body that sits above all other EMOs in State II. Organisation C 
has the legislative responsibility to warn communities in emergency events. The organisation 
is, in contrast to the other case organisations, very young and came into being within the last 
seven years. The organisation does not have its own response capabilities, such as fire trucks 
and other emergency response assets on the ground, but it is an umbrella organisation 
supporting state emergency response organisations with communication, coordination, and 
collaboration capabilities. In a large-scale extreme event, the emergency response organisation 
in the state such as Organisation D and E, hand over said responsibilities to Organisation C 
with the objective of improving the event coordination. 
 
The origin of Organisation C is closely linked to a devastating bushfire disaster event that 
occurred in Case State II. Many lives and properties were lost during this event. In the aftermath 
of the event, it became evident that there was a problem in the interoperability of the involved 
organisations. There were multiple breakdowns in communication, collaboration and 
coordination between the involved EMOs. Without these breakdowns, it might have been 
possible to respond more effectively to the event and lives may have been saved. The 
predecessor of Organisation C was established to improve this coordination in bushfire related 
events.  
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A mine fire in Case State II showed that emergency extreme events often have multiple 
cascading risk factors and outcomes. The fire event itself was manageable by the response 
organisation. Though it was not possible to extinguish the mine fire straight away, the fire could 
be contained, however, the ongoing smoke from the fire was a serious health risk for the 
surrounding communities. These problems showed that there is a need for better coordination 
between the response organisations and the involved support organisations in all types of 
extreme events, and not just during bushfire events. The predecessor of organisation C was 
therefore shifted from a fire-centred approach towards an all-hazard approach. Organisation C 
in the form as it is structured today was established in 2014.  
 
The main focus of this organisation is to support response organisations with their work and 
coordinate inter-agency collaboration in single and multi-hazard scenarios. Furthermore, the 
main responsibility of the organisation is to inform and warn the public about emergency 
events.  
5.3.1.2 Structure – Organisation C 
In contrast to the other case organisations, the member base of Organisation C consists only of 
paid employees as the organisation has no own volunteer members or emergency response 
equipment, such as fire trucks. The organisation is a relatively small organisation as its main 
activities are to support and improve the communication, coordination and collaboration 
between the EMOs within the state.  
 
The headquarters of organisation C houses the premises of the state control centre of Case State 
II. When the state control centre is activated, the relevant organisations coordinate the 
emergency response towards an event from this state control centre. The state control centre is 
activated during major extreme events, or in days of a high risk of such an event occurring. For 
example, the state control centre would be activated in days of a severe bushfire risk.   
 
The state control centre is coordinated by Organisation C. When it is activated, in the response 
to an event, involved EMOs coordinate this response from the state control centre. All involved 
organisations send members of their organisations to the centre. Some members are then on 
secondment in Organisation C to fill specific roles in that organisation, such as the role of social 
media officers. 
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5.3.1.3 Social Media Utilisation Structure – Organisation C 
The organisation uses social media in both modes of operation. In the non-operational mode, 
the social media channels are used to communicate information about the organisation. 
Furthermore, the organisation uses the channels to educate the public about potential 
emergency events in order to build community resilience.  
 
In the operational mode, the organisation operates social media channels on behalf of the 
involved organisations in an event. The organisation is in the operational mode when the state 
control centre is activated. The social media activity of the involved organisations is taken over 
by Organisation C, which then operates the corporate (headquarters level) social media 
channels on behalf of the involved organisations. The social media channels on a region, 
district or unit/brigade level are not operated by Organisation C. 
 
Social media is situated in two different teams, which have different aims and focus when it 
comes to the utilisation of social media channels. The first team is situated in the “public 
information and warnings” unit. This unit of the organisation is responsible for informing the 
media and the public about emergency events and risks related to these events. This team uses 
social media to distribute information towards the general public and media organisations.  
 
The second team is situated within the “intelligence unit” of the organisation. The 
responsibility of this team is to use social media to gather and validate relevant information 
during an extreme event. This information is then used to improve the situational awareness of 
the organisation and the management of the EMOs involved in the extreme event 
 
The two units in the organisation are distinct and physically separated organisational units. The 
social media officers within these units have different skill sets and training. The intelligence 
unit only gets activated when the operation is in the operational mode. The social media unit 
within the media team is also operational in the non-operational mode of the organisation, 
however, it is then only operating the social media channels of Organisation C. 
 
The distribution of information to the public and media organisations is done through the social 
media team within the public information and warnings unit. When the organisation is not in 
its operational mode, the team has three members who operate the social media channels. 
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Besides communicating relevant information to the general public, this team improves and 
prepares the social media utilisation for disaster management.  
 
When the organisation is switching into the operational mode, the state control centre of State 
II is activated. In such a case, a shift happens in the social media utilisation of the involved 
EMOs. Organisation C takes over the coordination of the social media channels of other 
emergency managing organisations on their behalf. In these cases, the social media activity is 
coordinated from the state control centre and not from the headquarters of the individual 
organisations. The involved EMO suspends to use their corporate channels during such times 
of operation. 
 
Organisation C extends their capacity to operate the social media channels with social media 
officers provided by emergency response organisations within State II. Which social media 
officer operates which social media channels is determined by the roster. Through this practice, 
the organisation has capabilities to respond to sudden surges when there are more social media 
officers needed.  
 
The allocation of who operates is coordinated through a roster where each potential social 
media operator of the state is a part of. During the days they are on the roster, they are on call. 
If the state control centre is activated during a day, the on-call persons will be informed to 
operate the social media channels from the state control centre. 
 
The specific social media officer for the day can come from, for example, Organisation E, but 
broadcasts messages for Organisation D. The decision who is in the state control centre is 
dependent on a predetermined roster which is set active when the state control centre is 
activated. 
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5.3.2 Case Organisation D 
Table 5.4 Overview Organisation D 
Organisation Name: Organisation D 
State: State II 
Size: More than 52,000 members (combined volunteers and paid staff) 
Type of Events: Bushfire events and structural fires 
Structure: 5 regions <- 21 districts <- 1200 brigades 
Social Media adoption: 2008 
Social Media is used as: Communication channel to engage with Public and Media; Intelligence Channel 
5.3.2.1 Overview – Organisation D 
Case Organisation D is a fire response organisation. The organisation’s emergency 
responsibilities include all fire related emergency events in Case State II, excluding the state’s 
capital. Organisation D also responds to structural fires, which is a contrast to organisation A 
which responsibilities only include bushfire events.  
 
Organisation D was an early adopter of social media services for emergency and disaster 
management within Australia. The corporate (headquarters level) social media channels were 
established in 2008 and back then included Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. In the beginning, 
the organisation used two different Twitter channels; One was dedicated for emergency 
warnings, and one was dedicated to other emergency relevant information and information 
about the organisation. Now the organisation is only using one Twitter channel at the 
headquarters level, which is used as both as a warning and as an information channel.   
5.3.2.2 Structure – Organisation D 
The operation area of the organisation is the whole state excluding the state capital as another 
fire organisation is responsible for the area of the state capital. The member base of the case 
organisation consists of volunteer roles and paid staff roles. The paid employees include career 
fire fighters, support staff, and management staff in senior roles. The main member base of the 
organisations consists of volunteers. The organisation currently consists of more than 50,000 
volunteers and more than 2,000 paid staff members. Most of the volunteers in the organisations 
are trained volunteer fire fighters. Around 1,000 paid career fire fighters are employed in the 
denser populated areas of the state where 24-hour a day operated fire stations are necessary. 
The organisation refers to these fire stations as integrated fire stations as these stations host 
both volunteer fire fighters as well as career fire fighters.   
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In contrast to Organisation A, which is also a fire department operating in the rural areas of the 
state in which it is located, Organisation D is responsible for both structural fire and bush fire 
events. Different equipment, strategies, and training are necessary to respond to these two 
different fire types. These fire event types do not behave the same way, and different risk factors 
are involved when they occur.   
 
The organisation is very hierarchically structured and centrally organised as it typically is for 
EMOs. The different sub-structures (Holons) of the organisations have still autonomy to some 
extent and can operate autarkical during events. The operation area of the organisation is 
divided into five regions with a total of 21 districts. There are several fire brigades in each 
district. In total, there are more than 1,200 brigades in the organisation.   
 
The social media utilisation shows similar patterns to the other examined volunteer 
organisations. There is some social media activity on a brigade level, which means that some 
of the brigades utilise social media services to communicate with the public, however, the 
emergency-relevant communication is still very centralised and orchestrated through the 
headquarters level.  
 
The organisation has two major modes of operation; it operates in an operational mode, and a 
non-operational mode. The social media utilisation in the non-operational mode is more 
diversified and experimental, while the social media operation in the operational mode shows 
standardised established practices.  
 
The operational mode shows two major manifestations. The first of these manifestations is the 
normal operational mode in which the fire events are localised and the risk level of it to transfer 
into a major disaster event are low. In this case, the organisation coordinates the response within 
its own structure. The main social media communication is then handled from the headquarters 
of the organisation.  
 
When there is an intense extreme event present, then the event is coordinated from the state 
control centre. When the state control centre is activated, the organisation is then also activated 
as a coordinating organisation. Some of the coordination of the event is then transferred from 
the headquarters of the organisation towards the state control centre. In such a case, the social 
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media communication is then completely suspended in organisation D and picked up by 
organisation C, which then operates the social media channels on behalf of organisation D.  
5.3.2.3 Social Media Utilisation Structure – Organisation D 
Social media is situated on three levels in the organisation: Centralised at the headquarters: on 
a district level; and on a brigade level. Not all districts and brigades operate social media 
channels. Similar to the other case organisations, most emergency relevant information is 
provided through the headquarters social media channels.  
 
The social media team within the headquarters is situated in the media and communications 
unit. While more members of the organisation have access to the social media channels, the 
main social media team consists of two members of the organisation. These two members 
coordinate the centralised social media channels and also monitor their social media channels. 
 
Outside office hours and especially during the weekend, there is a roster in place that indicates 
which social media officer is responsible for coordinating the social media channels at this 
time.  
 
When the organisation is in the operational mode and the state control centre (organisation C) 
is not activated, the headquarters level social media channels are operated from within the 
headquarters of the organisation. 
 
When the state control centre is activated, the social media coordination is moved to 
Organisation C which then operates the headquarters level social media channels of 
Organisation D from within the state control centre.   
 
Besides the human operation of the social media channels, the organisation uses automated 
warnings to post on their main Facebook channel and to one of their Twitter channels. The 
organisation uses two Twitter channels, one for emergency related information warnings and 
one for organisational updates to the volunteer members of the organisation. The automated 
warnings are sent out by an internal warning information system.  
  
125 
5.3.3 Case Organisation E 
Table 5.5 Overview Organisation E 
Organisation Name: Organisation E 
State: State II 
Size: ~5700 members (combined volunteers and paid staff roles) 
Type of Events: Storm events; flooding events; tsunami events 
Structure: 6 regions; 149 units  
Social Media adoption: 2011 
Social Media is used as: Communication Channel to engage with Public and Media  
5.3.3.1 Overview – Organisation E 
Organisation E is specialised to respond to storms, flood, and tsunami related extreme events. 
Furthermore, the organisations also have the capabilities to provide relief to other event types. 
The organisation can be compared to Organisation B as it is the correspondent EMO in Case 
State II. Organisation E is a volunteer organisation supported and coordinated by a small core 
group of paid employees.  
 
At the headquarters level, the organisation has been utilising social media since 2011. At this 
organisational level, the organisation uses a Facebook channel and two Twitter channels. One 
Twitter channel is dedicated to information about the organisation as well as less time-sensitive 
emergency relevant information. The second Twitter channel is dedicated to warnings and 
time-sensitive disaster information. 
5.3.3.2 Structure – Organisation E 
The operational area of the organisation is the whole state. Organisation E is the smallest of the 
volunteer-centred case organisations with about 5,700 members. The majority of these 
members are volunteers. The organisation employs between 150 and 200 paid staff members 
in administrative, senior operational and other support positions.  
 
The language the organisation uses in regards to its structure is similar to case Organisation B. 
There are 149 units are structured into 6 different regions which are governed by the 
headquarters. The headquarters is situated in the capital of State II. The operational area of the 
organisation is the whole Case State II.  
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When it comes to the overarching patterns in utilising social media, Organisation E has similar 
practices in place as Organisation D. The organisation works in two operational modes: The 
non-operational mode, which is the day-to-day operation; and the operational mode, which is 
the mode when the organisation responds to an emergency event. The operational mode has 
two forms of manifestation or escalation. In the first form, the social media communication is 
managed within the organisation. In the second form, the state control centre, and with it 
Organisation C, is activated. 
5.3.3.3 Social Media Utilisation Structure – Organisation E 
Case Organisation E uses social media channels on a unit, region, and headquarters level. 
Volunteers of the organisation operate the social media channels on the unit and region level. 
A small social media team operates the social media channels at the headquarters level. Critical 
emergency relevant information is broadcasted through the headquarters social media 
channels.  
 
Members of the media and communication unit operate the headquarters social media channels. 
There are four members within the organisation who coordinates the social media channels on 
a day-to-day basis as one aspect of their role duties. 
 
In the non-operational mode, the social media channels are only operated during office hours, 
however, there is a roster for an on-duty media officer. The media duty officer is sporadically 
monitoring the social media channels outside the office hours and during weekends.  
 
The organisation currently uses social media to communicate and engage with their listening 
community (members of the general public who decide to follow the social media channels of 
the organisation) and the media. The organisation does not use social media as an intelligence 
channel to improve situational awareness. This case organisation is relatively small and does 
not have the resources for such an endeavour.  
 
The organisation uses an internal warning information system which automatically broadcasts 
warnings at the headquarters level Facebook page and on one Twitter channel.  
 
Similar to organisation D, organisation E has two manifestations of the operational mode. In 
the case that the state control centre is not activated in Case State II, then the social media 
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channels are operated from within the headquarters of organisation E by the media and 
communication team.  
 
The second manifestation of the operational mode would be when the state control centre is 
activated. In the case that the decision is made to activate the state control centre, then 
Organisation E suspends its social media communication and the external social media 
communication is handled centrally through Organisation C in the state control centre of State 
II.  
 
The social media operators from Organisation E are also part of the roster, which operates 
social media from within the state control centre.  
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter provided a description of the different case organisations used in this study. Each 
case description was structured into three parts: An overview about the organisation, which 
included event types the organisation typically responds to; an overview of the structure of the 
organisation; and finally, an overview of the social media utilisation structure in each 
organisation.  
 
The organisations are situated in two federal states with different approaches in emergency 
management. Case Organisation A, and B are situated in Case State I. Organisation C, D, and 
E are situated in Case State II. 
 
Table 5.6 shows a comparative overview on the different case organisations in the two case 
states. In total, four ‘classical’ EMOs, and one ‘umbrella’ organisation were selected. The 
‘classical’ EMOs have either a fire focus (Organisation A and D), or a focus on events related 
to storms and floods (Organisation B and E). Organisation C, the ‘umbrella’ organisation, has 
the responsibility of warning and informing the public, and ensuring interoperability between 
organisations in larger extreme emergency events. 
 
Table 5.6 Comparison of Case Organisations 
Organisation Member Structure 
Emergency 
Responsibility Operation Area Jurisdiction 
Organisation 
type 
Organisation A 
Volunteer and 
paid staff 
members 
Bushfire events Whole state  State I 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
Organisation B 
Volunteer and 
paid staff  
members 
Flood and storm 
related events Whole state  State I 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
Organisation C Paid staff members 
All hazards 
approach Whole state  State II 
Coordinating 
umbrella 
organisation 
Organisation D 
Volunteer and 
paid staff 
members 
Bushfire and 
structural fires 
Outside state 
capital  State II 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
Organisation E 
Volunteer and 
paid staff 
members 
Flood and storm 
related events Whole state  State II 
Emergency 
Response 
Organisation 
 
 
The case organisations are actively using social media services for emergency management 
and have adopted this technology early on. 
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Except for case Organisation C, the case organisations are predominantly volunteer 
organisations with a large volunteer member base and a comparatively small ratio of paid staff 
members in senior leadership and support roles. Organisation C constitutes only of paid staff 
members.    
 
It is important to highlight that the volunteers in the case organisations are highly trained for 
the tasks they are expected to perform. It is an ongoing commitment that requires time for 
meetings and training. These types of volunteers should not be confused with spontaneous 
volunteers who want to help after an event occurred and typically only have a low level of 
commitment.  
 
In the next chapter, the results of the data analysis and the findings from the five case 
organisations are presented. 
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Chapter 6 – Analysis and Findings  
“Look there are always people that are critical of social media. That's because they don’t 
understand it. People talk - use the term dinosaurs – for people who don't understand 
technology. They exist everywhere. There are some people who view social media purely as this 
cyber bullying platform and that it holds no weight. There are people who don't understand it, 
but they know that it is massive and that people use it so it's a good tool. But they don't 
understand it. There are people who are critical of it because they're fearful of repercussion. 
What if I do something wrong? What if I get on there and people talk badly about me or my 
brigade or anything like that? The answer to that is that they can do that anyway. If people 
want to talk badly about you, the internet exists for them to do that whether you have a 
Facebook page or not. So the best thing to do is to get on there and control that.” – Social 
Media Officer – Organisation D 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, analysis of the empirical data is outlined. The data analysis resulted in twelve 
themes which each cover an important aspect of social media utilisation within EMOs.  The 
chapter is structured into fifteen sections, the main ones shown in Figure 6.1. In the following 
subsection, an overview of the major themes found through the analysis of the data is provided. 
In the following twelve sections, each of these themes is explored in detail. The chapter is then 
concluded with a brief summary of the themes. 
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Figure 6.1 Outline Chapter 6 
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6.2  Overview of Identified Themes in the Dataset 
As described in Chapter 4.6, the data analysis approach was an iterative process in which 
themes of social media utilisation in EMOs for the purpose of Emergency and Disaster 
Management were identified within the dataset. The data analysis resulted in twelve themes 
emerging. Seven of these themes have sub-themes. To provide a broad understanding of the 
findings from the data analysis, the themes are presented in Table 6.1. The table is structured 
as follows. The names of the themes are provided in the dataset. If a theme has a sub-theme, 
the naming of the subtheme is provided in column two. The third column shows a short 
description of the exploration of the particular theme. The last column shows the research 
question to which a particular theme contributes to answer. The research questions are provided 
in Table 6.2 as a reference.  
 
Table 6.1 Identified Themes in Dataset 
Theme  Sub-theme Description 
Contributes 
to answer 
research 
question  
Localisation of Social 
Media in the 
Organisation 
 
Explores on which organisational 
level social media is utilised within an 
organisation. 
RQ 1,2,3 
 Headquarters Level 
Explores the social media utilisation 
at the headquarters level of an 
organisation. 
RQ 1,2,3 
 Region and District Level 
Explores the social media utilisation 
at the Region and District Level of an 
organisation. 
RQ 1,2,3 
 Brigade/Unit Level 
Explores the social media utilisation 
at the Brigade or Unit Level of an 
organisation. 
RQ 1,2,3 
Social Media Channel 
in Use  
Explores which Social Media 
channels are used by the EMOs. RQ 1,2 
 Main Social Media Channel 
These are social media channels 
which are predominantly used for the 
active emergency management  
RQ 1,2 
 Supporting Social Media Channel 
These are social media channels 
supporting other communication 
activities by the organisations.  
RQ 1,2 
 Placeholder Social Media Channel 
These are social media channels are 
not actively used but the 
organisations registered an account 
with. 
 
RQ 1,2 
 
 
Legacy Social Media 
Channel 
 
These are social media channels not 
used any more. RQ 1,2 
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Social Media Selection 
and Audience 
 
 
 
 
Explores how a social media channel 
is selected to communicate with the 
listening community and whether 
there are different perceived 
audiences within the listening 
community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ 2 
 External Social Media Utilisation 
Explores the aspects of 
communicating with the external 
audiences. 
RQ 2, 
3.1,3.2 
 Internal Social Media Utilisation 
Explores the aspects of 
communicating with the internal 
audiences. 
RQ 2, 3.3 
Sourcing and 
Distribution of 
Information through 
Social Media Channels 
 
Explores where the information 
distributed on the social media 
channels is coming from. 
 
 Operational Mode 
Explores where the information 
distributed on the social media 
channels is coming from during the 
operational mode. 
RQ 1.1, 2, 
3.1 
 Non-Operational Mode 
Explores where the information 
distributed on the social media 
channels is coming from during the 
non-operational mode. 
RQ 1.1, 2, 
3.1 
Social Media as an 
Engagement Channel  
Explores how social media is used to 
communicate and engage with the 
general public.  
RQ 1,2,3.1 
Social Media as an 
Intelligence Channel  
Explores how the social media 
channels are used to gather 
information from these channels.  
 
 Communication Intelligence 
Explores how the channels are used to 
gather information relevant to what 
the organisation distributes through 
their channels.  
RQ 1,2,3.1 
 Operational Intelligence 
Explores how the organisations utilise 
their social media channels to gather 
information which influences how the 
organisations responds towards a 
particular event.  
RQ 1,2,3.1 
Incident Reporting 
through Social Media 
and Dispatching 
 
Explores what happens when 
members of the public use the social 
media channels to ask for help or 
report an incident.   
RQ 2,3.1 
 Occasional Incident Report 
Explores the approaches towards an 
occasional incident. RQ 2,3.1 
 Extreme Event Help Requests 
Explores the aspects of large-scale 
emergency events. RQ 2,3.1 
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Social Media Operators  
Explores the different types of social 
media officer in the case 
organisations. 
RQ 1, 2 
 Social Media Engagement Officer 
An officer who communicates 
through social media with the 
listening audience.  
RQ 1, 2 
 Social Media Intelligence Officer 
An officer who gathers information 
from the social media channels. RQ 1, 2 
 Integrated Social Media Officer 
An officer who both communicates 
with the listening audience, but also 
gathers information from the social 
media channels. 
 
 
 
RQ 1, 2 
Formalisation of Social 
Media  
Explores how social media activities 
are formalised within the case 
organisations.  
 
 
RQ 1, 2 
Social Media for-intra-
organisational 
communication 
 
Explores how the case organisations 
utilise their social media channels to 
communicate with the volunteer 
members within the case 
organisations. 
RQ 3.2 
Social Media for inter-
organisational  
communication 
 
Explores how the case organisations 
utilise their social media channels to 
communicate with other EMOs. 
RQ 3.3 
Supporting Software in 
Use for Social Media 
utilisation 
 
Explores what kinds of supporting 
software the case organisations utilise 
to operate their social media channels 
for different purposes.  
RQ 1 
 
Table 6.2 Research Questions asked in this thesis 
RQ Number Research Question 
RQ 1: How are Social Media Services integrated into the structures of Emergency Management Organisations? 
RQ 2 How are Social Media Services utilised within Emergency Management Organisations for the purpose of emergency and disaster management? 
RQ 2.1: Is there a difference in the Social Media utilisation during the operational mode and the non-operational mode of an Emergency Management Organisation? 
RQ 3: How are Social Media Services used as communication platforms in Emergency Management Organisations for the purpose of emergency and disaster management to: 
RQ 3.1: interact with the public? 
RQ 3.2: interact with other Emergency Management Organisations? 
RQ 3.3 interact with their own organisational members? 
 
Each of the following sections is used to unpack one of the themes in the dataset in detail.  
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6.3 Localisation of Social Media in the Organisation 
In this section of the data analysis, organisational levels at which social media is utilised within 
the case organisations are highlighted. As shown in figure 6.2, three organisational levels in 
which the case organisations operate in different independent organisational structures are 
outlined. These organisational levels refer back to the partially independent holonic sub-
systems introduced in Chapter 2. Each of the organisational level is a sub-system of the 
organisation and operates to a certain extent independent of the organisational level higher up 
in the hierarchy.  
 
 
Figure 6.2 In Case Organisations Observed Organisational Levels 
 
Case organisation A, and D operate their social media channels on four organisational levels; 
The headquarters level, the region level, the district level, and the brigade level. Organisation 
B, and E operate on three major hierarchical levels: The headquarters level, the district level, 
and the unit level. Organisation C operates social media at the stage of the study only on the 
headquarters level or in the state control centre, however, the organisation plans to extend this 
utilisation in the future. 
 
On a headquarters level, there are usually only paid staff members. On a district/region level, 
there are usually both volunteer and paid staff members of the organisation. Only volunteers 
usually operate the unit/brigade level. The term “usually” is used here since there might be 
some exceptions, especially in the operational mode of the organisations, which renders it 
necessary that there are, for example, volunteers of the organisation in the headquarters to 
support in specific roles; Or the other way around where paid staff members are temporally 
seconded to a region, district, or even unit level to support the emergency response on a more 
local level.  
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Furthermore, organisation E shows another exception to the pattern. Organisation E employs 
career fire fighters on a local level within the organisation. There are integrated fire brigades 
operated by both career fire fighters and volunteer fire fighters, and brigades only operated by 
volunteers. The career fire fighters are paid staff members of the organisation. 
 
Organisation C does not have volunteers in its organisation. Organisation C is a coordinating 
“umbrella organisation” which is instantiated to warn the general public and support the inter-
organisational collaboration in the emergency management sector. Subsequently, organisation 
C does not have its own emergency response resources or volunteer members within its 
organisation. This case organisation operates both the State Control Centre and regional 
incident control centres, but does not have a unit/brigade level.   
 
Table 6.3 Organisational Level and Social Media Utilisation 
Organisational 
Level 
Organisation  
A 
Organisation  
B 
Organisation  
C 
Organisation  
D 
Organisation  
E 
Predominantly 
operated in 
mode of 
operation 
Social 
Media 
operated 
by 
Headquarters X X X X X Both modes of operation 
Paid staff 
members 
Region X Not applicable  X Not applicable 
Non-operational 
mode 
Paid staff 
and 
volunteer 
members 
District X X  X X 
Non-operational 
mode 
Paid staff 
and 
volunteer 
members 
Brigade/Unit X X Not applicable X X Non-operational mode 
Volunteer 
members 
 
Table 6.3 provides an overview on which organisational levels each organisation utilises social 
media. The social media channels are not shared between different organisational levels. There 
are independent social media channels at each organisational level operated by members of 
these specific organisational levels. In the non-operational mode, there is social media activity 
on all three organisational levels.  
 
The data shows that the case organisations utilise social media technology centralised for active 
emergency management. This is contrary to the potential that social media could be used 
decentralised on a local level.  In the operational mode, the main focus of social media 
utilisation is at the headquarters level, while the other organisational levels only have a support 
role. The headquarters channels provide the warnings and the emergency relevant information. 
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District or Region channels reproduce this information and might provide additional localised 
information. However, in the case that particular information could help to avoid dangerous 
situations, the localised information then would also be provided through the headquarters 
social media channels. In the operational mode, the brigade/unit social media channels are not 
used.  
 
At the point in time of the data collection, organisation C was only operating social media from 
the headquarters of the organisation, but not yet from the regional control centres. The 
organisation was planning to extend the social media utilisation to the regional control centres, 
however, the necessary human resources were not yet in place. As already shown, organisation 
C operates the social media channels for organisation D and E on behalf of these organisations 
when the state control centre is activated (operational mode). Organisation C only takes over 
the corporate headquarters channels of the organisations, but not the region district, or the 
unit/brigade channels.  
6.3.1 Headquarters Level Social Media Use 
On a headquarters level, social media is used in both the operational mode as well as in the 
non-operational mode. The organisations use their channels on this level for emergency 
relevant information, as well as for public relations, or organisational member relations 
relevant information.  
 
All case organisations have dedicated social media officers within the headquarters who 
coordinates and operates the social media channels during both modes of operation. In the non-
operational mode, there are dedicated officers who operate the social media channels as part of 
their roles. The main coordination in the non-operational mode is done by the team which 
operates the digital communication channels, such as the public facing websites, the internal 
facing Intranet, and now also the social media channels. Additionally to this core team, there 
are the public engagement officers who also contribute towards the social media 
communication.  
 
In the operational mode, the social media utilisation in each case organisation is very 
centralised as illustrated through the following quote:  
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“When it comes to warnings and that critical emergency information it's quite centralised in 
the sense that it's generally managed either by ourselves at <Organisation D> headquarters 
or the State Control Centre if there's really bad bushfire days or there's a major emergency 
happening. The State Control Centre's activated and there'll be a number of agencies in there 
and they really are responsible for that warning information.”  - Organisation D Social Media 
Officer   
 
Important emergency relevant information, such as warning or information critical for the 
public to have access to, is distributed centrally through the headquarters social media 
channels. The social media utilisation at the remaining organisational levels has only a support 
role during the operational mode.    
  
 
Figure 6.3  Different Social Media location in operational mode when state control centre 
(SCC) is activated 
 
During major emergency events, the states activate a State Control Centre. The state control 
centre is activated when an emergency event is large enough that a more coordinated approach 
from a different organisation is necessary to effectively respond towards an event. The two 
case states show fundamental different approaches to the social media utilisation when the 
State Control Centre within the case states is activated as shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
In Case State I, the social media utilisation stays within the respective case organisations, which 
is Organisation A or Organisation B. These organisations operate their social media channels 
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by themselves. The social media channels are not operated from the State Control Centre but 
rather, from the headquarters of the respective organisation.  
 
Case State II shows an entirely different approach as shown in the following quote: “When the 
State Control Centre's activated basically we're no longer acting as our individual agencies. 
We're acting on behalf of <Organisation C>.  So it's a slightly different structure I think than 
<State I>.  So we have all the various agencies like the <naming a list of different involved 
organisations>” Social Media Officer A in Organisation D 
 
When the State Control Centre is activated in Case State II, then the case organisations involved 
in an event suspend their social media utilisation, and Organisation C operates the social media 
channels for the involved organisations on behalf of these organisations. Only the headquarters 
channels of the organisation are taken over, but not the channels on the other organisational 
levels.  
6.3.2 Region and District Level Social Media Use 
Not all regions operate social media channels in the case organisations. Furthermore, the social 
media utilisation within the regions is predominantly done during the non-operational mode. 
Social media utilisation during the operational mode has a lower priority on a regional level in 
all case organisations.  
 
Some regions and districts in the case organisations operate social media channels. That not all 
regions operate social media channels depends on the resourcing, as the following quote from 
a social media officer in organisation B illustrates: Basically we have one main page for each 
region; Not everyone. Only the ones that can resource it. And basically those pages deliver 
localised information to that area or that patch that they run. And then from there we have 
some unit pages that also speak to the public in regards what the unit does. Social Media 
Officer - Organisation B Headquarters 
 
All of the case organisations pointed out that the relevant emergency management use of social 
media is at the moment very centralised within the organisation. As shown in the following 
quote, there are concerns that this practice will be unsustainable in the future and might be in 
conflict with the usage principles of social media.  
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“One of the things we're involved in this coming fire season this summer is trying to establish 
more social media roles in the regions at the Incident Control Centre, so that more having 
people actually out on the ground at Incident Control Centres and Regional Control Centres 
doing social media, because we don't think that centralised state approach is probably 
sustainable in the longer term.” Social Media Officer – Organisation D 
 
All of the case organisations plan, for the future, to decentralise their social media utilisation 
to a more regional utilisation of social media, however, during the time of the study, social 
media utilisation for emergency management was centralised within the headquarters of the 
case organisations.  
 
Organisation C operates the State Control Centre and also incident control centres across the 
state. Incident control centres are regional centres from which an emergency event is 
coordinated. However, at the current point in time, these regional incident control centres are 
not yet operating their own social media channels since the state has too few trained social 
media personal to operate these channels. The organisation draws on the social media officers 
within the state. However, at the moment there is only a limited amount of social media officers 
and the resource requirements to operate the social media channels in the incident control 
centres would be much higher than what can be currently covered. The organisation is training 
additional social media officers in order to close this capability gap in the future.  
6.3.3 Brigade/Unit Level Social Media Use 
On the unit or brigade level, the social media channels are entirely operated by the volunteers 
of the organisation. The approach in all case organisations with volunteers is similar; this means 
all case organisations except for Organisation C. The volunteers on the unit/brigade level are 
not required to operate a social media channel, but they are allowed to do so if they want to 
add this communication channel into their communication portfolio.  
 
“<Organisation D> is made up of just under 60,000 members. You're looking around 55,000-
ish volunteers, which is massive. We have around 1,200 different fire brigades state wide. At 
this stage there are - I believe the last count was about 380 brigade Facebook pages. We 
actively recommend that they get involved on social media. But being volunteers people come 
from all different walks of life. They have all very different skill sets. They also have varying 
amounts of free time. Social media done right takes a lot of time. It does, and even a lot of 
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planning and preparation if you're just making content.” Social Media Officer 2 - Organisation 
D Headquarters 
 
The previous quote illustrates the struggles on operating social media channels at this 
operational level of the organisation. As the volunteers are literally volunteering their time and 
it can be quite time-consuming to operate social media channels, it is not a surprise that only a 
fraction of the brigades/units operate their own social media channels. The sophistication of 
these channels varies highly across the state dependent on the skill level of the particular 
volunteers in a unit or brigade.   
 
However, some of the units or brigades established social media channels before the rest of the 
organisation adopted social media services into their communication portfolio. Some of the 
social media officers had concerns with the volunteers communicating directly with the public 
on behalf of the organisation, as shown in the following quote. “It was really hard for our 
volunteers, I guess, to understand the difference between; communicating to the public, and as 
well just communicating between themselves, internally. So we liked them to create closed 
groups were they could discuss <organisation B> matters internally and that wasn’t available 
for the public to see. “Social Media Officer - Organisation B Headquarters 
 
Some of the social media officers showed concerns with whether the volunteers understand 
how the communication between the organisation and the public should look like. This was a 
theme brought up in several of the interviews with the social media officers in the headquarters 
of the organisation. This highlighted the very compartmentalised structure of the case 
organisation where there is a divide between the corporate structure of the organisations and 
the volunteer structured part of the organisation.  
 
Organisation D shows a contrasting approach to these practices. The organisation has two sets 
of social media channels, one intended for communication between the volunteers, and one 
between the volunteers and the central organisation. These channels are open to see for 
everyone, including the public. The thought behind it is to show some level of transparency of 
the internal workings of the organisation. Furthermore, it is assumed that the channels are not 
relevant for somebody who is not part of the organisation.  
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As volunteers operate the local social media channels, there is a separation with the social 
media communication when the brigade/unit is in the operational mode, or in the non-
operational mode. Brigades/Units operate social media channels when they are in the non-
operational mode and generally do not operate social media when they are in the operational 
mode. The reason for this is shown through the following quote: “Alternatively, in the case of 
brigades what you'll see a bit of is the brigade, when it's not a busy operational period the 
brigade will be heavily involved and you know they'll have a, they'll build themselves up a 
Facebook presence. Then within their local community they become a trusted source of 
information. Then there is a fire in that area and everybody goes and jumps on a fire truck and 
suddenly you get this bit of an information black hole.” (Social Media Officer - Organisation 
A) 
  
When a particular brigade/unit is activated, the volunteers in this particular brigade/unit are 
responsible for responding to the emergency incident at hand. In the example of Organisation 
A, they would try to extinguish bushfires. At the point of this study, volunteers of an 
organisation are trained to respond to the emergency events for which a particular organisation 
is responsible; these volunteers are needed when the organisational unit is in the operational 
mode. None of the case organisations established non-traditional volunteer roles in the form of 
a social media officer yet when this study was performed, therefore, the brigades/units do not 
operate their social media channels when they are in the operational mode.  
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6.4 Social Media channels in use  
In this section, the kind of social media channels used by the case organisations for the purpose 
of emergency and disaster management are explored. In the first part of this section, the social 
media utilisation at the headquarters level is focused on. In the second part of this section, the 
social media utilisation on the region, district, and brigade/unit level is discussed.  
 
As shown in the previous (Chapter 6.3) section, the main social media utilisation for the 
communication with the listening community, in Ahmed’s model Agency-to-Community 
interaction (A-C), takes place at the headquarters level. The social media utilisation on the 
region level is still developed. The social media utilisation on the brigade/unit level is done by 
the volunteers and differs from brigade/unit to brigade/unit. Furthermore, social media 
utilisation in the operational mode “blacks out” on this level since the volunteers are needed to 
fulfil the main part of their role, which is responding to emergency events. Because of these 
reasons, the utilisation at the headquarters level is explored in more detail in comparison to the 
social media utilisation on the other organisational levels.  
6.4.1 Social Media channels in use at the headquarters level  
There are four different types of social media accounts that case organisations have on different 
social media platforms: (1) Accounts which are actively used, (2) Accounts which are 
supplementary used, (3) Accounts which are placeholders in case the platform shows more 
potential for emergency management in the future, and (4) Legacy Channels which are not 
used any more. Accounts which are actively used are termed Main Social Media Channels. 
Accounts which are used in a supplementary manner are termed Supporting Social Media 
Channels. 
 
Figure 6.4 Types of Social Media Channels 
 
The analysis of the different cases showed that there is not much difference between the 
accounts used by the different organisations. All case organisations use very similar social 
media services. The main focus is to use these channels as communication channels with which 
the organisation can provide emergency relevant information towards the public.  
Main	Channels Placeholder	Channels
Social	Media	Channels
Supporting	Channels Legacy	Channels
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As shown in the following quote by a Social Media Officer in Case Organisation A, the 
decision of which social media services are used depends on the expectations of the public and 
where the organisation assumes the listening audience is: “Our primary channels are Facebook 
and Twitter. We also use Flickr and YouTube and Vimeo.  Then we have a range of other various 
channels that we have accounts with that we sort of are at the researching whether they work 
for us or not or are just reserving the appropriate name space in case they sort of take off at a 
later point. Google Plus is probably sort of something in that space at the moment. We have 
been playing around as well a bit with Instagram and have started doing some work in that 
space, but the focus for us is still primarily Facebook and Twitter because that's where the 
majority of our audience is.” The interview was done early in the study. By the time of the 
write up, the organisation was not using Flickr any more. The use of Flickr was replaced by 
the use of Instagram. This also highlights how the use of a specific channel can change 
relatively fast.  
 
Table 6.4 shows the social media channels used on a headquarters level within each case 
organisation. The channels indicated with an X are actively used. From these active social 
media channels, the bold X indicates the primary social media channels of the organisations. 
The channels marked with (X) are channels which the organisation has registered an account 
in but are not using. These social media accounts are placeholder channels for potential future 
use. The channels marked with an (X)* were used in the past but are not used anymore. For 
example, in Case Organisation A and D, Flickr was replaced by Instagram, which has now a 
broader user base.   
 
Table 6.4 Social Media Utilisation within Case Organisations 
Social Media 
Channel 
Organisation  
A 
Organisation  
B 
Organisation  
C 
Organisation  
D 
Organisation  
E 
Facebook X X X X X 
Twitter X X X X X 
YouTube X X (X) X X 
Instagram X X  X X 
LinkedIn X X X X X 
Google + (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) 
Flickr (X)* X  (X)*  
Vimeo (X)*     
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The organisations operate social media channels with which information or other type of 
content can be shared with the public, such as social networking sites (Facebook, Google+, 
LinkedIn), microblogging services (Twitter), video or photo sharing platforms (Instagram, 
Flickr, YouTube, Vimeo). 
 
Table 6.5 Social Media Platforms and utilisation in Disaster Management 
Social Media Service 
Name Social Media Type Mode of Operation 
Facebook Social Networking Site Non-operational and operational 
Twitter Microblogging Platform Non-operational and operational 
YouTube Video Sharing Platform Non-operational 
Instagram Photo Sharing Platform Non-operational 
LinkedIn Social Networking Site Non-operational 
Google+ Social Networking Site Non-operational 
Flickr Photo Sharing Platform Non-operational 
Vimeo Video sharing platform Non-operational 
 
The EMOs are utilising a broad selection of social media services. There are two main types 
of social media use within the case organisations: microblogging, and video or photo sharing. 
Microblogging is done through dedicated microblogging platforms, such as Twitter, and 
through different social networking sites. Within the social networking sites, the focus of the 
organisations is the social microblogging functionality and not the social networking aspects 
of these platforms. The main social media channels within the case organisations are the social 
networking site Facebook and the social microblogging Platform Twitter, which are 
predominantly used for Emergency or Disaster Management. 
 
Additional broadly used social media channels are the video sharing platform YouTube and the 
Photo Sharing Platform Instagram. These channels are almost exclusively used during times of 
non-operational mode as a support channel to showcase what the organisation and its members 
are doing, or as a channel for community education to build disaster resilient communities.    
 
During the operational mode, the organisations fall back to the social media channels Facebook 
and Twitter. These channels might be supplemented through live videos that can be embedded 
into these channels. For example, the livestreaming app Periscope.  
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The interviews showed that the understanding of social media in emergency management 
sector focuses predominantly on microblogging on Facebook or Twitter. It needed further 
probing within the interviews to uncover that there are actually more than these two services 
in active use. These remaining services, such as YouTube or Instagram, are used as auxiliary 
services during the non-operational mode. 
 
Surprisingly, none of the organisations were using any kind of crowdsourced social media 
service. For example, crisis mapping.   
6.4.1.1 Main Social Media Channels 
The main social media channels in an organisation are those social media channels which are 
primarily used to interact and engage with the different audiences of an organisation. These are 
as well the channels which are an essential component of the emergency management 
communication strategy of the case organisations. All of the case organisations utilise the social 
microblogging Service Twitter and the social networking site Facebook as their main social 
media communication channels. These channels are both used in the operational as well as the 
non-operational mode. These two channels are mainly used for the emergency management 
relevant social media communication. This includes critical emergency event information and 
warnings.  
 
In the operational mode, these channels are used to distribute information and warnings, to 
fight rumours, and encourage specific behaviours from the listening audience, such as “do not 
drive through floodwater”.  
 
In the non-operational mode, these channels are used for public relations purposes. For 
example, inform the public about the organisations; to distribute Emergency Management 
relevant information; and to educate the general public about emergency events. 
 
Organisation C, D, and E operate two main Twitter channels. One of these channels is for 
emergency relevant information, and the other channel is used for information about and 
around the organisations. The case organisations in Case State I only have one Twitter channel 
which they utilise for emergency management relevant social media communication and social 
media communication which is not necessarily emergency management relevant.     
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6.4.1.2 Supporting Social Media Channels  
“YouTube I always think is like this other thing that sits outside and I know it is social media 
but I don't say that because it's not in my head. It's not the same thing but yes, YouTube” (Social 
Media Officer – Organisation C). 
The quote exemplifies that social media is a broad umbrella term which includes different 
technologies. The social media officers of the case organisations put their main focus on the 
main social media channels of the organisations. The remaining social media channels are seen 
as support channels. These support channels are supplementary communication channels 
which are used to improve the messaging of an organisation but are rarely used for active 
emergency management. 
 
There are some support channels indirectly used, such as Video and Photo Sharing Platforms. 
YouTube and Instagram are used for community education, and to engage the listening 
community. Furthermore, the support channels are used to share what the organisation and its 
volunteers are achieving and other PR activities. 
 
The social networking site LinkedIn is used as a “business card” for the case organisation and 
to advertise vacant jobs for potential applicants.   
6.4.1.3 Placeholder Social Media Platforms 
“Then we have a range of other various channels that we have accounts with that we sort of 
are at the researching whether they work for us or not or are just reserving the appropriate 
name space in case they sort of take off at a later point. Google Plus is probably sort of 
something in that space at the moment.” As illustrated through the quote from a social media 
officer in Organisation A, placeholder social media channels are channels where the 
organisation registered an official user account, but not utilising the channel yet.  
 
The switch whether the organisation uses this channel depends on if the channel would be a 
good fit for the communication portfolio, if the organisation expect that the intended listening 
audience would use this channel, and if the platform has a critical mass of users. Google+ is a 
good example of this type of channel. Or the organisation does not yet have the use in its 
communication portfolio  
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6.4.1.4 Legacy Social Media Channels  
Then there are social media channels which case organisations used in the past, but are not 
used anymore. One example of such a channel is Flickr in Case Organisation A. It was actively 
used in the past to share photos of bushfires, or photos that showcase the work of the 
organisation and their volunteer members, however, the use of Flickr was nearly completely 
suspended; Now the organisation uses Instagram for the tasks they were using Flickr for in the 
past.  
 
This illustrates that social media channels are in flux and changing. Some of the channels are 
losing the relevant audience for EMOs; or channels come into existence that are better suited 
for what the organisations want to achieve.  
6.4.2 Social Media channels in use on region, district, and brigade/unit level 
The social media channels for active emergency management are managed centrally at the 
headquarters level in all case organisations. This is particularly valid for the operational mode. 
There is social media activity on other organisational levels, however, this social media 
utilisation focuses on the non-operational mode. The reason behind this is that volunteers, who 
only have limited time and resources to operate these channels, predominantly operate the 
channels outside the headquarters level.  
 
Not all of the regions or districts utilise social media channels. It depends on individuals in 
these regions or districts if they want to operate a channel. If a region or district is operating a 
social media channel, it is predominantly used during the non-operational mode for PR 
purposes, community education, and to provide emergency relevant information. In the 
operational mode, the channels are less active than the channels operated at the headquarters 
level. Relevant localised information from the headquarters level is reproduced on a localised 
basis. The regions district who decide to utilise social media channels use Facebook and/or 
Twitter, and a smaller amount also uses Instagram or other channels which they deem to be 
suitable.   
 
The following quote from an interview indicates that social media is seen as an amplifier for 
spreading information. The social media audience is not only seen as the people who actively 
follow the social media channels of the organisation; the social media audience is also seen as 
people who also get information indirectly from the social media channels. “Potentially 
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excluding someone else.  So maybe someone who's in the United States who has parents living 
in a bushfire area in Victoria and they might see that information in the States and tell their 
parents about it; whereas if we targeted just that specific area in Victoria those people's 
children may not see that if they're located in the States or overseas or whatever.” (Social 
Media Officer - Organisation D) 
 
However, there is the fear that information is not received by somebody who needs that 
particular piece of information if it is only shared locally on a region/district or brigade/unit 
level. Therefore, the case organisations are reluctant to share information only on a local level 
and not also on the state level.  
 
As already established, the volunteers of the case organisations operate the social media 
channels on a brigade/unit level. All of the case organisations that have volunteer members 
show the same patterns. Only a fraction of the brigades or units utilise social media to 
communicate with their listening communities. The units/brigades mostly use Facebook; some 
also use Twitter, or Instagram; a smaller number of brigades/units utilise YouTube or other 
platforms. Some brigades/units use multiple different channels while some only use one.  
 
It is common that the social media channels are almost entirely used in the non-operational 
mode of the brigade/unit and not in the operational mode at all. One reason behind this is shown 
in this quote from a Social Media Officer in Organisation A: “when it's not a busy operational 
period the brigade will be heavily involved and you know they'll have a, they'll build themselves 
up a Facebook presence.  Then within their local community they become a trusted source of 
information. Then there is a fire in that area and everybody goes and jumps on a fire truck and 
suddenly you get this bit of an information black hole.” The volunteers are needed for their 
core responsibilities in the operational mode and there are currently not additional volunteer 
roles who could operate the social media channels when a brigade/unit is in operation. In the 
non-operational mode, the channels are used for community education and to inform the 
listening community about what the brigade/unit is doing.    
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The Tables 6.6 – 6.10 give an overview on which social media channel are used in which case 
organisations; on which organisational level the social media channels are used; and how many 
followers the organisation has at the headquarters level for this particular channel. The “Direct 
Follower Reach” gives an indication of how many individuals can be directly reached by the 
case organisation, excluding all sharing activity by any followers. Organisation C, D, and E 
have each two Twitter Channels and show therefore two numbers for “Direct Follower Reach” 
on Twitter. 
 
Table 6.6 Social Media Channel in Use – Organisation A 
Channel 
Name 
Social Media 
Type 
Level of use in 
Organisation 
Modes of 
Operation 
Use of 
Channel 
Direct 
Follower 
Reach (State 
Channel) 
Facebook 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
348266 
Twitter Microblogging Platform 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
74326 
YouTube Video sharing platform State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
1594 
Google+ 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Used as 
Placeholder 64 
LinkedIn 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Business Card 
Recruiting 
 
3643 
Flickr Photo Sharing Platform State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
 
(Not used any 
more) 
32 
Vimeo Video Sharing Platform State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
(Not used any 
more) - 
Instagram Photo Sharing Platform 
State / 
Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
9107 
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Table 6.7 Social Media Channel in Use – Organisation B 
Channel 
Name 
Social Media 
Type 
Level of use in 
Organisation 
Modes of 
Operation 
Use of 
Channel 
Direct 
Follower 
Reach (Main 
Channel) 
Facebook 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
121309 
Twitter Microblogging Platform 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
55549 
YouTube Video sharing platform State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
688 
Google+ 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Placeholder 58 
LinkedIn 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Business Card 
PR of 
Organisation 
2652 
Instagram Photo Sharing Platform State / Units 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
274 
Flickr 
Non-
operational 
mode 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
54 
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Table 6.8 Social Media Channel in Use – Organisation C 
Channel 
Name 
Social Media 
Type 
Level of use in 
Organisation 
Modes of 
Operation 
Use of 
Channel 
Direct 
Follower 
Reach (Main 
Channel) 
Facebook 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
34385 
Twitter Microblogging Platform State  
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
7904 / 562 
YouTube Video sharing platform State - Placeholder 87 
Google+ 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State - Placeholder 4 
LinkedIn 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Business Card 
Recruiting 
PR of 
Organisation 
1459 
 
Table 6.9 Social Media Channel in Use – Organisation D 
Channel 
Name 
Social Media 
Type 
Level of use in 
Organisation 
Modes of 
Operation 
Use of 
Channel 
Direct 
Follower 
Reach (Main 
Channel) 
Facebook 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
348266 
Twitter Microblogging Platform 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
83298 / 18510 
YouTube Video sharing platform State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
3881 
Google+ 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Placeholder 134 
LinkedIn 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Business Card 
Recruiting 3523 
Instagram Image Sharing Platform  
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
9740 
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Table 6.10 Social Media Channel in Use – Organisation E 
Channel 
Name 
Social Media 
Type 
Level of use in 
Organisation 
Modes of 
Operation 
Use of 
Channel 
Direct 
Follower 
Reach (Main 
Channel) 
Facebook 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
80050 
Twitter Microblogging Platform 
State / Districts 
/ Brigades 
Non-
operational 
mode and 
operational 
mode 
Warnings and 
Information 
Broadcasting 
all phases of 
PPRR 
11228/ 
10514 
YouTube Video sharing platform State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
435 
Google+ 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Placeholder 10 
LinkedIn 
Social 
Networking 
Site 
State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Business Card 
Recruiting 2525 
Instagram Image Sharing Platform State 
Non-
operational 
mode 
Community 
Education and 
PR 
1766 
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6.5 Social Media Channel Selection and Audience 
EMOs utilise several social media channels to communicate and interact with the public for 
emergency and disaster management. Within the case organisations, this emergency relevant 
utilisation of the social media channels is centralised within the headquarters of each case 
organisation, as presented in the previous sections. The literature indicated that there are 
distinct user groups on different platforms, which have different approaches in using these 
platforms to receive information and form particular audiences. In this section, it is explored 
in detail whether there are distinct approaches towards the selection of social media utilisation 
and whether the case organisations are taking the various audiences in their social media 
channels into account.  
 
The case organisations utilise social media channels to inform the public, which is external to 
the organisation. This communication would refer to, in Ahmed's current model, the agency-
to-community interaction dimension (A-C). The case organisations also use their social media 
channels to communicate with the volunteer members of the organisation, this communication 
is intra-organisational and is not shown in Ahmed's model. In the first part of this section, the 
social media channel selection and audience groups for external social media communication 
are described. The emergency relevant information distributed through the headquarters level 
of the organisation is then focussed on. In the second part of this section, intra-organisational 
social media communication is outlined. 
6.5.1 Social Media Channel Selection and Audience for external social media 
communication 
 
The focus of this analysis is the social media utilisation at the headquarters level, where most 
of the emergency relevant social media utilisation is centrally coordinated. In Section 6.4, 
Social Media Channels in Use, it is shown that emergency relevant information is provided 
through the main social media communication channels, Facebook and Twitter. The support 
channels are only used in exceptions for particular emergency management activities.  
 
The interviews and their analysis revealed that the messages on these communication channels 
are partially targeted to different audiences. The relevant social media audience is termed the 
listening community, since these are the social media communication participants who are 
listening or receiving social media communication from EMOs. As shown in Figure 6.5, the 
interview revealed that the case organisations divide their listening audience into two major 
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groups, members of the general public, and into members from the media. Across all case 
organisations, Twitter was seen as a channel where the media can effectively be reached, while 
Facebook can be seen as a channel to engage with parts of the audience that can be considered 
as the general public. 
 
Figure 6.5 Social Media Audience Groups 
 
EMOs utilise a broad range of communication channels   to provide emergency relevant 
communication to the public. For example, radio and TV broadcasts, their websites, text 
messages for serious warnings, community briefings, or social media to just name a few. Social 
media is seen as an additional channel to extend the communication portfolio and reach, not as 
a channel to replace existing communication channels. This is illustrated in the following 
quote: “Some people have preference for Twitter to find their emergency information, some 
people have preference to radio. We're not about saying that one is more important than the 
other we're about catering for the needs of different people about the way that they want to get 
information during an emergency.” Social Media Officer 1 - Headquarters Organisation C  
 
Table 6.11 Social Media Channels and Perceived Audience 
Social Media Channel Audience 
Facebook 
(Social Networking Site) 
Predominantly 
General Public 
Twitter 
(Microblogging Service) Media and General Public 
Instagram 
(Image Sharing Platform) 
Predominantly 
General Public 
YouTube 
(Video Sharing Platform) 
Predominantly 
General Public 
 
A reoccurring theme within the dataset was that the social media channels are selected to 
provide the relevant information on the channels where individual members of the public were 
choosing to receive this kind of information. Emergency relevant information is broadcasted 
through all relevant communication channels. The information is specially adjusted to fit the 
requirements of the specific communication channel.  
  
Media General	Public
Listening	Audience
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All case organisations are using Facebook or Twitter as primary communication channels for 
emergency management relevant communication. This information includes emergency 
relevant information and warnings. 
 
Warnings about an event are shared through both Facebook and Twitter. Warnings can be 
published manually through the social media operators, or published automatically through an 
IT system. The warnings in Case State II are automatically broadcasted through the relevant 
social media channels by the warning information system within this state. This warning 
system is the backend to several communication channels towards the public. For example, 
text messages, media, sirens and others. When a warning is created in this system, all relevant 
channels are automatically informed. These channels include internal communication as well 
as communication towards the public. The organisations within Case State I also use Facebook 
and Twitter as warning channels, however, the warnings in Organisation A and B are manually 
created and posted through social media. The social media officers source this information 
from the internal Warning Information System. 
 
The supporting channels are generally not selected for emergency information or warnings. 
The following quotes illustrate, with the example of Instagram, that support channels are 
selected to engage and show the work and capabilities of the organisation. “Instagram offers 
no benefits when it comes to warnings. It doesn't. Because we can't have automated feeds 
saying, hey be careful there's a fire here and there. But we utilise it because it showcases the 
organisation. It's imagery. People like big red trucks. People love seeing fire-fighters getting 
dirty and doing their job. So the engagement is huge on Instagram. But technically it offers 
nothing to the core service that we offer which is putting out fires.” Social Media Operator 
Organisation D. As the quote illustrates these types of channels are predominantly selected for 
public relations and to show the public what the volunteers within the organisation are 
providing to keep their communities safe. 
 
This does not mean that the supporting social media channels are not selected for emergency 
management purposes at all. A further use of the support social media platforms is for not time-
critical messages in the prevention, preparedness, and recovery stages of the PPRR model, not 
only for the response aspects of the model which correlates with the operational mode. In these 
stages of the model, the channels are selected for community education and other forms of 
community resilience building. 
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The targeted audience groups of the supporting social media channels are members of the 
general public. The organisations do not view the general public as a homogenous group, but 
rather as a diverse group with different aims and agendas. This is in the following quote from 
a social media officer in organisation C which describes that different demographics have a 
different perception on the use of social media communication channels: “It's interesting to 
look at different demographics and where people go to find that information. So my boss ran 
an awesome national review last year, that you should look up, and it talks about for my 
generation we are more likely before calling 000 we would rather post a picture of what we're 
seeing on social media. So it's a big changing beast I suppose in terms of demographics about 
what people go to find where and how they communicate with authorities during an emergency 
incident. So you're catering for a very wide group of people.”  
 
The social networking site Facebook and the social microblogging platform Twitter are used 
in the operational mode to communicate emergency management relevant information during 
the operational mode of emergency management. As shown in section 6.4 Social Media 
Channels in Use, the case organisations have a bigger audience on Facebook than on Twitter.  
 
“Facebook has got a little bit more of a critical mass and mainstream acceptance I suppose 
amongst the general public. Twitter obviously still has some really good usage numbers just 
amongst the general public, but then it's also a sort of a focus area for journalists and news 
type sources.” (Social Media Officer - Organisation A) The quote illustrates that the 
organisation identified two different audience groups for their emergency relevant information: 
members of the general public, and members of media organisations. Members of the media 
are perceived to monitor Twitter activity of the organisations actively.  
 
The following quote by a social media officer in Organisation A shows that Twitter is used as 
a channel to communicate with members of the media and Facebook is more seen as a channel 
to communicate and engage with members of the general public. “If I had to get a message 
and I had to choose one channel and I was going to and I had to get the message to the media 
I would use Twitter.  If I had to get the message to the general population I would use 
Facebook.” (Social Media Officer - Organisation A) 
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All organisations, but especially Case Organisations C, D, and E, select Twitter when they want 
to send information towards media organisations. Facebook, on the other hand, is seen by all 
case organisations as a communication channel to communicate with members of the general 
public. 
 
There are significant differences between how the social media officers in the two different 
case states view the social media channels. The social media officers in Organisation A and B 
view social media more as a tool to communicate with the public. Whereas the social media 
officers in the case Organisations C, D, and E perceive social media channels as an efficient 
tool to also communicate information towards the media. These differences might be explained 
through the backgrounds of the social media coordinators within the case organisations. The 
social media coordinators in organisation C, D, and E all have backgrounds in journalism, while 
the main social media coordinators in organisation A, B not.   
6.5.2 Social Media Channel Selection and Audience for intra-organisational 
social media communication 
 
The social media channel Facebook is used for intra-organisational engagement with the 
volunteers of the relevant case organisations, which are all case organisations except of case 
organisation C. Intra-organisational social media communication happens predominantly in the 
non-operational mode and not in the operational mode of an organisation.  
 
The audience for intra-organisational social interaction are the volunteers of the organisation 
situated in their units or brigades away from the headquarters of the organisation.  
 
"We have primarily Facebook groups. We have at the corporate level, we have a <Organisation 
A> members group which is open to all members of the service and they can discuss issues, 
ask questions, raise concerns.  We also have a number of more targeted groups based on - so, 
for instance, the social media administrators group. We have similar groups for our trainers, 
learning and development, community engagement. That one's actually a page, not a group 
because there's historical reasons for that. Then as you get down to the district level, a lot of 
districts will have district level groups to send information out to their membership and a 
significant number of our brigades also have typically Facebook groups for intra brigade 
communication." As illustrated through the quote there are intra-organisational social media 
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channels on all levels of the organisation. More generally the social media channels are in this 
context used to reduce the information divide between the centralised headquarters and the 
units or brigades. 
 
However, the organisations also use the channels for a more targeted audience, such as social 
media operators in the districts or brigades/units, or for general training and engagement 
purposes.  
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6.6 Sourcing and Distribution of Information through Social Media 
Channels 
In the previous sections the organisational level on which social media is utilised, what kind of 
social media channels the case organisations use, for what kind of information different social 
media channels are utilised, and whether this information is catered for a specific audience is 
explored. In this section, how information is sourced within the case organisation and then 
distributed on the social media channels for the purpose of emergency management is 
discussed.  
 
Again, the main focus is on the main social media channels Facebook and Twitter as these 
channels are the preferred channel for the active emergency management.   
6.6.1 Sourcing and Distribution during the operational mode 
In the operational phase, “the overriding goal is to keep people safe and to give them the 
information that they need to be able to make an informed choice about what they’re going to 
do” (Social Media Officer – Organisation A). The aim of the case organisations is that the 
general public has the necessary information to make an informed decision about their 
behaviour in an emergency event; this can include helping an individual make the decision to 
stay at their properties, or whether it would be better to self-evacuate early.  
 
All the case organisations operate in natural disasters. Natural disasters have the slight 
advantage, in contrast to intentional human caused events such as terror attacks, that there is 
no perpetrator who could be warned through the broadcasted social media messages. The social 
media officers in the different case organisations stated that they try to provide the general 
public as much information as they can. The decision to act on this particular information is 
then with the members of the public.  
 
In this operational phase, the case organisations use their social media channels most 
prominently to disseminate information and emergency warnings. They use these 
communication channels as well to educate the community about specific risks of the ongoing 
emergency events, and for community or media navigation. With community navigation, they 
encourage a specific behaviour from the community; A prominent example would be to not 
drive through floodwater during floods, or to prepare the property accordingly with a risk of 
an upcoming bushfire. The decision to actually act on the information is with the individual, as 
162 
the organisation cannot force the behaviour. Another aim of the social media utilisation is to 
correct rumours and false information circulating the social media channels, since these can 
lead to another dangerous dimension in the emergency management activities.  
 
 
Figure 6.6 Social Media Communication - Operational Mode 
 
The social media channels are seen as distinct channels with specific audiences. All case 
organisations try to avoid relinking from one channel to the other. Such a practice of relinking 
to a different channel is seen as telling the audience they are on the wrong communication 
channel and should switch. “We should wherever possible provide the information that they4 
need in a format that’s applicable to that channel. If we can’t then we need to do our job better.” 
(Social Media Officer – Organisation A).  
 
When there is additional information which cannot be brought to the audience through the 
channel, the organisations tend to link these messages back to their own website where they 
then have more information provided. As for example, Twitter has currently a 140-character 
restriction. 
 
The websites are seen as a single source of truth for the organisations. On this communication 
channel, they provide fire updates and warnings. The websites are regularly updated during 
emergency events; Regularly means about every thirty minutes. “Now that gets updated 
regularly, but probably not regularly enough for a, when we're looking at it from a social media 
perspective. So, you know it might get updated every half an hour for a fire that's had 
                                                        
4 The listening community of that channel. 
Broadcast	Information
Community	EducationSocial	Media	Communication
Broadcast	Warnings
Encourage	Behaviour
Fighting	Rumours
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emergency warning, but for people - at the speed at which social media moves, half an hour is 
an awfully long time.” (Social Media Officer – Organisation A). It is likely that the social media 
channels show more up-to-date information during emergency events.  
 
Figure 6.7 Sources of Information for Social Media 
 
The main amount of information broadcasted through social media is sourced from the internal 
information systems of the organisations; These include the warning information systems, and 
the job-tracking information systems. “We use our operational management system and it has 
an intelligence feature so - the districts that are looking after the fires will put information in 
about what the fire is doing, where it's at, what road, you know various pieces of information.  
We use that information a lot in pushing out our social media messages.  So, you know, the fire 
has crossed this road or the fire is here or here is a photo” (Social Media Officer – Organisation 
A). 
 
Another source is information from within the organisation. Organisation A found that maps 
where the fire is at the moment are well received and create engagement with information from 
the public. “One thing that we've found really really popular is some of the mapping tools, so 
we have a specialised aircraft that will fly over the fire grounds twice a day and do what's 
Broadcast	Information
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Broadcast	Warnings
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called a line scan.  So basically it does an infrared line scan so it shows exactly where the fires 
are at that point.  Then we'll map those up and put major, well put all of the towns in that area 
around there and we'll put those sort of mapping products up.” (Social Media Officer -
Organisation A) The organisations source and share their information from several internal 
units of the organisation.  
 
A further source of information are the public social media channels themselves. The 
organisations receive photos from the public and use these photos for their social media 
messaging as shown in the following quote: “If we get some good photos from members of the 
public we will repost those so that they can see this is what it actually looks like at this point 
in time“ (Social Media Officer – Organisation A). 
 
In addition to information sourced from the public, the case organisations also use material 
sourced from within the own member base, especially when it comes to photographic material. 
This material is mostly sourced from the internal membership groups.  
 
The social media channels are used to distribute community and media briefings. These 
briefings are either in text form or in the form of live videos where a high-ranking 
representative of the organisation provides updates about the emergency situation. 
 
One major difference between Case State I and Case State II is that the Case Organisations in 
Case State II use automated warnings on their social media channels and Case Organisations 
in Case State I not. All of the case organisations use their internal warning information systems 
as a source for the warnings they distribute through social media.   
 
In Case State II, the warning systems are under the control of Organisation C and operate for 
different organisations. The following is a description from the social media coordinator in 
Organisation D on how warnings are entered into the system in Case State II and how they are 
distributed: “There is distributed authorship in the incident control centres, so there's hundreds 
of warnings officers around the state who can enter information into our warning system. Once 
they enter that information and get it verified or get it authorised by an incident controller, it's 
distributed through various mediums. So initially it was emails to the media published onto the 
website, your standard mediums, but then back in 2011 we got that system - we automated it so 
that that system also published warnings to our social media channels to Facebook and Twitter. 
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So there's an automated process in place that automatically publishes those official warnings.  
That's not every incident we're attending; it's just the ones that require a warning.  The ones 
that the incident controller decides requires some kind of advice or watch and act or emergency 
warning to the community. So those are official warnings, advice, watch and act and emergency 
warnings are automatically published to Twitter and to Facebook.” The distributions of 
warnings are also done in night time in both modes of operation in the case organisations from 
Case State II. These automated warnings normally do not receive too much engagement and 
attention from the listening community.  
 
The important warnings are picked up by the social media team and augmented with additional 
information. This information includes maps of the area and answers potential questions that 
might arise from the warning. “Advice level warnings happen quite often and really there's no 
rest to the community with an advice level warning, so we would just leave that to itself.  But 
if there was a watch and act or an emergency warning then our media team and social media 
people would be activated and would be monitoring and responding to questions and adding 
additional information. Because what we have seen is that that automated warning system is 
great for that 24/7 coverage and for getting the information out there initially, but it's just a 
text warning and obviously in social media that doesn't really grab much attention.  So we'll 
often just try and add value to that by finding images or identifying the most interesting aspects 
of the warning that we think as social media professionals that we know will grab the attention 
of the community and increase its reach.”  
 
The case organisations in Case State I also provide warnings through their social media 
channels. However, they do not use an automated warning system. The warnings which seem 
to be important are posted through the social media channels by the social media officers.  
 
In the next section, it is shown how information is sourced and distributed through the non-
operational mode as there are different requirements in this mode of operation than in the 
operational mode of operation.  
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6.6.2 Sourcing and Distribution during the non-operational mode 
The messages and information distributed through the operational mode are intended to keep 
the public safe. These messages focus on the active emergency management in the Response 
phase of the PPRR model. The message focus in the non-operational mode is broader than the 
pure emergency management. The background aim is still to inform and prepare the public for 
potential emergency events, however, it is subtler than during the operational mode. In the non-
operational phase, the focus is to raise interest and to engage the public about emergency 
management, the EMO, and emergency events. 
  
In the operational mode the communication channels which are used across all case 
organisations are the main social media channels in these organisations; In the non-operational 
mode, the case organisations utilise their main communication channels as well as their 
supporting channels to distribute messages and information towards their listening 
communities as illustrated in the following quote: “I feel very fortunate in my role at <Case 
Organisation D> that I am given this platform for <Case Organisation D>, this huge audience, 
to push these messages out and have fun, because that's what social is all about. You've got to 
be having fun. If it's all about the sale, if it's all about the safety messaging that is so boring. 
The higher ups at <Case Organisation D>, I said very early on, if all we do is fire safety 
information, it's boring. I’m going to be perfectly honest with you. I love the <Case 
Organisation D>. But if it's just constant messages - don't do this, don't do that - who's going 
to - there's no engagement there. It's got to be fun. So the organisation as a whole understands 
the importance of social media and we're able to keep exploring that. Instagram as an example 
is something I use heavily. Instagram offers no benefits when it comes to warnings. It doesn't. 
Because we can't have automated feeds saying, hey be careful there's a fire here and there. But 
we utilise it because it showcases the organisation. It's imagery. People like big red trucks. 
People love seeing fire-fighters getting dirty and doing their job. So the engagement is huge on 
Instagram. But technically it offers nothing to the core service that we offer which is putting 
out fires” (Social Media Operator Organisation D). There is less focus on the emergency 
messaging and more emphasis on raising interest in the listening community about what the 
organisations are providing.  
 
The aims what the case organisations want to achieve with their social media communication 
is slightly different in the non-operational mode. “When we're non-operational I suppose there 
are a couple of goals.  It's then we switch to a lot more - depending on the time of year, a lot 
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more preparation helping people to prepare for the fire season and what they should be doing.  
Encouraging people to have a bushfire survival plan. We'll also do some more I suppose PR 
type stuff, just for us to show various things that our brigades have been doing and they've been 
active and what they've been doing in their communities, sort of goodwill, good news stories. 
This time of year, for instance, we've often got a lot of hazard reduction work going on.  So 
we'll do posts around hazard reduction and where they're happening and why they're happening 
and often sort of fielding questions and answering questions around why that kind of thing is 
important.  Some people get quite upset when they're inundated for smoke for three or four 
days.  So it's explaining why we're doing it and what that means for them” (Social Media 
Officer – Organisation A) As shown in the quote, the social media channels are used to fulfil 
several distinct goals during the non-operational mode. One aspect of the social media channels 
is to use them as a public relations tool in which the organisation wants to show the general 
public what the organisation and especially the volunteers are providing in their activities to 
support the different communities. The channels are then also used to engage the communities 
to be more interested in emergency management.  
 
During the non-operational mode the social media channels are still used to provide 
information, broadcast warnings, or correct false information, as shown in Figure 6.8, however, 
the emphasis is more on community education and to encourage the behaviour to prepare for a 
potential future emergency event. Such a preparation could have the form to prepare a plan 
when living in a bushfire prone area. Additional to this, the social media channels are much 
more used for public relations purposes, such as informing about the organisation or to provide 
and promote information about what the volunteers in the organisation are providing for their 
communities. Furthermore, the channels are utilised to inform the listening community about 
ongoing operations, such as in the example of the bushfire organisations hazard reduction 
burns. 
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Figure 6.8 Social Media Communication – Non-Operational Mode 
 
The information about the volunteer work is sourced directly from the volunteers within the 
organisations. In case organisation D, for example, the social media officer uses the social 
media channels and Facebook groups of the different brigades as a source for this kind of 
information as shown in the following quote: “Okay so in the mornings when I monitor the 
brigade Facebook pages I get stuff from there. So I'll be scrolling through and I'll find a great 
photo. I'll save it. I'll put it away. I'll take some details. That's done. That's how I find content 
for Instagram, from all the brigade Facebook pages. So I troll through them. We have our 
official photographer who is part of the team, Keith, I mentioned before. He goes to a lot of 
fire calls. So I'll get stuff from him. We have a few other photographers around the state who 
are very good. They attend a lot of calls and they send us their photos when they've got them. 
The other thing is the social media group.” 
 
The social media channels are used as a tool to educate the listening communities about 
potential emergency risks and how to prepare themselves as communities for a potential event. 
The case organisations focus more and more on community resilience. One important 
component to foster this community resilience is the social media communication of the 
organisations. The source for this kind of messaging comes from different sides within the 
organisation, such as teaching material, created video material, or current events amongst some 
other sources.  
 
In this section on how information is sourced for the social media channels and how and where 
it is distributed is highlighted. This utilisation of social media is still that of a push medium, or 
a “Megaphone” to distribute information towards the listening communities. In the next 
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section, how the social media channels are used to engage with the listening community and 
how the case organisations actually use social media as the two-way communication channel 
to interact with their listening communities is discussed.  
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6.7 Social Media as an Engagement Channel 
The social media services are not just used as a channel to disseminate information from the 
EMOs towards the listening communities (see Chapter 6.6), but as well as a channel to engage 
and interact with these listening communities. The difference between these two types of 
communication is that the dissemination of information works as a one-way communication 
channel in which information is pushed to the audience; the engagement, on the other hand, is 
using the social media channels as a two-way type of communication. All of the case 
organisations use their social media channels for engagement purposes in both operational 
modes. As the two operational modes have an influence on how the case organisations are 
utilising their channels this section is split into two sub-sections:  First, it is explored how the 
social media channels are utilised to engage with the listening community in the operational 
mode and then how the channels are used to engage in the non-operational mode.  
6.7.1 Social Media as an Engagement Channel during the Operational Mode  
During the operational mode, the social media engagement focuses on answering questions 
from the public through social media and to enhance the broadcasted information. The aim 
with enhancing broadcasted information is to make it more accessible and relevant for the 
listening communities; The information needs to be provided in a way that the members of the 
listening audience interact with messages. The interaction ensures that the information is 
circulated in a wider community and not just the immediate listening audience.   
 
The following quote from a Social Media Officer in Case Organisation D indicates the response 
to questions when the organisation is in its full operational mode. It needs to be highlighted 
again that this means that the social media activity is then operated from within the State 
Control Centre under the review of Case Organisation C. “You could argue - and some of the 
- we were talking before about the dinosaurs that don't agree with social media - because 
people are asking for help on social media - oh well they shouldn't be doing that. But they are. 
Because it's the world's best communication channel and they have a question to ask. So we're 
going to answer it. During a large scale incident and the state control centre is activated the 
amount of messages that come through, and when I say messages I mean people commenting 
on a Facebook post or tweeting us, the numbers are staggering - huge. They're saying what do 
I do? Where do I go? What does this mean? What does that mean? I thrive on the - you know 
when it gets really busy - you're just absolutely focused on that screen, you see them come 
through and you just bang bang bang bang bang <Interview Informant indicates typing> and 
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you just get through to them. The media team have key messages. This is what we know. There 
are this many trucks. The fire is this big, heading that direction. This many houses lost, dah 
dah dah.” (Social Media Officer – Case Organisation D)5. Help requests in the context of this 
quote refers to questions, not to immediate emergency assistance; incident reporting and 
requests for emergency assistance is covered in Chapter 6.9. The social media officers respond 
to public and to private questions through their social media channels. The public questions are 
visible to the broader listening audience, the private messages, on the other hand, are only 
visible to the sender of the message and the receiver, which is in this case the EMO. The social 
media officers have key messages which are provided by the media team. These key messages 
include information about ongoing operations. Key messages include typically where the event 
is, whether people are at risk, how many responders are involved in the operation and advice 
on how to behave when in the risk zone. The later includes information which covers whether 
it would be advisable or safe to self-evacuate or if it would be safe to stay in the area.  
 
All case organisations are utilising their social media channels to answer questions. In Case 
State II the response to questions is very standardised. Organisation C is using a software 
product which is targeted for customer relationship management. This software package shows 
the on duty social media officers which messages from the public towards the organisation 
were checked or were not yet checked. In case that a message was already checked then the 
software indicates as well who checked it. In case that a message was a question and needed a 
response the software package then records as well who responded towards the message. The 
answers from the case organisation in Case State II have a very strict standardised form: The 
message starts with “Hi” followed by the name of the sender of the question; Following this 
comes the actual answer to the message, and afterwards the social media officer is signing the 
message off with their name.     
 
The case organisations in Case State I are as well answering questions through their social 
media channels, however, they do not have such a standardised approach in how an answer to 
a specific question needs to be structured. The need for a strict standardised approach is lower 
in the organisations in this state since only social media officers from within one organisation 
are operating the social media channels of an organisation. In Case State II, Case Organisation 
                                                        
5 Bold text stressed by author. 
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C is operating the social media channels of the remaining case organisations in the state when 
it is in its operational mode.   
 
The following quote illustrates that the questions from the public are used as an indicator for 
the social media officers whether the information they are providing towards the general public 
is sufficient or if there is a need for additional information. “Occasionally we'll get questions 
that we can't answer or that I go hey there could be something that's worth investigating what's 
going on here and then I'll liaise directly with our state Public Liaison Officer and they will 
sort of chase up the information and get back to us and then we can sort of give a reply. So if 
we all of a sudden find that we're getting a heap of questions about access to a particular 
school for instance, that's a trigger I suppose for us that we should be providing some more 
information and that what is actually happening at that school, is that something we should be 
worried about?  How does that all play out and work into what we're doing?” (Social Media 
Officer – Organisation B) 
 
The two-way communication ability of social media channels is seen as highly supportive for 
emergency management. “One of the other major benefits is that ability to get that feedback 
from the community to find out what the sentiment is normally. Often it's really just we get an 
idea if people aren't understanding the warnings or if they feel they aren't getting the 
information that they need.  So the community will ask questions and will complain and criticise 
if there's a gap that we haven't identified, so then it helps us then to try and fill that gap with 
more information or better information” (Social Media Officer – Organisation D). The quote 
from the social media officer from Case Organisation D highlights this aspect of the social 
media utilisation. All of the case organisations are eager to know what the public thinks about 
the information they are providing, in order that they can provide the information that the public 
needs to stay safe.  
 
The case organisations are not just answering questions from the public, when the social media 
officers assume that information is insufficient or misunderstood they then provide more 
detailed information through the social media channels. This has a major relevance in the 
warnings. In Case State II the warnings are provided through the internal warning information 
systems, and then they are automatically shared through the social media channels. These 
automatic warnings include all the necessary information but are not very engaging as shown 
in the following quote: “The answers are always in there but they don't read it. That's fine. 
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That's probably human nature. So a watch and act message will go out. We'll then repost with 
an image showing the affected area. If you're in this area you need to - you need to heed this 
message. They'll automatically see it and say oh I'm there right now. What do I do? What do I 
do? Is my house going to burn down? As quickly as you can you would reiterate whatever is in 
that message. If you are in the affected area your safest option is to leave right now. For further 
information, click here. You would link again to the warning which has all the info. We address 
them by their name and we sign off with our name so that they know they're talking to someone” 
(Social Media Officer - Organisation D). The important automated warnings are used as a basis 
for an enhanced manual social media message. All of the case organisations are providing 
enhanced social media messages when the social media officers in the organisation have the 
feeling that a particular important message was not well understood by the listening 
communities.  
 
All of the case organisations are using their social media channels in the operational mode to 
engage with the general public and not just as a one-way communication channel. The 
engagement in this operational mode has the form of answering questions and to provide 
tailored and enhanced information when there is the assumption that there is additional need 
of information.  
6.7.2 Social Media as an Engagement Channel during the Non-Operational 
Mode  
As established, the main aim of the social media communication during the operational mode 
is to support that the general public is safe. In the non-operational mode, there are several 
different aims why social media is used to support the emergency management activities. 
Social media is used for purposes which support and might increase community resilience, 
such as education around emergency events, encouragement to prepare for emergency events, 
or fostering interest about how to keep safe during such events. Furthermore, social media 
channels are used for public relations purposes, such as showcasing what the organisation is, 
awareness raising about what the volunteers in the organisation provide to their communities, 
or social media is used as well as a channel to raise interest in volunteering for the 
organisations.  
 
The channel selection is in the non-operational mode much broader than in the operational 
mode. In the operational mode, the organisations typically only utilise the main communication 
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channels, in the non-operational mode they additionally as well use their supporting social 
media channels (see Chapter 6.4). The supporting social media channels often provide no 
particular benefit when it comes to the core tasks of an EMO, of mitigating the effects of a 
particular emergency event type. However, the case organisations are using a portfolio of 
different social media channels to foster the interest of and the engagement with the general 
public as illustrated in the following quote: “Instagram offers no benefits when it comes to 
warnings. It doesn't. Because we can't have automated feeds saying, hey be careful there's a 
fire here and there. But we utilise it because it showcases the organisation. It's imagery. People 
like big red trucks. People love seeing fire-fighters getting dirty and doing their job. So the 
engagement is huge on Instagram. But technically it offers nothing to the core service that we 
offer which is putting out fires” (Social Media Officer – Organisation D). 
 
During the non-operational mode the organisations can try new approaches with their social 
media utilisation as they have more time at hand and a misunderstood message has no potential 
negative influence on the physical wellbeing of members of the listening audience. The social 
media channels are utilised actively for community education. An example of how the 
engagement for the community education might look like. Organisation C is promoting the 
utilisation of smoke alarms. If there is a news story about how a smoke alarm helped to keep 
occupants from a house with a fire incident safe then organisation C might use this information 
as a basis for social media messages about the benefits of smoke alarms. The message might 
be locally supported as a paid social media message. Such a campaign is not started if people 
got hurt in the fire incident. The remaining case organisations use as well current events for 
their social media community education.  
 
The social media channels are as well highly utilised for the showcasing of an organisation. 
This includes sharing relevant pictures of emergency or training events as shown through the 
quote at the beginning of this section. Furthermore, as all case organisations, except for 
organisation C, are large volunteer organisations the social media channels are utilised to 
showcase the volunteers within the organisation as shown in the following quote: 
“It can help our stakeholders and our campaigns with other organisations. But it shows that 
we have 60,000 people working hard all across the state showcasing brigades of towns that 
people have never even heard of. They didn't even know that they existed.” Social Media 
Operator Organisation D  
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It is possible through the social media channels to show the listening community what the 
volunteers are providing for their communities and as well that the members of the listening 
audience could be one of the volunteers in an organisation.  
 
The case organisations have managed to build up a significant follower base, which refers to 
individuals from the general public which are receiving the social media messages of the case 
organisations. This listening community acts as well to actively help answer questions or 
correct information which was posted on the social media channels of an organisation by a 
member of the public. The social media channels with their self-correcting communities are 
seen as valuable in both the operational mode as well as the non-operational mode. Altogether 
the social media engagement of the case organisation supports their main activities which is 
keeping the public safe.  
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6.8 Social Media as an Intelligence Channel 
Social media can also be used as a tool to gather information from the social media channels 
to improve the awareness of EMOs. The informants of the case organisations were reporting 
about two different types of social media intelligence. These two types are classified into: (1) 
‘Communicational Social Media Intelligence’, and (2) ‘Operational Social Media Intelligence’. 
The first type uses social media for gathering of information which helps to better communicate 
and engage with the public; the second type refers to the more classical form of intelligence 
gathering, where social media is used as a source of information to improve the situational 
awareness of an organisation. This information is then used to influence the operational 
response of said organisation.  
 
The Communicational Information Intelligence was split into two different forms: ‘Strategic 
Awareness’, which refers to social media intelligence that double checks whether the 
information distributed was understood; and ‘Dialogical Social Media Intelligence’, which 
refers to a form of Intelligence which makes sure that the Information distributed towards the 
public is what the public needs at a particular point in time.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Social Media as an Intelligence Channel 
 
Some form of Communicational Information Intelligence is performed by all of the case 
organisations. The organisations monitor their social media channels to understand how their 
listening audience perceives their messages. This type of social media intelligence is then used 
to improve the messaging in order to keep the public safe.  
 
Operational social media intelligence is only used by organisation A, C, and to a smaller extend 
by organisation D. Organisation B, and E currently do not have the expertise and necessary 
resources to use their social media channels as an intelligence tool.  
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6.8.1 Communicational Social Media Intelligence 
The Communicational Social Media Intelligence refers to gathering information to improve 
the communication practices of the organisation.  
 
Social media officers within the case organisations monitor social media channels of the 
organisations to make sure that their listening audience understands the message that the 
organisation intents to distribute. “So in the media unit public information section we'd be 
looking at trying to make sure that from the comments and the feedback that we're getting 
people are understanding what we're trying to communicate to them. That they understand the 
warnings, and that they are interpreting the warnings correctly.  So we'd be looking at that 
from an intelligence point of view.” (Social Media Operator - Organisation D).  
 
Linking back to the work of Artman et al. (2011), I refer to this type of social media intelligence 
as ‘Strategic Awareness Social Media Intelligence’. The social media channels are monitored 
to check for questions and misunderstandings. Case Organisation A, C, and D, use commercial 
CRM social media software for this purpose. Organisation B and E are much smaller 
organisations with less financial resources, therefore the social media teams do not have the 
budget to utilise such commercial CRM software packages. The interview informants in these 
organisations stated that they directly check the social media channels.  
 
Social Media Officers who operate the social media channels to engage with the listening 
community and distribute messages towards these communities use some type of Strategic 
Awareness Social Media Intelligence in all case organisations. The social media officers probe 
and double check whether their messaging was understood or if there are questions or 
comments which indicate a misunderstanding on the social media channel the particular social 
media officer is responsible for.  
    
Social media officers from Case Organisation A, C, and D reported a further form of social 
media intelligence used to improve the communication with the listening audiences on social 
media. In reference to the work of Artman et al. (2011), this second type of social media 
intelligence can be referred to as ‘Dialogical Social Media Intelligence’. 
 
This form of Communicational Social Media Intelligence is characterised through an active 
monitoring of the social media channels in order to gather information for the organisation. 
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However, in contrast to the Operational Social Media Intelligence, it has no influence on the 
actual physical operations of the organisation, rather it is used to improve the communication 
with the listening audience. The following vignette from Case Organisation A illustrates the 
Dialogical Social Media Intelligence: 
“The other thing to remember as well though is a lot of the time the information may be 
operationally inaccurate, so it's no good from a send a fire truck there perspective, but from a 
public information perspective that incorrect information can be as valuable if not more so 
than stuff that is right. 
 
A really good example of that, in those same <specific region> fires, it was just before I 
knocked off on a shift one night and we had, suddenly Twitter just lit up with people in this little 
town called <specific town> were going door to door knocking on the neighbours saying that 
they had to evacuate, that there was - over Twitter they had been told that they needed to 
evacuate, the fire was about to impact the town and everyone needed to get out now and head 
towards <specific other town>. 
 
I was sort on shift and using some of our monitoring tools I saw this big spike all of a sudden 
and sort of had a look at it and we knew exactly where that fire was.  We knew that under the 
fire conditions that we had there was absolutely no way that this town of <specific town> could 
be under threat at that point in time. But driving to <specific other town> would actually take 
people directly through the fire's path. I had to stop that happening. 
 
So because we were able to identify that, we were able to get on Twitter, we were able to correct 
that misinformation, calm everyone down and instead of having you know dozens and dozens 
of people driving through a fire, they stayed where they were where they were safe. 
 
I suppose that's just a bit of a good anecdote on how that operational intelligence can be useful 
from a public information perspective when operationally [technical difficulty] bad 
information.” (Social Media Officer - Organisation A) 
 
The information in question which was gathered from social media was based on rumours and 
did not reflect the situation of the event. The information had the potential to put individuals 
in danger who might would have acted on this information. The information gathered through 
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social media can be used to create targeted social media messages, which can help counter 
misinformation or promote a specific behaviour in the communities as in the shown example. 
 
This kind of social media intelligence is hardly possible without additional software in use; 
The social media officers in the case organisations who use social media as a dialogical 
intelligence channel use similar monitoring software packages. The following quote describes 
how such software packages are used within the organisations: “we use basic monitoring tools 
like Sprout Social with keyword searches and if there's an incident happening in a particular 
location we'll set up key word searches to try and monitor what other traffic is happening in 
relation to that incident.  So we do a bit of that but it's not very sophisticated; it's just really 
around keyword searches and less of following the people that we know that do share a lot of 
emergency information.  So the influencers and so on, we monitor those channels and we set 
up keywords during incidents.” (Social Media Officer Organisation D) The intelligence 
activities are still in the early phases and need to be further developed.  
 
The interview informants see using the public as partially trusted information as a paradigm 
shift in EMO. In the past, organisations saw the public as something that purely needed to be 
protected, but not as a party who co-creates valuable information or actively supports the 
Emergency Management. “But certainly a big shift for the emergency services because - and 
that's where the whole verification stuff comes in.  In the past emergency services here would 
only - wouldn't really be - not interested in what the community were saying because they didn't 
feel that the community knew what they were talking about basically.  They'd only believe if 
it was one of our own members that passed information back and there only were the structures 
to get that information from our members. But now there is an acceptance - more of an 
acceptance that there is useful intelligence to be gathered from the community via social 
media.” (Social Media Officer Organisation D) The practices and processes still need to be 
developed how the case organisations can properly process and utilise this information. 
Currently, the processes are still on an ad-hoc basis. The information from social media 
channels is seen as something valuable, however, the verification processes need to be further 
refined.  
 
The members in the organisation see information from the social media channels to be valuable 
for two different purposes; communication relevant information and operational relevant 
information. In this section, social media intelligence for communication relevant information 
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was described. In the next section, social media intelligence for operational social media 
intelligence will be discussed.  
 
6.8.2 Operational Social Media Intelligence 
Operational Social Media Intelligence refers to the gathering of information to improve the 
situational awareness of the organisation and to influence the operations on the ground. Using 
social media services for operational intelligence is still developing. Within the case 
organisations only Organisation A, C, and indirectly D have the capabilities to utilise social 
media as a source of operational intelligence. Most of the information is collected through 
Twitter, as Twitter data is data more transparent and easier to collect in contrast to Facebook.  
 
“Operational intelligence gathering so actually identifying information that could be useful in 
the actual response to the emergency, so like where a fire might be, how many points of ignition, 
the size of fire, that sort of thing. (Social Media Officer Organisation D) As shown in the quote 
with the example of a bushfire, the organisations try to collect information relevant to the event.  
 
Organisation A has several bushfire behaviour analysts who can predict the behaviour of a 
specific bushfire from different data sources such as weather forecasts, or image material from 
the fires. For example, these specialists can predict the behaviour of the fire amongst others on 
the smoke plume. Social media data can highly support the bushfire behaviour analysts since 
it provides valuable image material shared by individuals from the general public during the 
bushfire events. Photos are seen as the most valuable information source social media can 
provide and is seen as relatively easy to falsify.   
 
The case organisations check the information they gather through social media in an attempt 
to verify it. The photos are checked for prominent landmarks easy to identify and are put 
through the Google Reverse Image Search to verify if a photo is recent or if it is from a previous 
event. The social media informant in Case Organisation A stated that after their initial 
verification process the accuracy of the information is between 80-85% which is seen by the 
organisation as more than acceptable. It needs to be stated that emergency organisations do not 
rely on one particular source of information but triangulate the information to build their 
situational awareness.   
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The interview informants stated that information in the control centres is often requested from 
the social media intelligence cell about a specific event. These active information requests are 
common in the early phases of the response when the traditional information sources are not 
yet fully in place. The traditional sources are organisational members on the ground, 
information from partner agencies, or in bushfire event the fire reconnaissance aeroplanes. 
 
Not all information passively gathered through social media can provide the needed 
information. The informant in Organisation A stated that sometimes the organisation would 
favour to request additional photos from members of the general public. In this case, the social 
media officer actively asks for particular information about an event. Nevertheless, most 
information gathering through social media is passive. The organisation is afraid to steer the 
public perception in a direction where the public thinks the organisation is not well equipped 
to respond towards the current emergency event. Such doubt in the capabilities could lead to 
mistrust towards the organisation and difficult outcome of the emergency event. “It is a fine 
line that you’ve got to kind of play between seeking the information that we need but also not 
undermining the faith that the public has in us and our ability to be able to know what’s 
happening”.  
 
In Case Organisation A, the main interview informant of the organisation performs the social 
media intelligence. During the operational mode, this informant has an integrated role in which 
the interview informant is responsible for social media intelligence as well as operating the 
social media channels to engage with the public. 
 
Organisation C has a different structure. Organisation C has a social media cell in the Media 
and Communication unit, which is responsible to communicate with the public, and a social 
media cell within the Intelligence Unit. The social media cell in the Intelligence Unit is 
responsible for gathering information through social media.  
  
This social media intelligence cell is still in an early phase as shown in the following quote: 
“That isn't particularly well developed yet and certainly in <Case State II> we have an 
intelligence unit that now has a social media person as well in the State Control Centre, but 
we're just trying to establish some tools and some training that will help people in that more 
specific intelligence gathering role.” Member 1 Organisation D  
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There are established verification processes but how social media information is gathered is 
still in an ad-hoc basis. Organisation C and D are currently in the progress to advance this form 
of social media unit and train the necessary human resources.  
 
At the moment, Organisation A, C and D are all in the progress of formalising the intelligence 
gathering through social media further. These organisations are gradually building up an operational 
function of social media intelligence gathering for the operational mode of operation.  
6.8.3 Social Media Intelligence within the Case Organisations 
Table 6.12 shows how the case organisations utilise social media as an intelligence tool. All of 
the case organisations utilise Social Media as a Strategic Awareness tool in order to understand 
whether the messages they are providing towards their listening audience is understood. This 
form of social media intelligence can be counted as part of the social media engagement with 
the listening audience. The Social Media Officers who operate the social media channels to 
distribute information perform these functions (Social Media Engagement Officers). 
 
Table 6.12 Social Media as an Intelligence Channel within Case Organisations 
Intelligence Type Organisation  A 
Organisation  
B 
Organisation  
C 
Organisation  
D 
Organisation  
E 
Communicational 
Intelligence 
Strategic 
Awareness X X X X X 
Dialogical 
Intelligence X  X (X)  
Operational Intelligence X  X (X)  
 
The Case Organisations A, C use their social media channels as a channel for dialogical 
intelligence in order to cater their social media communication strategies to exactly what kind 
of information the public needs at a current point in time.  
 
Organisation A and C actively utilise social media for Operational Intelligence. The two 
organisations have different approaches to the Dialogical Intelligence and the Operational 
Intelligence. In Case Organisation A, the distribution of information and the intelligence are 
combined in the same role. In Case Organisation C, the roles that perform the messaging on 
Social Media and the roles that perform Social Media Intelligence are separate roles, physically 
separated in different rooms. However, the Intelligence Officers update the Engagement 
Officers about their findings. 
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Organisation D has the capabilities to use social media for Operational Intelligence, and also 
for Dialogical Social Media Intelligence. However, these two forms of social media 
intelligence, are performed only when the organisation switches into its full operational mode. 
When the organisation is in the full operational mode, then the social media channels are 
operated from the State Control Centre.  
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6.9 Incident Reporting through Social Media and Dispatching 
“Something that you're seeing increasingly in the United States for instance is people reporting 
incidents via social media and that opens a whole bucket of worms for us. “ - Social Media 
Operator - Organisation A  
 
New patterns of behaviour emerge on how individuals and groups engage with EMOs, which 
are facilitated through social media. Some of these behaviour and interaction patterns were not 
possible before EMOs adopted social media services as communication channels into their 
organisations. Help requests and incident reports through social media are some of these 
emerging patterns. For EMO, this is disruptive and potential dangerous. 
 
In Australia, incident reports and requests for emergency help is being gathered through the 
emergency hotline Triple Zero (000). This is an organisation that responds to and coordinates 
the emergency calls for all EMOs in Australia. Triple Zero’s structures and procedures are set 
up in a way that it can process the relevant information through phone calls but not through 
other means such as email, text messages, social media, or other forms of text transferred 
information. Furthermore, EMOs themselves do not have the practices and procedures in place 
to allow incident reports through social media.  
 
However, not responding to a request for help, which the organisation is aware of, could have 
lethal consequences. For EMOs, it is of highest priority to keep the public safe. The interviewed 
informants expressed that it is a moral responsibility for members of EMOs to follow up on 
incident reports when they are aware of them. Nearly all case organisations report some form 
of reporting of emergency incidents in the past as shown in Table 6.13. 
 
In this section, it is expanded upon how social media is used when members of the public report 
incidents, or request emergency assistance through social media. For EMOs, this opens up the 
problem on how to react to such behaviour and how to integrate social media services within 
the dispatching processes of the organisation. The processes and procedures to accompany 
incident reporting and emergency assistance through social media as an official service offered 
by EMOs are currently not properly developed. The informants of the case organisations 
identified a struggle with the current structure of the organisations, the established processes, 
the norms of the organisation and the moral responsibilities of members within the 
organisation, and the expectations of the public.  
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Table 6.13 Incident Reporting through Social Media across case organisations 
Organisation Process Experienced in Past Social Media monitoring 
Organisation A Informal Occasionally Operational Mode and  during Office-hours 
Organisation B Informal Occasionally Operational Mode and  during Office-hours 
Organisation C Formalised Occasionally Operational Mode (sign on and sign off) 
Organisation D Semi-formalised Occasionally 
During Office-hours 
(Extended in Operational 
Mode) 
Organisation E Informal No 
During Office-hours 
(Extended in Operational 
Mode) 
 
Informants outlined two types of incident reports and emergency requests through social 
media: (1) Occasional incident reports by individuals who are not able to, or decide not to call 
the official emergency hotline (000), (2) incident reports when the official emergency reporting 
infrastructure is not reachable. The official emergency reporting infrastructure can break down. 
For example, an overload in an extreme event or when the physical infrastructure is damaged. 
The first part of this section focuses on incident reports where members of the public decide to 
not go through the official reporting channel. The second part of this section will focus on the 
possibility of the social media structures not being reachable.  
 
On the surface, both reasons for incident requests through social media seem to bring the same 
risks and problems for EMOs, however, through the different setup in the operational and the 
non-operational mode, incident reports bring different struggles and risks for EMOs in these 
different organisational modes.  
 
Incident reporting through social media channels are currently a rare occurrence, however, as 
shown in Table 6.13 except for the informant from organisation E, the case informants 
operating the social media channels in the headquarters of the organisations stated that 
incidents were reported through social media in the past. The fire response organisations 
experienced incident reporting of serious issues more than the remaining case organisations 
(Organisation A, and D). 
186 
6.9.1 Occasional Incident Report through Social Media 
The first type, incident reporting when an individual is reporting through social media because 
they are not able to call or decide not to go through the established emergency reporting 
channels, happen occasionally. The main risk of such a report is the possibility that it might not 
be noticed by the organisation since the social media channels are not constantly monitored. 
This is a higher risk outside of the operational mode. If and when an incident report is noticed, 
the case organisations can cope with it as long as it does not occur too frequently.   
 
In all of the examined organisations, incident reporting through social media is seen as a critical 
issue for which the organisations are not prepared. Only Organisation C established formalised 
processes that specify how to integrate help request through social media into the official 
response and dispatching processes. Organisation D established semi-formalised processes 
within its structure. The remaining case organisations have unofficial processes in place which 
outline how the social media officers respond to incident reports through social media. 
Subsequently, a lot of knowledge is within the social media officers and not formalised within 
the processes of the EMOs. These unofficial processes have the same form and manifestation 
as the formalised processes within organisation C but they are not documented within the 
process structure of the organisation. 
 
A common theme within the different interviews was tension and struggles between the 
organisational manifestation of the EMO and the individuals within the system. “If you've got 
people going ‘help my house is on fire, I'm trapped’, and they're writing you this on Twitter, 
you want to be able to do something about that.” (Social Media Officer - Organisation A)   
Generally, the interview informants across all organisations were outlining the struggle 
between the moral responsibilities of: the individuals within the system, the organisations as 
EMOs, the procedural struggles within the organisations, and the fear to set public 
expectations. 
  
The quote from a social media officer in Organisation A is a good example of the moral 
responsibility the social media operators are feeling. This sentiment towards dispatching 
through social media was a shared perception of the informants across all case organisations. 
 
The social media officers made it clear that the structures and resources within the EMOs are 
currently not there to allow incident reports and requests for emergency assistance through 
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social media. The concern of the informants is that when the public expectation is set up to a 
specific extent, then the organisation cannot go back to a stage before this.  
 
“So we didn't want to be in a position where - on the one hand there's the risk of almost 
approving that sort of method of asking for help.  If you make it obvious that you're going to 
help people, they do that.  Do you know what I mean? You establish an expectation in a way.  
So there was a bit of concern of that - that was really the concern and because there are no 
official processes in place to actually manage that. So we need to be really careful about setting 
that expectation, but at the end of the day we weren't prepared to just do nothing if someone 
was asking for help and we thought that was a genuine request. (Social Media Officer 1 - 
Organisation D Headquarter)  
 
The interview informants indicated that it is a very thin line between avoiding to build a public 
expectation for which the organisations are not yet prepared and to follow the moral 
responsibility to mitigate the effects of an emergency event. The quote showed this struggle 
between moral responsibility and the risk to set a public expectation the organisation is not yet 
prepared to meet.  
 
The social media units within the organisations actively try to avoid situations where 
individuals ask for emergency assistance through the social media channels. To manage the 
expectation of the public that social media would be a valid reporting channel, the social media 
profiles of the organisations show a disclaimer that these channels are not reporting channels 
and are only operated through the normal office hours. These disclaimers also indicate that the 
channels are used as an information channel from the organisations towards the public. Social 
media in general, and Facebook and Twitter in particular, are seen as additional broadcasting 
channels from the organisation towards the public.  
 
When an incident report or the request for emergency assistance is made through the social 
media channels of an organisation, the social media officers follow a similar procedure across 
all the case organisations. As mentioned above, only organisation C has formalised processes 
embedded into the training material and the social media manuals for social media officers 
within the organisation. Organisation D established a semi-formalised process not embedded 
into the official structure and procedures of the organisation, but is followed amongst the social 
media officers within the organisation. The remaining case organisations do not have 
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formalised processes in place. However, the interview informants indicated the same steps 
when asked how such an occurrence was handled in the past, or how they would handle such 
an occurrence.  
 
The following quote outlines the establishment of the semi-formalised process in Organisation 
D on what to do when individuals request help through social media.  
“In our - one of our first - one of the first drafts of our guidelines that was one of the issues 
that we raised and we had quite a long discussion, thinking process, through this. At the end of 
the day there was no real organisational structures in place to handle that sort of thing, so it 
wasn't like there was a requirement from our employment perspective we felt to actually 
respond to that or do anything with that, but at the end of the day it was more of a moral 
responsibility.” (Social Media Officer 1 - Organisation D Headquarter)6   
 
Again, the quote shows the struggle between the moral responsibility of the individuals within 
the organisation and the lack of organisational structures that could accompany reports through 
social media. Especially in the non-operational mode, the social media channels cannot be 
monitored closely all the time because the organisations currently don’t have the necessary 
resources. EMOs are structured into different units and departments, which can be very siloed.  
 
When it comes to incident reporting and the necessary dispatching of emergency response 
resources it can change to an inter-organisational response, which makes it even more 
complicated. For example, in a fire event it could easily happen that multiple organisations 
need to be involved: Fire service to fight the fire, police to navigate the traffic and close roads 
or to start criminal investigations, and ambulance services if there are potentially injured 
people. The emergency hotline Triple Zero has the responsibility to make sure that all necessary 
organisations are involved when an incident is reported through the emergency hotline. 
Because of this, the social media officers usually report the incidents to the Triple Zero hotline 
when they are aware about an incident reported through social media.   
 
The processes, which the social media officers follow, have the same form across the case 
organisations. The simplified process flow is shown through the BPMN model in figure 6.10. 
If an incident is reported through social media, the social media officer will respond and tell 
                                                        
6 Bold text stressed by author. 
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the sender that it is not possible to report an incident through the social media channel and that 
an incident needs to be reported through the official emergency reporting channel (which is the 
phone number 000, the nationwide emergency telephone number in Australia). If the social 
media officer is convinced that the incident report is genuine, the social media officers will 
report the incident themselves by calling Triple Zero or the dispatching unit within the 
organisation to make sure that the organisation responds to the potential incident. The social 
media officers need to go through the official reporting channels themselves as they do not 
have direct access to the dispatching system of the organisation and need to make sure that all 
relevant organisations are involved in the response to the reported incident. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 BPMN model incident report or emergency assistance request through social 
media 
 
The model shows the three different involved entities (through the pools in the BPMN model): 
At the top, a member of the general public reports an incident; the middle represents an 
emergency response organisation in which the social media officer is situated; The bottom 
represents the Triple Zero (000) call centre where the emergency hotline officer processes the 
response and starts the official emergency response. As shown through the different pools in 
the model, there are multiple organisations. Not shown in the model are the multiple distinct 
organisational units within the emergency response organisation, which are then involved in a 
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response when they are activated through the Triple Zero (000) hotline. A report through social 
media might influence different organisations and in each organisation, different organisational 
units. When the emergency hotline officer starts the response, potentially multiple 
organisations are informed and within these organisations the traditional processes of an 
emergency response are set in motion.   
 
When the organisation is in the operational mode, the social media channels are actively 
monitored. Hence, a low quantity of incident reporting is seen as a minor problem. If there are 
not too many incident reports, the organisations can cope with them within the current setup. 
During the non-operational mode, case organisations do not continuously monitor the social 
media channels and only operate during normal office hours. During this mode, it is highly 
possible that an incident report is not noticed for some time. The following quote by a social 
media officer within organisation A shows that it would be especially critical if an incident 
would be reported at night time. “The issue that we would have then is, if at 2 am tonight 
somebody reports a fire, we might not see that until six or seven o'clock tomorrow morning.” 
(Social Media Officer - Organisation A)  
 
The following quote from a social media officer in organisation D describes the procedure the 
organisation follows outside of their office hours in monitoring and responding to social media 
messages on the headquarters Facebook and Twitter channels. “There is a disclaimer saying 
it's not monitored 24 seven. You hope common sense plays a role in that as well. Over the 
weekends myself and <name of Informant 1 of Organisation D> take it in turns, and at the 
evening we'll have a quick look at Sprout <monitoring software in use>. Is anything major 
happening? Are there big issues? Do I need to action anything? Is it all just normal stuff and I 
can deal with it on Monday? So we do keep an eye on it over the weekend and public holidays 
for those reasons but generally it's pretty good.” (Social Media Officer 2 - Organisation D 
Headquarter) 
 
This procedure is similar in the remaining case organisations. Outside of the normal office 
hours, there is a social media person on-call who sporadically checks the social media channels. 
This structure provides the risk that an incident report at night time or during the weekends 
might not be noticed on time, which may result to the organisation not being able to respond 
to it within an appropriate time frame, however, the perception within the organisation is that 
it is clear for the public that the social media channels are not reporting channels and that the 
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reports through social media are a rare occurrence: “But as I said, it's only happened half a 
dozen times really over the years so it's not a major concern. I don't think we are at risk at the 
minute anyway of creating any expectation that that's a legitimate way to request assistance.” 
(Social Media Officer 1 - Organisation D Headquarter) The risk that incident reporting through 
social media could lead to a critical situation for the organisations, outside of the operational 
mode, is generally seen as low. 
 
Incident reporting through social media is not seen as a technical issue, but more that the 
procedures and processes are just not yet in place; The processes will not be put in place in the 
near future either. “The interesting thing was that the argument against accepting requests for 
help from social media was that you couldn't verify the information, and yet by us just phoning 
up with that information the emergency dispatchers were quite happy to dispatch help on that 
basis. So it's not - the information isn't more or less verified; it's just coming through a different 
medium because they came to them on a phone, they can handle that, but there obviously still 
aren't any official processes in place to handle that request through social media.” (Social 
Media Officer 1 - Organisation D Headquarter) It is not the fear that social media is more prone 
to false or misinformation than information which is processed through phone calls; It is a 
problem in the setup of processes on how information can be processed within an organisation. 
The processes within the emergency response hotline (000) are set in a way that this 
organisation needs to receive information through phone calls and is not prepared to process 
information through alternative forms of communication other than the phone calls, therefore, 
all of the processes and procedures are structured around phone calls.  
 
A general fear is that false incidents are reported through the anonymity of social media. This 
anonymity is similar to a phone call. Especially on Twitter or Facebook, it is possible through 
the profile setup to determine whether a profile seems to be genuine or a fake profile. This 
already helps determine how to judge the information sent through. This does not mean that 
there are no false reports sent towards the organisation through social media. “We have had 
one false report so a girl who maliciously reported a fire at her neighbour's house. That was 
interesting because we had suspicions about whether or not this was genuine, and we did make 
it clear to her that it was an offence to falsely report an emergency, but then she still insisted 
that it was a genuine emergency. So we called 000 and that information was passed onto the 
police and I think the police have dealt with her.” (Social Media Officer 1 - Organisation D 
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Headquarter) Similar to false reports through the official emergency report hotline, the 
available information would be sent to the police.  
 
“If I saw someone asking for help on social media and thought it was genuine then I would 
phone 000. Not because I'm a <name of organisation> member or not because I'm acting on 
behalf of the state or anything, but just because I'm a concerned citizen.  So that's the basis on 
which we would do that in the State Control Centre or anywhere else.” (Social Media Officer 
1 - Organisation D Headquarter) 
 
As shown in the quote for the social media officers within the organisations, it is again more 
of a moral responsibility to keep their communities safe. Therefore, the social media officers 
process incident reports through social media when they are aware of them, however, the 
organisations do not have the resources or the current strategy for social media channels to be 
monitored at all time. It could easily happen that an incident report is not noticed by the 
organisation. 
 
The case organisations can cope with an occasional incident report or the request for emergency 
assistance through social media, as long they are aware of the report. During the operational 
mode, it is more likely to happen that the organisation notices such a report because the social 
media channels are actively monitored during this time and not just sporadically checked. 
Therefore, incident reports and request for emergency assistance through social media are less 
of an operational risk during the operational mode than during the non-operational mode.  
6.9.2 Extreme Events and Help Requests through Social Media  
During an extensive extreme event, it is possible that the emergency reporting infrastructure is 
impaired. The infrastructure is either unreachable through to damage of the infrastructure or in 
extreme events it is possible that the emergency hotline is overloaded. For EMOs, it is another 
problem area resulting in organisational risks.  
“One of the things that we are looking at and that we need to address as an organisation and 
a bit of an organisational risk for us: there is some good research that the American Red Cross 
did on this and that's supported by anecdotal stuff from various agencies that have had the 
situation happen, is that where the major reporting system, where the major incident reporting 
phone number goes down - so 911 or 000 becomes unavailable for whatever reason, 
something like 86 per cent of people, their first fall back option is to then go and report the 
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incident on the agency's social media channels. - Now we aren't set up for that.” (Social 
Media Officer - Organisation A)7 
 
A systematic failure of the emergency hotline Triple Zero (000) through infrastructure failure 
or an overloaded hotline would most likely result in the public to resort to alternative reporting 
channels, such as the social media channels of the emergency response organisations. The 
current social media setup and structures are not prepared to respond to an event in which social 
media would become incident reporting channel. The social media structures in the 
organisation are still largely seen as an alternative broadcasting channel to distribute 
information to a large audience.  
 
Internationally, such a behaviour was observed during Hurricane Sandy in the US (Chatfield et 
al. 2014). The emergency hotline was overburdened and affected members of the public where 
requesting help through the social media channels of the New York Fire Department. The fire 
department resorted to dispatch based on the information they received through their social 
media channels. The social media operators within the case organisations are aware about the 
possibility of such an event happening, however, none of the case organisations currently have 
the structures in place or are prepared to dispatch based on social media information during an 
extreme event when a large amount of lives would be at risk.  
 
“In Australia the closest I can think of is during the storm events, the flooding events that we 
had a couple of months ago, the organisation were just overwhelmed with the number of 
requests and you had people reporting incidents and the <Organisation B> social media team 
were basically saying please go and ring this number. People were going well we've been 
ringing this number for six hours this is why we're trying to tell you.” Social Media Operator - 
Organisation A  
The previous quote shows that to a small extent, such an event happened in Australia. 
Organisation B operates a hotline for non-live threatening flood, storm, and tsunami related 
reporting and assistance requests. This reporting hotline was overburdened during a storm 
event that resulted in major flooding in urban and rural areas. Callers who wanted to report an 
incident or needed emergency assistance were unable to report through this number due the 
large volume of calls. The social media team was not prepared to respond to the inevitable 
                                                        
7 Bold text stressed by author. 
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request through social media. As outlined in sub-chapter 6.3, the social media channels are 
operated from within the media and communication team and are perceived as a broadcasting 
channel. With the current setup and role structures, it is not feasible to use this channel to feed 
the social media information into the operations structure of the organisation that is organising 
the response to an extreme event.  
 
This is not just a potential problem in case organisation B as the following quote shows: “What 
we don't have, and as far as I'm aware no Australian agency really has, is a process, a 
procedure in place to deal with that major event type failure and the resources and the what 
would need to be put in place rather rapidly. I don't think it's necessarily something that you 
could do on the fly.  You need to have a plan for this beforehand otherwise it could end up very 
messy very quickly.” Social Media Operator - Organisation A  
 
Organisation A has structures in place to use their social media channels and an intelligence 
channel from which information can also be fed into the operational structures of the 
organisation during the operational mode, however, they do not have the necessary procedures, 
resources, and structures in place necessary to dispatch based on social media incident 
reporting during an extreme event in which the emergency reporting infrastructure would be 
disrupted. The remaining case organisations are not prepared for such an event either. While 
the interview informants from the headquarters of the organisations responsible for corporate 
social media channels mentioned that they are aware of the possibility that such an event could 
happen, they also indicated that none of the case organisations had procedures in place which 
would be necessary to dispatch based on social media information when it would be on a large 
scale.    
 
The social media officers highlight that such an extreme event would be very rare and unlikely 
to happen, as shown in the following quote from a social media officer in Organisation A,. 
However, in the case that such an extreme event would happen, the impact on the organisation 
and the affected communities would be seen as high. “Yeah look and just - I suppose the 
important thing to note here as well is we're talking extreme events in this case.  It probably 
will only happen in one per cent of major incidents, but it's the type of major incident where if 
we don't have a plan and there in place, you're going to be potentially looking at major loss of 
life.” Social Media Operator - Organisation A  
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The two fire response case organisations, Organisation A and D, and the all-hazards 
Organisation C have more capabilities when it comes to the utilisation of social media than the 
two flood and storm response Organisations B and E. This difference in capability might 
depend on the size of the organisations and that Organisation A and D have more resources as 
well as funding at hand to explore the utilisation of social media. Organisation C has a different 
status since it can draw on the knowledge of all the emergency response organisations in the 
respective state it is located.  
 
To conclude this section, incident reporting and emergency assistance request are potential 
risks the social media officers in the organisations are aware of but it is not a risk that has a 
high priority for the organisation to mitigate. All organisations, except organisation E, 
experienced cases where individuals from the public used a social media channel of the 
organisation to report incidents. The social media channels are not reporting channels for the 
organisations, however, when the social media officers are aware of a report through social 
media, they will follow up on it.  The organisations are able to respond to low amounts of 
requests through social media as long as these requests are within the normal office hours or 
during the operational mode when the social media team is monitoring the social media 
channels. In the non-operational mode, or outside office hours, the social media channels are 
only sporadically monitored, and therefore, it is likely that a social media message is not seen 
for a long time.  
 
The case organisations are not prepared for incident reports through social media in large 
amounts when the traditional reporting infrastructure is disrupted. For example, Hurricane 
Sandy in the US (Chatfield et al. 2014). As shown in the first part of this section, the case 
organisations, except for organisation C and D, did not have established formalised processes 
in responding to incidents and requests for emergency assistance reported through social media 
in the first place. None of the organisations has the structures, resources, and processes in place 
to dispatch based on social media information in case the traditional reporting infrastructure 
would be impaired during a large-scale extreme event. Social media incident reporting is a 
potential organisational risk, which might be covered by the organisations when the social 
media integration further matures in the organisations. 
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6.10 Social Media Officers  
For the case organisations which are emergency response organisations (Organisation A,B, D, 
and E), social media is established on three organisational levels: on the brigade or (unit) level, 
on the region (or district) level, and at the headquarters level. Organisation C currently only 
established social media in the State Control Centre, which also functions as the headquarters 
of the organisation.  
 
In all of the case organisations, social media is used at the headquarters level in all phases of 
the PPRR model. Most social media activity in the operational mode focuses on social media 
channels coordinated centrally by the organisations. All of the case organisations established 
specific roles, which have the responsibility to coordinate and operate the emergency 
management relevant social media channels. In this section, a closer look is taken at the 
different types of social media officers used as established roles across the case organisations.  
  
 
Figure 6.11 Types of Social Media Officers 
 
As shown in Figure 6.11, there are three types of social media officers present in the case 
organisations: social media engagement officers, who are responsible for the broadcasting of 
information and to engage with the listening community; social media intelligence officers, 
who use social media to gather emergency relevant information; and integrated social media 
officers, who use social media for both intelligence gathering and engagement with the 
listening audiences.    
6.10.1 Social Media Engagement Officer 
The first type of identified Social Media Officer is the Social Media Engagement Officer, this 
Social Media Officer is responsible for communicating with the listening Audience on the 
Social Media Channels. The responsibilities are to distribute information through social media; 
answer questions the organisation receives through their social media channels; and to monitor 
the social media channels of the organisation. The monitoring is to ensure civility on the 
Social	Media	Engagement	Officer	 Integrated	Social	Media	Officer
Social	Media	Officers
Social	Media	Intelligence	Officer
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channels; and to ensure that the information distributed is understood by the members of the 
public, which includes aspects of Social Media Intelligence for Strategic Awareness.  
 
The Social Media Engagement Officers in Case State II often have a background in Journalism. 
This is particularly valid for Case Organisation C, and D. These specific Social Media Officers 
have less specific domain knowledge about Emergency Management, but have detailed 
knowledge on how to interact and manage media organisations. The social media officers who 
have Journalism background emphasised during their interviews more that social media is 
utilised to provide media organisations information about emergency events. These particular 
Social Media Officers also have extensive knowledge in handling difficult PR situations. 
 
When Case State II switches into the operational mode, and the State Control Centre is 
activated, the Social Media Coordination for the involved EMOs is coordinated centrally from 
the State Control Centre. The Social Media Engagement Officers are sourced from EMOs 
across the State. The responsibilities are standardised and who is operating when is coordinated 
through a roster.  
6.10.2 Social Media Intelligence Officer 
The main focus of the social media intelligence officer is to gather relevant information from 
the social media channel in order to improve the situational awareness of the organisation. The 
Social Media Intelligence Officer is responsible for Operational Social Media Intelligence as 
well as for Dialogical Social Media Intelligence.  
 
Currently, Case Organisation C, and D have this type of Social Media Officer. The intelligence 
officers from Case Organisation D operate from the State Control Centre when the organisation 
is in its full operational mode. 
 
The Social Media Intelligence Officer has extensive domain knowledge about the relevant 
emergency events. The role is gathering information for the organisation, but not feeding 
information back to the community. In the State Control Centre of Case State II, the Social 
Media Intelligence Officers are physically separated from the Social Media Engagement 
Officers as they operate from different rooms. 
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6.10.3 Integrated Social Media Officer 
Organisation A shows a hybrid form of Social Media Officer, which is termed the Integrated 
Social Media Officer. This role is responsible for using the social media channels to interact 
and engage with the listening communities, but also to use the social media channels for 
intelligence purposes in order to gather relevant information from their social media channels.  
 
The Social Media Officers who perform this role within Case Organisation A have a 
background in emergency management which provides them with detailed knowledge about 
this domain. However, they are not trained journalists which might provide a small 
disadvantage when it comes to interact with Media organisations.   
6.10.4 Social Media Officers within the Case Organisations 
The case organisations still have a relatively small pool of social media officers they can draw 
from. The social media officers established in the headquarters of the case organisations have 
a high influence on how the social media channels are operated and used. The social media 
officers in the different case organisations can still be classified as mostly evangelists (Latonero 
and Shklovski 2013) who ‘preach’ the social media utilisation to the different case 
organisations. Formalisation of the roles is in progress, however, when the members of the 
organisation who are currently operating the social media channels would leave the 
organisation, the social media utilisation would most likely drastically change.  
 
Table 6.14 Social Media Officer Type in Case Organisations 
Social Media 
Officer Type 
Organisation 
A 
Organisation 
B 
Organisation 
C 
Organisation 
D 
Organisation 
E 
Engagement 
Officer X X X X X 
Intelligence 
Officer   X   
Integrated 
Officer X     
 
Table 6.148 gives an overview about which types of social media officers are in the different 
case organisations. Organisations A, B, C, D, and E have the Social Media Officer role which 
can be classified as the Social Media Engagement Officer. They are focused on communicating 
information towards the listening communities.  
                                                        
8 Case Organisation D uses social media for some social media intelligence (See Section 
6.8.3), despite having neither dedicated Social Media Intelligence Officers nor Integrated 
Social Media Officers. 
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The Social Media Engagement Officers in Case Organisation C and D have a background in 
Journalism; they use the social media channels highly to distribute information towards the 
media in order to take the pressure off the media telephones operated by the organisations.  
 
The Social Media Officers in Organisation B and E have not indicated such a strong aim to 
target the media with their messages during the case interviews. Their focus is more to 
distribute relevant information towards the listening community. 
 
Organisation A has a few Social Media Engagement Officers, and Integrated Social Media 
Officers. The focus of the messaging in this organisation is more to distribute information 
towards the general public, but also distribute information towards the media during emergency 
events.  
 
The Integrated Social Media Officers are both operating the social media channels to distribute 
information to the listening community and is using the social media channels as well as a 
source of intelligence. The organisation is using their social media channels for both for public 
information intelligence, and operational intelligence.   
 
Organisation C has dedicated Social Media Intelligence Officers. These social media officers 
monitor the social media channels to improve the situational awareness of the organisation as 
well as to gather operational relevant information. The social media intelligence officers are 
only activated in the operational mode and operate from the State Control Centre.  
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6.11 Formalisation of Social Media 
The early social media utilisation in the case organisations was an ad-hoc adoption of the 
technology. Since then the services were more and more appropriated into the structures, and 
progresses of the case organisations. By now the majority of members of the case organisations 
recognise social media as a communication channel which is beneficial for emergency and 
disaster management. In this section, the ongoing formalisation approach of social media into 
the case organisations is explored. Two different aspects are looked at: The ongoing 
formalisation of roles and structures; and the formalisation of processes and training. 
6.11.1 Formalisation of Roles and Structures  
The social media coordinators in Organisation A, B, and D are still first generation social media 
officers. They substantially influenced how the organisations see and use social media services. 
The social media coordinator of Case Organisation B describes their initial role responsibilities 
as something they could form and decide what was included and what was not: “I was hired 
as the Web and Social Media Coordinator, at the state headquarters. Basically that role at the 
time was coordinating the social media presence and the governance around social media. As 
well as maintaining and governing the websites associated with the organisation. It was sort 
of a new role and I got to make it into mine a little bit” (Social Media Coordinator – 
Organisation B)9. Back then the role was something new and a first attempt to formalise the 
social media utilisation in this Case Organisation. Social media was already used in different 
parts of the organisation, such as in several units. The social media coordinator had to find a 
way to integrate this shift in using social media into the broader aims of the organisation. The 
social media coordinators in Case Organisation A, and D reported similar experiences. These 
social media coordinators formed the social media activity as it is in their organisation today.  
 
When Case Organisation C was founded, there was already some experience how EMOs can 
utilise social media services. The social media coordinator of organisation D gave input into 
the necessary structures and responsibilities of how social media can be used in such an 
organisation. Since the organisation was designed to foster inter-organisational collaboration 
and coordination the processes which were used in this organisation were formalised and 
structured.  
 
                                                        
9 Bold text stressed by author. 
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However, even in this case organisation the roles are evolving and emerging influenced by the 
greater understanding of social media technology by relevant members of the organisation. The 
social media intelligence officer (see Chapter 6.10) in case organisation C is a new role which 
is using social media technology to gather information for the organisation. The requirements 
for the role are still not fully clear and are better understood while the organisation is 
appropriating the social media technology into its processes.  
 
The social media coordinator of case organisation E took over the role requirements from their 
predecessor. The social media coordinator drew on the experience of the case organisation D 
and C, but still shifted the social media utilisation within the organisation. 
 
The social media officers in all case organisations expressed that the technology and public 
expectations are moving much faster than the structures and processes within the case 
organisations, as expressed in the following quote: “social media is a responsible role. It has 
to be part of the chain of command and this is the issue that we have where our technology and 
our channels have moved so much quicker than what our processes are” (Social Media Officer 
– Organisation C). EMOs are highly hierarchical structured. The hierarchical structures 
implicate a strict command and control structure, in which the social media operators need to 
be embedded. The organisations are still exploring what the responsibilities of the social media 
officers are and how properly embed them into the command and control structure.  
 
The social media officer roles are in a progress to be formalised with clearer responsibilities 
what the role includes. Organisation C has embedded role structures and responsibilities. The 
processes in this organisation are formalised, and the social media officers who are sourced 
from different organisations in the operational mode use these formalised processes to perform 
their role duties, however, in the remaining organisation, there is not yet such a formalised 
structure. The knowledge on how to operate social media channels within EMOs is internalised 
within the social media officers. If the social media officers would leave the organisation the 
social media practices and processes within the organisation would change, as illustrated in the 
following quote: “Look, primarily I suppose I do a lot of our work.  Our media team all have 
some capacity, but as far as developing our social media and growing it, that's sort of one of 
my main roles. We would have some issues; if I was to get hit by a bus tomorrow, we would 
have some resourcing issues to a degree and that's a risk that we've identified and that we're 
trying to resolve at the moment” (Social Media Officer – Organisation A). 
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Outside of the headquarters, the roles are not yet formalised. Especially on the volunteer basis 
there are not clear responsibilities what it involves if a brigade/unit is utilising social media. 
All of the case organisation have standardisation and training approaches planned to improve 
the average standard of the social media utilisation of the brigades and units which are actively 
utilise social media.  
6.11.2 Formalisation of Training and Processes 
When social media was introduced into the case organisation the utilisation was ad-hoc without 
predefined processes. Since then there is an ongoing process of formalising the social media 
activities within all of the case organisations.  
 
All of the case organisations started to formalise their social media training activities. This 
includes handbooks which describe the roles of the social media officers, manuals on how to 
operate social media (both for social media communication, and in the relevant organisations 
for social media intelligence), guidelines and policies, and training programs. The training 
programs are directed by social media officers who operated the centralised social media 
channels, and there are other programs which are targeted to the volunteers within the case 
organisations.  
 
Case organisation C has the most standardised processes when it comes to the social media 
activities. The social media operators are seconded from the different EMO of Case State II, 
when Case Organisation C is in the operational mode. They established clear guidelines and 
manuals on how to communicate through social media. The remaining case organisations have 
established a less strict communication guidelines and process steps, however, all of the case 
organisations started to formalise their social media activities. The social media processes 
could be split up in social media broadcasting, social media engagement, social media 
intelligence, and dispatching based on social media.  
 
All the case organisation established their guidelines and somewhat standardised processes 
within their organisation for social media broadcasting and social media engagement. In 
addition, the case organisations A, C, and D established formalised processes, or are 
establishing these processes, when it comes to social media intelligence. Interview informants 
from several organisations indicate that they are planning to establish more formalised 
guidelines around dispatching based on social media in the future.    
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In all case organisation the social media coordinators have an influence on how they structure 
the social media utilisation for the organisations.  
 
The social media alignment with the organisation is still in progress and processes are 
standardised designed for the activities for the organisation. The social media officers are still 
evangelists (Latonero and Shklovski 2013). If these social media officers would leave the 
organisation the social media utilisation would change as significant amount of knowledge is 
tacit knowledge which is not documented. 
6.12 Social Media for Intra-Organisational Communication 
The case analysis revealed that the organisations are not only utilising their social media 
channels to interact with communication participants external to the organisation but as well to 
communicate with the volunteer members and other members within the organisations. In this 
section, social media utilisation for the intra-organisational communication is discussed; In 
particular, the social media channels which are used for communication with the volunteer 
members of an organisation. This section is not relevant for Case Organisation C as this 
organisation does not have volunteer members and is not using social media channels to 
communicate with other members of the organisation.  
 
Social media for intra-organisational utilisation, refers to microblogging and social networking 
sites. Other social media channels are not utilised from the headquarters level to particularly 
communicate with the volunteer members or other organisational units. Private tools or 
platforms such as messengers were not looked at in the context of this study.  
 
Except for Case Organisation C, One characteristic of the case organisations is that they are 
large volunteer organisations with volunteer brigades/units distributed across the operational 
area of the organisations. Through their setup and the holonic structure of the organisation, the 
volunteer members within these brigades or units mostly interact with members of their own 
brigade or unit. There is not much interaction across different brigades/units or the 
headquarters, outside of specialised training courses or extreme events. 
 
The interviews revealed that the case organisations use social media services to reduce the 
separation between the centralised (corporate) structure of the organisation in the headquarters 
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with the volunteer-based brigades/units. "It helps to break down some entrenched cultural 
stigma of, we sit here in a crystal palace and have no real idea how the world works and we're 
faceless bureaucrats that by our volunteers' behaviour, engage directly. It helps address that” 
(Social Media Officer – Organisation A).  
 
The structure of the organisations specially separates the senior officers in the headquarters 
from the organisations with the volunteers of the different units and brigades. The 
commissioners of the case organisations all have  Twitter and/or a Facebook Accounts used to 
communicate with the public and to communicate with the internal member base. The 
following quote from a Social Media Officer in Organisation D illustrates how the organisation 
is using regular “ask me anything” (AMA) events to break down the separation between the 
senior manager level of the organisation with the volunteers: 
“we have a regular AMA - a Q&A but I like the idea of the popular thread AMA on Reddit - 
ask me anything. I think that says a lot more, just that title. There is a monthly AMA on our 
members' Facebook page. There is a lot of uncertainty in <Organisation D> environment at 
the moment. So it's really good. It's a really really positive thing that you've got the hierarchy 
taking on these new age channels and communicating with people one on one through them.” 
 
The other case organisations have similar structures. There are internal groups in Case 
Organisation A,B,D, and E where the senior manager level communicates with the volunteers 
on an ongoing basis. “We get a lot of manager level staff who will - some of them choose to 
actively engage, but a lot of them will keep an eye on it and see what's going on.  We've got a 
few that will actively engage and answer questions proactively without us having to come and 
suggest that they do, which is great. Our commissioner doesn't engage through that group, but 
he has a Facebook page and it's - it's a Facebook page and a Twitter account.  The primary 
market for that would be our volunteers.  Obviously the content there is also suitable for 
general consumption, but a lot of it is where he's at, volunteers he's visiting.  The focus is on 
our volunteer activities.  So he has that and members engage with him via those channels quite 
well” (Social Media Officer – Organisation A).  
 
The social media channels are also used for other purposes, such as dissemination of 
information within the Case Organisations. As shown in the following quote, the information 
flow in the holonic organisations can be slow and important information can get lost: 
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“We are a very hierarchical organisation, which means that it can take a very long time for 
information to get from here to the coal face. A piece of communication may be sent out from 
here, go via a regional office, the regional office then sends it to their districts, the districts 
then sends it to the brigade, the brigade then tables it at the brigade meeting whenever they 
hold a brigade meeting next, and through that, we find that there's often a filtering process.  So 
the district will go, well, I don't think this is relevant to our members and the brigade secretary 
goes, oh yeah, I don’t think this is interesting.  So the information doesn't always get where we 
need it to get because of that filtering process.  So certainly social media is a very good way 
for us to be able to directly engage” (Social Media Officer – Organisation A). The relevant 
case organisations use the internal social media channels to distribute information towards their 
member base.  
 
All of the case organisations are rather large organisations; it is not unusual that there is 
confusion about the specific positions of the organisations. The social media channels are 
utilised to clarify these positions. This can be through active questions from the member base, 
as shown in the following quote: “Another thing that it's quite useful for is clarifying service 
positions on things.  Volunteers will ask questions on, what does the service think of this or that 
or whatever else, and we can put out a response” (Social Media Officer – Organisation A). 
 
Social media is as well used for internal communication in the case that an organisation is 
aware that there are internal rumours. In these cases, the social media channels are utilised to 
fight rumours within the organisation as shown in the following quote: 
“Because of the history of the organisation, and not too long ago in the greater scheme of 
things, there was 150 odd different bushfire services in <Case State I>.  They are now our 
districts, but districts will often have district specific rules of how they do things.  The way that 
one district does something can be very different to the way that another district does it, or 
people are taught, this is the way that they do it and they are under the assumption that that's 
the standard across the state, when it may just be a district specific quirk. Social media is quite 
useful for us in helping to - and just sort of clarify that and where people are under false 
assumptions of, this is the way we do it, or they've been told by their captain, this is how it is.  
It provides us the opportunity to be able to correct that.  So it's kind of myth busting in a way, 
but on a larger scale." 
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There are significant differences between the two Case States whether these internal social 
media channels should be open to the public or not. The case organisations in Case State I have 
their internal social media channels as private closed groups. The internal volunteer social 
media channels in the case organisations in Case State II are generally open to the public; It is 
assumed that the channels are not relevant for the public and therefore not followed, as 
illustrated through the following quote: “They're completely open. There was a consideration 
that do we lock them down because they're only for members. But the fact is, the public can 
view them, yes. But the content is irrelevant. So if they want to continue to like the page and 
engage with the content that's fine but it's not relevant. It's not private, it's just not relevant.” 
(Social Media Operator Organisation D) For the member communication, Case Organisation 
D and E each have a dedicated Facebook channel and a dedicated Twitter channel. The 
channels are completely open and accessible for the general public. The goal of the organisation 
is to be transparent about their communication; the organisations are under the assumption that 
the communications within the member channels are just not relevant for the general public.  
 
In Case State I, the internal social media channels of Case Organisation A and B are closed 
groups. The process to get access to the channels is similar to the process described by the 
Social Media Officer from Organisation A: 
"It's a closed group. We check the applications against our member database and approve 
based on that.  It's not perfect because if you've got a name like Peter Smith, all I can tell you 
is that there is a Peter Smith in the service." 
 
Organisation B had concerns about the behaviour of their members and how it might be 
perceived by members of the public as indicated in the following quote: “It was really hard for 
our volunteers, to understand the difference between; communicating to the public, and as well 
just communicating between themselves, internally. So we liked them to create closed groups 
were they could discuss <Organisation B> matters internally and that wasn’t available for the 
public to see” (Social Media Officer – Organisation B). Therefore, the centralised organisation 
desires that their internal social media channels be outside of the view of the general public.  
 
There were thoughts in Case Organisation A to have the internal social media channels open 
for non-organisation members, however, it was a problem to coordinate the channels and keep 
them on a necessary standard. "But we've had to go down that path, spamming was an issue at 
one point, but we were also getting a fair bit of trolling and stuff.  There are other community 
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run firefighting interest groups as well that we keep an eye on.  Some of those are quite 
antagonistic between members of the <Organisation A> and members of <City Firefighter 
Organisation>" (Social Media Officer – Organisation A)  
 
All of the case organisations monitor the internal social media channels and moderate these 
channels when it is necessary. The following quote illustrates the moderation approach in Case 
Organisation A, the moderation approaches within the remaining case organisations are 
similar: "We certainly don't restrict posts.  We haven't gone down the path requiring a 
moderator approval before posting or anything like that.  That said, we do monitor quite 
closely.  We are quite active in the community moderation, community management stuff.  So 
removing offensive posts, personal attacks, sorting out disputes between members and the 
carry on and posting inappropriate content. With the content itself, it will depend on the 
content.  If it's something that we feel requires an official response, we'll talk with the relevant 
subject matter experts and provide them an official - this is the official position of the service.  
But we also - we'll let members be, if a discussion's going on and you can see that the person's 
question has been answered by other members accurately, then we may not interfere. We sort 
of step in for that myth busting stuff or if it's a very a technical question or something, that 
they're asking something quite specific, or if there's myth busting stuff or it's a significant issue 
that needs some sort of approach from us.  As I mentioned earlier, we've got after hours on call 
officers. One of the things that the online communication - on call officers does is to monitor 
those core groups in the evenings and such. But it's fairly self-organising. We encourage 
respectful discussion. It's not uncommon that they are quite critical of a service policy or the 
way something's being done or the way that their district does things.  If that's done in a 
respectful manner, we generally - we're not trying to stop them saying things or that it has to 
be very pro <Organisation A> or anything like that" (Social Media Officer – Organisation A). 
 
To summarise, in this section it was outlined how the case organisations utilise their social 
media channels to communicate within the organisation. Case Organisation A, B, D, and E 
utilise social media channels to communicate with their own member base. The main reason 
for this utilisation is to break down the separation between the different Holons in the 
organisations. In the next section, the inter-organisational social media utilisation between 
different organisations for the purpose of social media in emergency and disaster management 
will be expanded upon.  
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6.13 Social Media for Inter-organisational Communication 
Ahmed's model suggested that social media could also be utilised for coordination and 
collaboration between EMOs (Ahmed 2011), however, there was no evidence in the data that 
showed that the case organisations utilise social media channels for such coordination and 
collaboration purposes for the traditional emergency management. The case organisations 
already have established channels in place, which are used for this inter-organisational 
emergency management coordination. 
 
In the non-operational mode, there is some social media interaction between the social media 
officers from different organisations. There are a few Facebook groups where social media 
officers from different organisations share their knowledge and show what works well and, on 
the other hand, which tactics and practices were not successful.  
 
In the operational mode, the interview informants stated that there is no social media interaction 
across different organisations. EMOs work closely together in emergency events. Incidents are 
usually coordinated within the involved organisations. There are established lines of 
communication through which the different organisations coordinate their collaboration to 
counter the emergency events effectively. The State Control Centres of the different states are 
placed to facilitate such collaboration. 
 
The State Control Centres are activated during larger emergency events or emergency extreme 
events. The different organisations within a state have delegates from their organisations within 
the State Control Centre who are responsible for that collaboration and coordination between 
the organisations is taking place.  
 
Therefore, social media is not used for inter-organisational communication within the observed 
case organisations for the active emergency management. The case organisations have well-
established communication channels through which this communication is performed, and 
collaboration is facilitated. 
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6.14 Supporting Software in use for the Social Media operations 
The entry requirements to use social media in an emergency management setting are low. This 
is especially valid of social media is just used to communicate with the listening communities. 
The utilisation of the social media platforms is on a basic level free of charge and 
uncomplicated to set up, however, the interview informants indicated that they are utilising 
specialised software in their social media activities. In this section, this software utilisation is 
explored in two aspects: First what types of software are used for social media communication 
and engagement, and then secondly the software support necessary for social media 
intelligence.   
6.14.1 Software for Social Media Communication & Engagement  
There are several types of software in use to support the social media efforts of EMOs. As 
shown in Table 6.15, not every case organisation is using software packages to support their 
social media activities. Different types of software are outlined and then how the relevant case 
organisations integrated them into their social media activities is explained.  
 
Table 6.15 Software types for Social Media Communication and Engagement 
Software type Organisation A 
Organisation 
B 
Organisation 
C 
Organisation 
D 
Organisation 
E 
Channel 
Monitoring X (X) X X (X) 
Keyword 
monitoring  X  X X  
Trend detection X     
CRM    X X  
Graphical  X X X X X 
 
The first type of software which is used to monitor different channels on social media. These 
types of software artefacts are used to monitor the different channels which an organisation 
operates. The social media officers are using this software to check what happens on the 
different channels and if everything is appropriate. This is especially relevant since the case 
organisations have several pages outside the direct control of the centralised social media 
officers, such as brigade or unit pages. Organisation A, C, and D are using software to monitor 
their social media channels. Organisation B and E have access to such a software package, 
however, the social media officers tend to not use it for their social media activities.  
 
The second type of software are keyword monitoring tools. These tools show for specific 
predefined keywords the social media activity around this keyword. Some of the software 
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packages can then as well show the keyword activity for geographical areas. Again Case 
Organisation A, C, and D are using these types of software 
 
Trend detection software packages are designed to identify trends in the social media 
communication and bring awareness about these trends. These software packages can often be 
integrated with keyword filters and keyword searches. Organisation A is using this software 
for its social media communication and engagement activities.  
 
Organisation C and D are using CRM software packages originally intended for commercial 
organisations. The software package supports the organisations with the monitoring and 
answering process of social media messages. The software shows which message needs 
answering or which social media officer responded to the request. This kind of software is as 
well used to improve the scheduling of social media messages which will be distributed at a 
later time. 
 
All case organisations are using different software packages to create graphics and infographics 
for their social media communication. The organisations in Case State II have a repository of 
graphics which is shared across the different case organisations.  
 
Organisation B and E are using much less software support in comparison to the remaining 
case organisations. The main reason behind this is that these organisations are much smaller 
and the social media teams currently do not have the financial resource to acquire licences for 
specialised software packages.    
6.14.2 Software for Social Media Intelligence  
Social media for intelligence gathering purposes is in higher need to be supported by software. 
All of the case organisation who are using social media for intelligence gathering implemented 
a broad selection of specialised software, as shown in Table 6.16. Organisation D only uses 
these software packages indirectly since their social media intelligence officers are operating 
from the State Control Centre of Case State II when activated.  The social media activity of the 
organisation is supported by professional social media software.  
 
Channel monitoring, keyword monitoring and trend detection tools have already been 
explained in the previous section. Therefore, these tools will not be discussed in this section in 
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detail. The software helps in the early stages of an incident to identify where an incident is 
happening and what is going on. In the later stages of an emergency event, the benefits of such 
software are rather marginal. 
 
Sentiment analysis tools are utilised to better understand the emotional sentiment of the social 
media communities within the emergency-affected areas. These tools are at the moment 
relatively basic since they are only indicating a positive or a negative sentiment.  
 
The processes of validating the collected information are supported by software. Image 
material is sent through Google image searches and as well specialised image validation 
software to identify whether the picture was tampered with or whether it appears to be 
trustworthy. 
 
Table 6.16 Software types for Social Media Intelligence 
Software type Organisation A 
Organisation 
B 
Organisation 
C 
Organisation 
D 
Organisation 
E 
Channel 
Monitoring X  X (X)  
Keyword 
monitoring  X  X (X)  
Trend detection X  X (X)  
Sentiment 
Analysis X  X (X)  
Image 
Validation X  X (X)  
Integrated 
Intelligence 
platforms 
X  X (X)  
 
The case organisations are utilising as well different integrated social media intelligence 
platforms. However, the interview informants who are utilising social media services for 
intelligence purposes pointed out that the activities surrounding social media intelligence are 
very manual and currently labour and knowledge intensive and the software is providing only 
minimal support. Software is in the process of getting developed; however, there is still a 
substantial need for software packages and analytical techniques which help EMOs to achieve 
what they want to achieve.  
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6.15 Summary 
In this chapter, the results of the data analysis were provided. The data analysis identified 
twelve distinct themes each which explores an aspect of social media utilisation for emergency 
management within the case organisations. The main findings of each of the themes will now 
be described.   
 
The first theme explores on which organisational level social media is utilised within the case 
organisations. The organisational levels in this context are linked to the holonic structure of 
EMOs. It was identified that social media is utilised for emergency management on the 
headquarters level, the district and region level, and on a brigade/unit level.  All of the case 
organisations use their social media channels in very centralised manner. In the non-operational 
mode, there is social media activity on all of these organisational levels. In the operational 
mode, most social media communication is coordinated from the headquarter level of an 
organisation. The social media coordinators on this level are paid staff members who have 
dedicated social media roles. On the district and region level, the social media use is less 
structured. Not all of the districts or regions operate social media channels, and there are no 
dedicated social media roles. The social media channels are managed by volunteers on the 
brigade/unit level. Not all brigades/units are using social media, and their activity on social 
media varies. In the operational mode, volunteers are needed for core tasks which means that 
the social media channels are not operated when a brigade/unit is operational.  
 
The second theme explores what kind of social media channels are utilised in the case 
organisations. These social media channels are very similar, and there is not much variation. 
The main social media communication channels, which are in all organisations were identified 
i.e. Facebook and Twitter; Support social media channels, which are channels which support 
the social media presence but are barely used during the operational mode; placeholder 
channels, which are social media platforms which might get further traction but do not have a 
relevance for social media utilisation in disaster management yet; and legacy channels, which 
are channels which were used in the past but which now have no activity by the case 
organisations any more.  
 
The third theme highlights the different audience groups among the listening communities and 
then the selection of the social media channel to communicate with a specific audience group. 
The term listening community describes social media users who are receiving social media 
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messages from EMO; In order to receive information, this audience needs to subscribe to the 
social media channels of an EMO.  There are three major audience groups to which the 
interview informants within the case organisations referred to, the media, the general public, 
and the volunteer members of an organisation. The media and the general public are audiences 
which are external to an organisation, while the volunteer members are an internal audience 
group. Information which is targeted specific to members of the media is in general provided 
through Twitter since Journalists are actively using this medium. Messages which are intended 
for the general public are shared through all social media channels. Facebook is the main 
channel which is used to communicate with the volunteer members from within the 
organisation.  
     
The fourth theme identifies the distribution approach of information through social media and 
where this information is sourced from. The approaches are different in the operational mode 
and in the non-operational mode. Case organisations are utilising their social media channels 
for the broadcasting of information, and warnings, for community education, to encourage a 
specific behaviour from the media and the public, to fight rumours and false information, and 
for public relations purposes. Most of the information is sourced internally from the case 
organisations and their different information systems, e.g. warning information system or the 
operational management system. 
 
The fifth theme focuses on the utilisation of social media as an engagement channel. All case 
organisations are trying to use their social media channels as an interactive communication 
channel and not just as a broadcasting medium. In the operational mode, this takes the form of 
answering questions from the public and clarifying messages when it seems that these 
messages are misunderstood. In the non-operational mode, this engagement includes as well 
linking messages to relevant events and raising awareness for emergency management by 
showcasing the organisation.  
 
The sixth theme explores the utilisation of social media as an intelligence channel. Social media 
intelligence refers to the practice of utilising different social media channels as a source of 
information which is used internally in the organisation for the purpose of emergency 
management.  There are two different types of social media intelligence used within the case 
organisations; 1) Communicational Social Media Intelligence, and 2) Operational Social Media 
Intelligence. Communicational Social Media Intelligence refers to using the social media 
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channels to improve the communication with the public. This type of social media intelligence 
can be separated into Strategic Awareness and Dialogical Social Media Intelligence. Strategic 
Awareness refers to the awareness of whether the listening audience understood the messaging 
from the case organisations. The case organisations are monitoring their social media channels 
to check for questions or misunderstandings in order to sharpen their emergency relevant 
messages. All of the case organisations use their social media channels to some extent for this 
type of social media intelligence. Dialogical Social Media Intelligence refers to an active 
monitoring of the social media channels in order to give an organisation the necessary 
knowledge to influence the ongoing social media communication. The information is gathered 
to create targeted social media messages, which can help counter misinformation or promote a 
specific behaviour in the communities. Amongst the case organisations only organisation A, 
C, and D currently have the necessary capabilities to use their social media channels for this 
purpose. Operational Social Media Intelligence refers to using the social media channels as a 
source for situational awareness which might influence the active operations of an organisation. 
This type of social media intelligence requires advanced resources and only case organisation 
A, C and D are now starting to use their social media channels for this purpose.  
 
The seventh theme identifies the phenomena of incident reporting through social media by 
members of the general public. Emergency resources may be dispatched based on these reports. 
Dispatching processes and approaches undertaken by the case organisations are also 
highlighted. Interview informants indicated two different types of incident reports. The first is 
incident reports from individuals who decide to not go through the traditional reporting 
channels. Such types of reports were experienced by the case organisations infrequently. While 
there is no official process in place, the social media officers see it as a moral responsibility to 
react to such reports. The members of the public are advised that social media channels are not 
a reporting channel and are not monitored 24 hours a day, however, when a social media officer 
is aware of a report they will follow up on it and organise the necessary dispatching of 
emergency management resources when deemed necessary. The second form of incident 
reports is when the official reporting structures i.e. the telephone line is overloaded or for other 
reasons not reachable. The interview informants raised concerns about potential social media 
reporting when the necessary emergency reporting infrastructure is not reachable. Past 
emergency events show that the public tends then to report incidents and ask for emergency 
assistance through social media. The case organisations are not prepared for such cases of large 
scale incident reports.  
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The eighth theme explores the different types of social media officers observed within the case 
organisations headquarters. There are social media engagement officers, social media 
intelligence officers, and integrated social media officers. The social media engagement 
officers are responsible for communicating with the listening audience through the social media 
channels of an organisation. This type of social media officer is present in all case 
organisations. The social media intelligence officer is responsible for utilising the social media 
channels for Operational Social Media Intelligence. This type of social media officer is 
observed in case organisation C. The integrated social media officer has both social media 
intelligence responsibilities as well as social media engagement responsibilities. Organisation 
A operates social media with integrated social media officers within their social media team.  
 
The ninth theme highlights the formalisation of social media adoption and ongoing 
appropriation within the case organisation. Most of the social media coordinators and many of 
the social media officers are still the first generation social media officers in their organisation. 
They are the social media evangelists (Latonero and Shklovski 2013), who have actively 
shaped the adoption of the social media technologies within the organisation. The formalisation 
of social media activities is an ongoing process. On the headquarters level, all of the case 
organisations have established formalised social media officer roles, which have clear, distinct 
responsibilities during the operational as well as the non-operational mode. On the district and 
region as well as the brigade/unit level there are no formalised social media roles established. 
This is especially the case on the volunteer level of the organisations, where social media 
activity is coordinated in an ad-hoc fashion. This might contribute to the phenomena that the 
social media channels of brigades or units cannot be actively coordinated when the particular 
unit is in its operational mode. The case organisations started to establish formalised social 
media training for both their professional staff members as well as the volunteer members. 
These training approaches are being refined on an ongoing basis.  
 
The data analysis revealed that the case organisations are utilising their social media channels 
for intra-organisational social media interaction in order to communicate with the volunteers 
within their organisations. In the tenth theme, this intra-organisational social media 
communication is explored. Volunteers units are physically distributed across the operational 
area of an organisation. These units operate to a certain extend independently. The holonic 
structure of the case organisations results in a certain extent in a divide between the centralised 
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core of the organisation and the volunteer units. Social media services are used to communicate 
with the volunteers in an organisation and to counter the hierarchical divide within the 
organisations.  
 
The eleventh theme explores social media utilisation for inter-organisational communication 
and interaction. The case organisations are not utilising their social media channels to 
communicate and interact with other EMOs for the purpose of active emergency management. 
These organisations are already well connected, with well-established channels for this kind 
interaction and coordination.  
 
The twelvth theme looks at what kind of software is used in the case organisations to support 
the tasks of the social media officers. All organisations have access to some kind of channel 
monitoring software, yet, the social media officers in organisation B and E rarely use these 
tools. Organisation A, C, and D are utilising keyword monitoring software to detect what the 
social media communities are communicating about. Organisation A is also using a trend 
detection software to analyse social media communication. Organisation C and D are using an 
advanced CRM software package to help with the response to messages on their social media 
channels. All case organisations are utilising some graphical software packages to help to 
create appealing and engaging social media content.  
 
In the following chapter, the themes in context of the literature and broader emergency 
management are discussed. Based on this discussion, a framework of Emergency Management 
Social Media Utilisation for Emergency and Disaster Management is outlined and discussed, 
which is the main contribution to knowledge from this research project.  
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Chapter 7 – Discussion                                       
7.1 Introduction 
The data analysis has revealed distinct patterns and themes of social media utilisation and 
integration in EMOs for operational and non-operational purposes.  In this chapter, these 
patterns, in the context of a broader integration of social media within EMOs, are discussed to 
answer the research questions underlying this thesis. As a result of this thesis project, a 
framework of Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management Organisations for 
Emergency and Disaster Management has been developed. This framework helps explain 
social media utilisation by EMOs and also contributes to the design of advanced social media 
utilisation approaches. 
 
Ahmed’s (2011) framework of Social Media in Disaster Management was used as a starting 
point for this research project, especially in the early phases. Findings have revealed that as 
time has moved on, social media has evolved in a way that important aspects of current social 
media utilisation in EMOs are not covered or represented within Ahmed's model.  
 
To better explain and represent the current situation, data has been gathered and analysed from 
five EMOs. The themes identified in this data was used to develop the framework.  
 
This chapter is structured to explain how components of the framework have been constructed 
from the data analysis and is organised into six sections.  
 
In section 1, Ahmed’s model of social media utilisation of disaster management (Ahmed 2011) 
is revisited and discussed. Its value and limitations based on current findings in the literature 
and results of the overall project data analysis are also discussed. In section 2, the themes 
identified in Chapter 6, are discussed. This assists us to better understand “How are Social 
Media Services integrated into the structures of Emergency Management Organisations?” 
(Research Question 1), and “How are Social Media Services utilised within Emergency 
Management Organisations for the purpose of emergency and disaster management?” 
(Research Questions 2).   
 
In section 3, different themes that emerge from the analysis of the organisational mode of 
operation are explored, as these themes influence most actions and decisions within the 
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organisation. This analysis assists us to better understand “Is there a difference in the Social 
Media utilisation during the operational mode and the non-operational mode of an Emergency 
Management Organisation?” (Research Question 2.1).  In section 4, findings regarding 
external social media utilisation are discussed which give us insight into, “How are Social 
Media Services used as communication platforms in Emergency Management Organisations 
to interact with the public for the purpose of emergency and disaster management?” (Research 
Question 3.1). In section 5 intra-organisational social media utilisation is explored to assist in 
our understanding of “How are Social Media Services used as communication platforms in 
Emergency Management Organisations to interact with their own organisational members for 
the purpose of emergency and disaster management?” (Research Question 3.3)”. Finally, inter-
organisational social media utilisation analysis is explored to answer “How are Social Media 
Services used as communication platforms in Emergency Management Organisations to 
interact with other Emergency Management Organisations for the purpose of emergency and 
disaster management?” (Research Question 3.2).   
 
From this understanding, a framework of Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management 
Organisations for Emergency and Disaster Management is constructed which can be used to 
better understand the actual social media utilisation within EMOs or the potential social media 
use within such organisations.  
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7.2 Revisiting Ahmed’s Model of Social Media in Disaster Management  
 
The literature review (see Chapter 3) introduced a framework of Social Media in Disaster 
Management (Ahmed 2011) which informed this research project, especially in the early phase. 
Ahmed’s framework in the context of emergency management, shows different social media 
participants and their use of social media for disaster management. While the framework is 
valuable, it has limitations which restrict our view of the phenomena over time. This section is 
split into two parts: First, a review of Ahmed’s framework is presented and explained as to 
what the framework provides. Afterwards, the model is critically re-examined for its limitations 
and how it restricts our view of Social Media in Emergency Management, on the basis of what 
we have learned since the model was proposed. 
7.2.1 Review of Ahmed’s Social Media in Disaster Management Framework 
Ahmed’s framework (Ahmed 2011) is shown in Figure 7.2; it divides social media utilisation 
in disaster management into three different dimensions of social media communication 
interactions. These dimensions outline the types of communication of particular social media 
communities. The three dimensions are social media communication and interaction between 
emergency services agencies (A-A), interaction and communication between an emergency 
services agency and the community (A-C), and the interaction and communication within the 
general public, community to community (C-C). 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Social Media in Disaster Management reproduced from Ahmed (2011) 
 
These three communication dimensions have different participants and a different focus which 
impact on how the social media services are and can be used. The framework provides 
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suggestions on how different participant groups use social media services during a disaster 
event.  
 
The main amount of messages during an extreme event are created by members of the general 
public or what Ahmed refers to, the community. Subsequently, the dimension of community-
to-community (C-C) interaction has high levels of interaction with a high amount of social 
media messages. Ahmed sees this interaction as an important communication dimension in all 
phases of disaster management, before, during, and after. From the literature we know that the 
general public uses social media services in a different way during extreme events than in their 
normal day-to-day life (e.g. Fraustino et al. 2012). In the initial model, Ahmed sees the main 
interaction in the community as communication about the event; the use of social media 
technology as a platform to send and receive moral and emotional support; as well as a platform 
to not only interact with the local affected communities, but with the rest of the world. 
 
The second interaction dimension is the social media communication of emergency 
management agencies with emergency management agencies (A-A). The framework does not 
make a difference between intra-organisational or inter-organisational interaction. Ahmed 
outlines that social media can be used for coordination and collaboration within and between 
the organisations as this is a major challenge of involved organisational participants in an 
extreme event (McEntire 2007). 
 
The third dimensions, the Agency to Community Interaction (A-C), refers on how EMOs are 
engaging with the general public for the purpose of emergency management and vice versa. 
The interaction of EMOs with the general public is seen as an important aspect of the emerging 
extreme event communication. Research shows that EMOs are central and influential actors in 
the emerging extreme event communication networks (Mirbabaie et al. 2014).  
 
Members of the general public are actively searching for credible and trustworthy information 
during extreme events (Fraustino et al. 2012). In case that official information is not available, 
other sources are chosen to close the information gap. Ahmed’s framework describes the 
purpose for utilising the social media communication in normal times of operation as a channel 
to educate the community about potential emergencies. Before and during extreme events, 
social media is also seen as a channel to disseminate information and issue warnings. This view 
of social media sees the direction of the communication is predominantly from the EMO 
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towards the community, which represents the “megaphone” approach described in different 
studies (e.g. Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Potter 2016).  
 
This framework was developed when research in social media in emergency and disaster 
management was still in its early stages. Back then, emergency response organisations were 
just starting out to explore the potential of utilisation of social media services as part of the 
official response towards disasters and other large-scale extreme events. The utilisation 
approaches of EMOs matured, and so did the research. 
 
The framework is still highly relevant and gives us an important and useful reference about 
social media in the domain. The framework shows a very high-level view on the social media 
interaction which needs to be further unpacked and refined. In the next section, a critique of 
the shortcomings of the model based on what was found in the literature and within the data 
from the case organisations is outlined.  
7.2.2 Limitations of Ahmed’s Social Media in Disaster Management Framework 
The current model has a narrow view of what social media is; social media is seen as the social 
microblogging Platform Twitter, the social networking site Facebook, and the Video Sharing 
Platform YouTube. While presumably these channels are only seen as an example of social 
media in disaster management, it needs to be broadened what is counted as social media for 
these purposes. In Chapter 2.4, it was outlined what social media services are as well as types 
of social media technologies. Social media is an umbrella term for a myriad of different 
technologies and platforms. Some of these social media services are and can be used as 
powerful platforms and tools in Disaster Management. Social media services can become 
outdated and not be used any more by the relevant audience as shown in Chapter 6.4.  The 
demand for specific social media channels can change; some social media channels lose their 
communities, or other social media channels emerge which could be relevant for disaster 
management. The current representation of the model of social media in disaster management 
is not flexible enough to take this change of landscape into account. 
 
The current framework focuses on the community, the technology, and EMOs. A previous case 
study (Ehnis and Bunker 2013) argued that Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005) is a suitable 
methodology to better understand these three involved “actors”.  Actor-Network Theory is not 
the underlying methodology for this thesis; still, it can help us take a closer look at the involved 
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participants (“actors”) which are touched upon by the model. As shown in Figure 7.3, the social 
media communication of EMOs is influenced by four main participants or actors: the EMO 
itself, their listening community (or better communities) the disaster event with its typology, 
and the social media technology.  
 
Figure 7.3 Actors in Disaster Social Media Communication reproduced from Ehnis and 
Bunker (2013) 
 
The communication strategies in different disaster types can vary as the typology of the event 
influences how an organisation can respond to an event. For example, some events, such as 
flooding events, have a long lead time which allows for a warning period. Other events, such 
as earthquakes or terror events, can happen suddenly and therefore have a very short or no 
warning period at all. Furthermore, terror attacks in contrast to natural disasters have the 
problem that the committer can be warned and influenced by the communication on social 
media while they perform the event; therefore, a response organisation needs to be much more 
careful with what kind of information they are releasing during such an event to compared 
during a natural disaster event where the information can only be used by the listening 
community.   
 
The “listening community” in an extreme event is not a homogeneous group. It consists of, 
amongst many others, individuals who are directly affected by an event; individuals who are 
indirectly affected by an event, such as friends and family members who want to know whether 
their affected loved ones are safe or in danger; individuals who are interested in the event. And 
as shown in Chapter 6.5, another important partner within the section of what the current model 
refers to as the community, is the media. Journalists and media organisations are actively 
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monitoring social media to report on unfolding events. All these different members of the 
“listening community” have different information and communication needs, use social media 
for different purposes, and have different expectations towards the communication from 
EMOs.     
 
A limitation of Ahmed’s current framework is that it treats the community as a homogenous 
group and focuses on a specific type of social media technology. The Media is one 
communication participant group which needs to be separated from the “Community” 
participant group. Media organisations have an essential role in emergency management. The 
literature, e.g. Mirbabaie et al. (2014), shows that media organisations, similar to the non-social 
media communication in the “real” world, are one of the most influential actors in the emerging 
extreme event communication networks. Media organisations interact closely with both the 
public they want to inform and the EMOs which act as sources of some of the information. 
Since the media has different targets and different approaches in their social media utilisation 
during extreme events, they can be seen as separate from the listening community in the 
emergency management communication. This brings then three main participant groups in the 
extreme event communication, as shown in Figure 7.4: EMOs, the listening community, and 
the Media.  
 
 
Figure 7.4 Central Actor Groups within Disaster Management 
 
The agency-to-agency interaction (A-A) refers to both inter-organisational and intra-
organisational social media interactions within the model. Within the data collected from the 
case organisations, there was no evidence that social media is utilised for interaction between 
different EMOs for active emergency management. There is some indication that there is some 
interaction for knowledge transfer during the non-operational mode.  However, social media 
was highly used to communicate within the case organisations, as shown in Chapter 6.12. As 
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described, the case organisations except for organisation C, all have a relatively small core of 
paid staff members and many volunteer members which are distributed all over the operational 
area for which an organisation is responsible (state). Some social media channels are used by 
members of an organisation to communicate amongst themselves as well as to interact and 
communicate with the headquarters of the organisation.  
  
The main focus of this thesis is the utilisation of social media within EMOs which affects the 
dimension agency-community interaction (A-C) and the agency-agency interaction (A-A) 
dimension. For the agency to community interaction, the model suggest that it is used for 
education, to issue warnings, and to provide updates about the event. Not considered are other 
communication behaviours, such as correcting false information (fighting rumours), requesting 
information from the public (appeal for information), or to encourage a specific behaviour from 
the public or media (Ehnis and Bunker 2013).  
 
Social media is more considered as a broadcasting channel towards the public and not as a 
channel where information can flow back towards the organisations. Chapter 6.7 showed that 
social media is highly used to engage with the public and to as well gather information from 
social media to improve the quality of messages being sent out. Furthermore, as shown in 
Chapter 6.8, social media is increasingly used as an intelligence channel, with which 
information from the public is gathered to improve the situational awareness within the 
headquarters of an organisation during the operational mode.   
 
Chapter 6.9 showed that members of the general public use social media to report incidents or 
to request emergency assistance. Such behaviour is not represented in the model.  
 
In the next three sections, the found patterns in the data set are discussed in light of Ahmed’s 
model of Social Media in Disaster Management. In section 7.4, the Agency-To-Community 
Social Media Interaction Dimension is looked at. In section 7.5, the Intra-Agency Social Media 
Interaction Dimension is discussed. In section 7.6, the Agency-To-Agency Social Media 
Interaction Dimension is focused upon. In section 7.7, Ahmed’s current model is used as a 
basis for a framework of Emergency Management Organisations Social Media Utilisation in 
Emergency and Disaster Management.   
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7.3 Two Modes of Social Media Operation - Non-Operational Mode and 
Operational Mode 
 
As established throughout the thesis, EMOs operate in two modes of operation: The case 
organisations refer to these modes as to the non-operational mode and the operational mode. 
The non-operational mode relates to the day-to-day operation when there is no emergency 
event present, and the operational mode refers to the modus of operation in which an 
organisation is responding to an emergency event. The mode of operation has an influence of 
external, internal, and intra-organisational social media utilisation. In this section, the 
operational mode in context of the social media utilisation in EMOs is discussed.  
 
In Chapter 2, EMOs are described as holonic systems; the organisations are hierarchically 
structured, and parts of the organisation are able to operate independently to a certain extent. 
Applied to the operational mode, this means that not all levels and units of an organisation 
(Holons) are necessarily in the same mode of operation at the same point in time. It is possible 
that parts of the organisation are in a non-operational mode, while other parts of the 
organisation are responding to an extreme event and are in full operational mode. Regarding 
the operational modes, this results in that the shift from the non-operational mode possibly 
being fluid. Furthermore, not the whole organisation is necessarily in the same mode of 
operation at the same point in time. 
 
Figure 7.5 Mode of Operation and PPRR  
 
The PPRR Model (Cronstedt 2002) has an influence on most emergency management relevant 
activities in an EMO. It is not a surprise that it has an influence on the utilisation of social 
media for emergency management. In the non-operational mode, social media is more utilised 
for activities which are associated with Prevent, Prepare, or Recover. While in the operational 
mode, the social media activities are focused on activities associated with Respond and also, 
to some extent, with Recover. During the non-operational mode, the social media channels are 
Non-Operational	Mode Operational	Mode
Emergency	Management	Social	Media	
Utilisation
Prevent RecoverPrepare RecoverRespond
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used to support community preparedness and community resilience. In the operational mode, 
the social media channels are used for information and warnings around and supporting the 
emergency response. When focusing and analysing the social media activities within an EMO, 
it is important to keep in mind that the organisations have a holonic nature and operate in two 
very different forms of operation. Furthermore, the principal objective of these organisations 
is to keep the public safe during emergency events. All these aspects underlie the social media 
activity in EMOs. 
7.4 External Social Media utilisation – Agency-to-Community Social Media 
Interaction Dimension  
 
The main reason that EMOs utlise social media services is to directly communicate and interact 
with the public for the purpose of emergency and disaster management. The data analysis 
revealed several distinct patterns and themes of social media utilisation and integration in 
EMOs. In this section, the patterns of social media utilisation with the external listening 
audiences are discussed.  
7.4.1 Types of Social Media Services in use  
 
The analysis showed that social media channels are used as additional channels to contribute 
to the communication portfolio of the case organisations (see Chapter 6.4). Amongst others, 
the communication channels referred to Telephone, Media, and TV. Social media is not 
regarded as a channel to replace other communication channels but as an addition to reach a 
broader audience. The difference to the remaining communication channels is that social media 
can be used as a one-to-one communication channel, a one-to-many communication channel, 
or a many-to-many communication channel. Further social media is flexible enough to be used 
as a broadcasting channel, which would reflect in a one-way communication channel; or an 
engagement channel, which would reflect in a two-way communication channel.  
   
The social media channels in use in the case organisations corresponded with the social media 
channels that are reported in the literature. The case organisations operate four different types 
of social media channels: (1) Their Main Social Media Channels, (2) Supporting Social Media 
Channels, (3) Placeholder Social Media Channels, and (4) Legacy Social Media Channels. 
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Figure 7.6 Types of Social Media Channels 
 
The Main Social Media Channels are, in the case organisations of this study, the social 
networking site Facebook and the microblogging platform Twitter. The channels are used in 
both modes of operation. Furthermore, the channels are utilised for information dissemination, 
and two-way communication with the listening audiences, as well as for social media 
intelligence.  
     
The supporting channels are predominantly used during the non-operational mode and are 
channels used to engage with the public, PR, community education, and fostering of 
community resilience. However, the channels are also used by some organisations, such as 
Case Organisation D, to gather information which can be distributed through the own social 
media channels. Supporting social media channels, in the case organisations, are in the case 
organisations currently image sharing platforms and video sharing platforms. 
 
Placeholder channels and legacy channels are channels where an organisation has a user 
account but is not using this channel actively. The placeholder channels are for platforms in 
which the organisation is not yet sure whether it would be worthwhile to use this channel for 
emergency management; the legacy channels are channels which were used in the past by an 
organisation, but are not relevant anymore.  
 
Social media services can be short-lived, and the trends might change, which results in the 
movement of relevant user groups. For EMOs this means that they always need to review the 
channels which they are using and need to determine whether the channel is still relevant or 
not. Furthermore, it can mean adding another communication channel towards the 
communication portfolio of the organisation.  
 
 
Main	Channels Placeholder	Channels
Social	Media	Channels
Supporting	Channels Legacy	Channels
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7.4.2 Understanding the Main Social Media Communication Channels 
 
Facebook and Twitter are both used as a channel to disseminate information, engage with the 
public and by Case Organisation A, C, and D as well as a channel to gather valuable 
information from the social media networks. Nevertheless, these two social media channels are 
perceived and used differently, depending on the restrictions of the technology, the expectations 
of the listening community on each channel, and as well the goals of the emergency response 
organisation.  
 
Walsham (1993) used metaphors to understand information systems within organisations 
better. The same is done here to increase our understanding of the use ofsocial media channels 
in EMOs.  
 
Facebook is utilised as a clearing house of information by all of the case organisations. The 
listening communities actively visit the respective Facebook channel of an organisation to 
receive the information they want. The majority of the listening community are members of 
the general public. All of the case organisations see the general public as the main audience for 
this channel. However, the members of the public are still a diverse community with different 
intents for receiving information: They could be individuals directly affected by an event; 
individuals who are indirectly affected, such as friends or family members who want to know 
what happens; or individuals who are just interested in what the EMO has to say. Of course, 
this is just a small selection, and there are other user groups.  
 
  
Figure 7.7 Metaphor - Facebook as a clearing house of information 
 
On the other hand, Twitter could be seen more as an ongoing dinner reception in an extreme 
event. The communication participants are mingling at this reception and interacting with other 
participants. There is a continuing conversation about the event which might be loosely linked, 
or may not be linked at all.  
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Figure 7.8  Metaphor - Twitter as a Dinner Reception 
 
EMOs are participating in the event communications, but are not the main reason why the 
audience is there. The organisations are an important (Mirbabaie et al. 2014) participant in the 
extreme event communication who can steer the communication in a particular direction. 
However, they are just one participant amongst others. On Twitter, there are also journalists 
who utilise the social media information as a source. The EMOs reported that they are using 
Twitter when they have information which they want to distribute amongst journalists.   
7.4.3 Social Media Audience Groups – Who is the listening community? 
 
EMOs have a broad audience of social media users which are interested in what EMOs have 
to say during emergency events and in times of normal operation. In this thesis, the audience 
is referred to as the listening community or audience, since there must be an active interest of 
an individual to receive emergency management relevant information during an emergency 
event or a disaster. The individual who wants to receive the emergency relevant social media 
messages needs to either follow a relevant EMO, or at least the social media communication 
around an extreme event. 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Social Media Audience Groups 
 
The listening audience is not a homogenous group; it is a heterogeneous group with different 
members (Ehnis and Bunker 2013) who all have different aims and intentions during an 
emergency event (Subba and Bui 2017).   
 
Media General	Public
Listening	Audience
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The case organisations identified two major groups of listening social media users which are 
their audience (see Chapter 6.5). The first group consists of members of the general public; 
The second group consists of members of the Media, such as journalists (see Figure 7.9).  
 
These groups are not homogenous within. The general public, for example, might consist of 
members who are directly affected by an event, are friends of family members of somebody 
who is directly affected by an event, or are individuals from the general public who just 
interested in the particular emergency event (Ehnis and Bunker 2013). 
 
Journalists and media organisations are well-connected in social media and are central 
participants in extreme event communications (Mirbabaie et al. 2014). These individuals and 
groups act as hubs and aggregators and are transferring the information towards other 
communication media, such as TV, radio, websites, or Newspapers.   
 
The identification of different audience groups is relevant since it can help better understand 
who is using social media during emergency events and understand for what reasons they are 
using these social media channels. EMOs can then tailor their messages to a particular audience 
group they want to reach.  
 
When focusing on the current social media landscape in the case organisations, it can be said 
that the supporting social media channels, such as Instagram or YouTube, are targeted to the 
general public audience group from the listening audience. The main communication channels 
are also generally targeted towards the members of the general public. However, all case 
organisations identified that Journalists and other members of the media also actively use 
Twitter as a basis for their reporting. Twitter is used as a main communication channel to send 
information towards the Media.  
7.4.4 Social Media Utilisation for the Distribution of Information  
EMOs use their social media presence as an additional communication channel to distribute 
information to a broad audience. Other communication channels, amongst others, include: print 
media, TV, radio, or community meetings. In contrast to media releases, they are in direct 
control on what is communicated through these mediums; Of course, it is outside the control 
what is done with the information by the audience. EMOs have the potential to communicate 
with their audience directly through social media. Furthermore, it has the potential to be used 
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as a two-way communication channel in which there can be a direct feedback loop towards an 
organisation. Still, social media is often used as a one-way communication channel to just 
broadcast information (Ehnis and Bunker 2013; Potter 2016) to the social media audience. 
 
The emergency management case organisations approach the utilisation of their social media 
channels differently depending on the operational mode the organisation is operating in (see 
Chapter 6.6). During the operational mode, the organisations distribute emergency relevant 
information and warnings. Warnings can be automatically posted from the warning information 
systems within the organisation. The interview informants across the organisations have 
different views on automated messages. On the one hand, it is a technique to make sure that 
relevant information is distributed, but, on the other hand, this information receives a low 
engagement in the form of social media metrics (e.g. post clicks, shares, etc.). Some of the case 
organisations only provide handcrafted warning messages (e.g. Case Organisation A), others 
rely on automated warnings which are afterwards supplemented manually with an additional 
information (e.g. Case Organisation C). 
 
Warnings and emergency management relevant information is provided in both modes of 
operation. In the non-operational mode, there is a focus on community education as well as PR 
around an organisation.  These patterns confirm what can be found in the literature (Bruns et 
al. 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2013; Potter 2016; Subba and Bui 2017).  
 
What is not yet discussed in the existing literature are the selections of the audience groups. 
The informants in the case organisations indicated that they are selecting the social media 
channel depending on audience groups they want to reach. For example, Twitter is 
predominantly used when information is intended for media organisations, while Facebook is 
used when information is intended for the general public.  
7.4.5 Social Media Utilisation for Engagement 
Social media is not just used to distribute or broadcast information towards the listening 
audience, but also to engage and interact with the social media audience. This engagement 
takes place in all phases of the PPRR model and in both modes of operation. The case 
organisations use their social media channels for information and warning dissemination, 
community education, to encourage a specific behaviour and to fight rumours, this is consistent 
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with what can be found in the literature (Ehnis and Bunker 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2013; 
Subba and Bui 2017). 
 
Broadcasting of information works in most instances as a “megaphone” (Ehnis and Bunker 
2012; Potter 2016) where information is pushed towards the audience. Social media in these 
instances work as a one-to-many communication channel. Social media engagement, on the 
other hand, adds the ability of a many-to-many communication. The audience can then directly 
interact with the EMOs. Of course, this requires additional resources and communication 
techniques.  
 
 
Figure 7.10 Areas of Social Media Engagement 
 
Social media engagement can be a part of Information and Warning Dissemination 
(Broadcasting), where the organisations answer questions or add engaging content for the 
relevant audience. 
 
For community education, it is important to engage the relevant audience, and this is done 
through interactive approaches and different media (e.g. images or videos) relevant for the 
particular audience. The organisations attempt to make the audience an amplifier for their 
information, in that either the information is shared online through social media, or in the 
physical offline communities.  
 
The encouragement of behaviour refers to the attempt to make the audience behave in a specific 
way. For example, prepare their property for a potential disaster, or not to drive through 
floodwater. There, the organisations also try to build their online communities. They answer 
questions and provide interactive and relevant material. 
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False information tends to be corrected by social media communities over time (Webb et al. 
2016). However, EMOs play a critical role in providing trustworthy and credible information 
as a source. To fight rumours, EMOs provide information and interact with their audience. The 
interview informants pointed out it is important to build an audience who helps answer 
questions or fight rumours.  
7.4.6 Social Media as an Intelligence Channel 
 
As shown in Chapter 6.8, social media platforms are not only used as a channel to provide 
information for the listening audience, but also as a channel to gather valuable information 
during emergency events. Social media data is not necessarily reliable data. However, it is 
quickly available when an emergency event unfolds and provides a view into what people are 
experiencing on the ground. Before social media data can be utilised within an EMO, it needs 
to be processed and verified which is a task that requires knowledge about social media and as 
well domain knowledge about emergency management. As social media data is produced in 
high quantity, these steps might need to be supported by technology.   
 
As identified through the analysis of the interview data, Social media utilisation for intelligence 
purposes can be separated into two different types: collecting of information which can be used 
to improve the communication with the public or media, and gathering of information which 
is relevant for the operations of the organisation and increases the situational awareness of the 
organisation. The first type of information refers to Communicational Social Media 
Intelligence and the second type of information to Operational Social Media Intelligence.  
 
 
Figure 7.11 Social Media as an Intelligence Channel 
 
These two forms of social media intelligence have different purposes within the organisation; 
depending on the organisation, they are performed in different departments, when performed 
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at all. Because of these reasons, firstly, Communicational Social Media Intelligence will be 
discussed, and then Operational Social Media Intelligence will be looked at.  
7.4.6.1 Communicational Social Media Intelligence 
 
Communicational intelligence in social media is used to collect information from social media 
channels which can be used to improve the communication with the public. All of the analysed 
case organisations check in some extent how the messages they are broadcasting are perceived 
by the public. This means all observed case organisations are using their social media channels 
for some limited form of Communicational Social Media Intelligence. However, this form is 
reduced on the organisation’s own social media channels and is more of a form of social media 
engagement. Organisations can use Communicational Social Media Intelligence as well 
broader. For example, Case Organisation A, where the social media communication around an 
event is analysed to improve the communication towards the own social media listening 
community. This form of social media intelligence is more proactive and more resource 
intensive.  
 
Artman et al. (2011) refers to the two different forms of Communicational Social Media 
Intelligence as ‘Strategic Awareness’ and ‘Dialogical Intelligence’. Strategic awareness refers 
to being aware of the receiver's understanding of the emergency information available as well 
as the receiver’s understanding of the emergency event itself. The first part, trying to be aware 
of the message receivers’, or referred to as the listening audience’s, understanding of the 
provided messages was covered by all the EMOs. However, in most organisation it is basic and 
ad-hoc. Some of the case organisations use social media CRM (customer relationship 
management) software to support this task. However, not all of the organisations have the 
budget for commercial software which then results into labour intensive manual tasks to build 
the understanding. To gather information about the receivers’ understanding of the emergency 
event itself is more difficult to collect information about, and might need to go further than the 
social media channels which are provided by the organisation, e.g. an organisation’s Facebook 
or Twitter Account. Being aware of the public’s understanding of an emergency event is 
important for EMOs, as one central aspect of the social media activity is to provide the public 
with information which they then can use to make informed decisions about their behaviour in 
an emergency event to stay safe. 
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Dialogical emergency management and the for this necessary ‘Dialogical Social Media 
Intelligence’ is more resource and time-consuming for an organisation. The EMO is monitoring 
the social media streams and actively creates their messaging around what is perceived on the 
social media channels. This can be valuable for countering rumours and false information. It 
refers to the active monitoring of messages in the Social Media communication network to 
actively adjust the communication strategy dependent on these messages shared by the public. 
This type of Communicational Social Media Intelligence can be valuable to diffuse information 
on the ground and help that the public stays safe. However, not all, especially not smaller 
EMOs, have the necessary resources, knowledge and budget to use social media for Dialogical 
Social Media Intelligence. 
7.4.6.2 Operational Social Media Intelligence 
 
Operational Social Media Intelligence is used to build a better situational awareness about an 
event for an EMO. The collected data is used within an EMO for decision-making to improve 
the actual response of the organisation on the ground. Therefore, it has an influence on the 
actions of EMO. At the time this research was performed, EMOs in Australia do not have the 
widespread capabilities to use social media for this purpose and just started to explore the 
possibilities to utilise social media for this particular purpose (e.g. Power and Kibell 2017).  
 
As this form of social media intelligence is resource intensive, only Case Organisation A, C, 
and D have the capabilities to use their social media channels as a source for Operational Social 
Media Intelligence. On the other hand, all of the analysed case organisations are utilising their 
social media channels for some form of Communicational Social Media Intelligence. 
 
Information from social media cannot be used directly in the operational information systems 
of an organisation as it might be of poor quality or information which is not related to a 
particular emergency event (Power and Kibell 2017). The information needs to be processed 
and validated before it can be used for decision-making (Power and Kibell 2017). This 
highlights the issue of an additional need of human resources who can perform these tasks 
which take them away from other needed tasks during an emergency event.   
 
A common critique which is expressed from emergency managers is that the information might 
not be credible or trustworthy. However, similar to the distribution of information to the public, 
emergency response organisations are not just relying on one data source, but rather multiple 
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lines of evidence which can be used to triangulate the information. Social media information 
is seen as any other information which an organisation is gathering in the sense that the 
organisation is not blindly relying on it but takes caution. This is necessary for emergency 
management; EMOs are hierarchical and typically centralised in structure. Emergency event 
coordination is organised from some kind of control centre. This control centre is often away 
from the actual scene where the response personnel is responding to the effects of an event. 
For an effective response, information gathering is unavoidable.  
 
Social media information might not always be the most reliable information, but it is often 
quickly available since it is shared almost instantly after an event occurs. It does not always 
matter that the social media information might not be completely reliable. The social media 
officers expressed that it helps them to build situational awareness especially in the early phases 
of an event.  
 
The most preferred information is image- or video material. The image material needs to go 
through a verification process first, which includes reverse image search and rudimentary 
checks whether it was tampered with. After this material is put through a verification process, 
it can be passed on to the relevant specialists. Image and video material can help emergency 
management experts to make an assessment about an event. The bushfire organisations 
expressed that with the analysis of the smoke plume prediction about the progression of a fire 
can be made.  
 
There is a difference between passive and active social media intelligence. Passive social media 
intelligence refers to that social media is used as a source of information but that the 
organisations do not actively request information from the public. Active social media 
intelligence means that the organisation requests specific information, for example through 
social media. The case organisations who utilise social media as an information source prefer 
passive information gathering and only request information in special circumstances. The 
reasoning behind this practice is that they do not want to provide the impression that the 
organisation is not in control over the event. The organisation carefully considers an 
expectation management with the general public.   
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When social media is utilised for intelligence gathering, additional software and IT 
infrastructure is required. The software helps with analysing the social media streams; 
however, there is human judgement involved which is stressing the available resources.  
 
The interview informants indicated that social media intelligence is not used in more 
organisations due to that it depends on the available technology, especially software, which 
may not yet be there to make it meaningful and that the organisations do not have the necessary 
budget in the area to advance their resources, both technical and human. 
 
Further, the informants discussed that more, for EMOs, innovative approaches could support 
the capabilities of these organisations when it comes to social media intelligence. Approaches 
would include crowd-sourcing (Geiger et al. 2011; Shahid and Elbanna 2015) and virtual 
operational support teams (VOST) (Denis et al. 2012). With these approaches, the vast amounts 
of data could be analysed in more detail, and a surge capacity of human resources could be 
made available during larger extreme events. 
7.4.7 Dispatching based Social Media Information 
 
Chapter 6.9 explored the phenomena of individuals utilising social media channels to report 
incidents or request emergency assistance from emergency response organisations. This social 
media incident reporting phenomenon was separated into two different types: Individuals who 
are reporting through social media instead to go through the traditional channel, which would 
be in Australia the emergency reporting hotline Triple Zero (000); and social media incident 
reporting when the traditional reporting infrastructure would be impaired through either 
overload or a failure of the infrastructure itself.  
 
Ahmed’s model (2011) does not include dispatching based on social media information. During 
the time the model was developed, social media was most dominantly seen as an additional 
broadcasting channel with the potential to be used as well as a possible channel for intelligence 
to gather information to improve the situational awareness for EMOs. By now the social media 
utilisation within EMOs further matured and we need to also take social media incident 
reporting into account. As it was shown in Chapter 6.9, the case organisations are not able to 
reliably respond to emergency help requests which come in through the social media channels.   
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Social media dispatching is not something unrecognised in the literature. Social media 
dispatching could be observed during Hurricane Sandy in the US where the reporting hotline 
was overburdened with the vast amount of calls. Subsequently, individuals who needed 
assistance from EMOs resorted to the social media channels of the New York Fire Department. 
The New York Fire Department decided to dispatch their emergency response units based on 
that information (Chatfield et al. 2014).  
 
Organisations in Australia had also experience with social media incident reporting during 
extreme events. Organisation B experienced reporting of incidents through social media during 
a major flood event in which a hotline for not life-threatening emergency reports was 
overburdened with calls from individuals from the general public who wanted to request flood 
and storm-related assistance. The members of the general public were disappointed with 
waiting for a free phone operator and resorted to the social media channels of the organisation. 
Due to the organisational structure of where social media utilisation is embedded in the 
organisation, it was not possible to dispatch based purely on the received social media 
information.    
 
None of the case organisations has the resources, procedures, and processes in place which 
would be necessary to add incident reporting through social media as an official service into 
the structure of the organisation so that members of the general public could use the social 
media channels as emergency reporting channels. Only organisation C has formalised 
processes in place which describe how a social media officer should react when they are aware 
of a request for emergency assistance or an incident report on the social media channels. 
Organisation E has a semi-formalised process within the social media team. The remaining 
organisations have no formalised process, but the informants in all organisations described the 
same approach on how they reacted in the past to such an occurrence or how they would react.  
 
Social media incident reports are a rare occurrence and are not the norm. Still, they could have 
potentially devastating consequences for affected members of the general public when they 
should decide or would need to report an incident through social media.   
 
The official stance of the organisation is that the organisation will not react based on emergency 
reports which are sent to the organisations through the social media channels. However, the 
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individual social media officers see it as a moral responsibility to respond to an emergency 
report when they are aware of it.  
 
In the non-operational mode, the social media channels are only sporadically monitored, and 
even more so outside of normal office hours (9am-5pm) or during the night. During the 
operational mode, there is, in all of the case organisations, a closer monitoring of the social 
media channels. Still, it can take some time from posting the incident or emergency request on 
social media until a social media operator becomes aware of the report. Since incident reports 
and emergency request are often time critical, this can result in a dangerous situation for the 
individuals who are requesting emergency assistance.  
 
Furthermore, incidents reports might require an inter-organisational response. Incident 
reporting through Triple Zero (000) ensures that when necessary, an inter-organisational 
response is initiated. The social media officers call the emergency hotline on behalf of the 
person who reported the incident. 
 
The processes around Triple Zero are set up so that they require information through phone 
calls. It is not the case that they would not trust textual information or that there would not be 
an option to verify the information to questions back to the sender; It is more the case that 
currently the structures and processes do not allow to accompany textual information, such as 
text messages, e-mail, or social media messages. Additional research is required that help 
requests through social media can be integrated into the current structure and processes. This 
would allow for a backup channel in large scale incidents when the traditional help requests 
channels are overburdened.  
7.4.8 Social Media Officers 
 
The adoption of social media services in the case organisations influenced the creation of new 
roles which were not existent before social media was relevant for emergency management. 
These new roles assisted with integration and alignment of social media services into the 
practices and structures; On the other hand, these roles aligned as well the organisation to the 
structure and practices of social media communities.  
 
Some of the case organisations transformed the role requirements of the existing roles, such as 
organisation A, where the person who was responsible for the website received additional 
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responsibilities through the adoption of social media channels. Other organisations, such as 
organisation B, established entirely new positions with specific social media requirements. The 
first generation of social media officers, the members of the organisation who were filling or 
establishing these roles were seeing themselves to be a part of actively shaping these roles, the 
social media utilisation, and the view of it in the organisation.  As illustrated in the following 
quote: “Two years ago I was hired as the Web and Social Media Coordinator, … It was sort of 
a new role and I got to make it into mine a little bit” (Social Media Officer - Organisation B). 
 
In the existing literature we have the changed role of the PIO (public information officer) which 
is a uniformed member of the organisation (Latonero and Shklovski 2013). The public 
information officer in the existing literature took on additional responsibilities with using social 
media to better communicate the key messages and other relevant information towards the 
general public and the media.  
 
The literature speaks of social media evangelists (Latonero and Shklovski 2010; Latonero and 
Shklovski 2011; Latonero and Shklovski 2013) who champion the social media utilisation in 
their organisations. They are actively involved in how the organisation uses social media and 
the development of strategies. The social media officers who are coordinating the social media 
channels from the headquarter in the non-operational mode are such social media evangelists. 
Social media technology can be still seen as in an early phase of adoption and alignment in the 
case organisations. A formalisation of the roles is in progress, however when the members of 
the organisation who are currently operating the social media channels would leave the 
organisation, the social media utilisation would most likely drastically change. There is 
currently a very small pool of available social media officers in each case organisation.  
 
 
Figure 7.12 Types of Social Media Officers 
 
Social	Media	Engagement	Officer	 Integrated	Social	Media	Officer
Social	Media	Officers
Social	Media	Intelligence	Officer
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The analysis of the case organisations revealed three different types of social media officers as 
shown in Figure 7.12: Social Media Engagement Officers, Social Media Intelligence Officers, 
and Integrated Social Media Officers.  
 
The social media engagement officer generally is supporting the role of the public information 
officer. The social media operators in case organisation C, D, and E have a strong background 
in journalism. These officers also have a strong emphasis on using social media as a channel 
to communicate with the press to take pressure of the media officers. The communication with 
the media often includes to share the often-asked key messages of an event, e.g. how many 
incidents, how many people affected, how many responders on the ground, etc. The social 
media engagement officers in organisation A and B use social media as well to communicate 
with the media, but they have a bigger emphasis on using social media to communicate and 
engage with the general public part of the listening audience.  
  
To use social media to communicate with the public and to use social media as an intelligence 
tool to collect information to build situational awareness requires two completely different skill 
sets. The organisations which started to use social media as well as an intelligence tool 
established the role of a social media intelligence officer. This social media intelligence officer 
is part of the intelligence unit and utilises the social media channels to gather relevant 
information for the operations of the organisation. 
 
The third type of social media officer combines the skill sets of the social media engagement 
officer and the social media intelligence officer. This integrated social media officer utilises 
social media to engage with the listening audiences and to gather relevant information from the 
social media channels.  
 
All of the organisations have in common that the role responsibilities change when the 
organisation changes from their non-operational modus of operation into the operational modus 
of operation. The social media engagement officer and integrated social media officer need to 
switch into a pure emergency management type of communication. The social media 
intelligence officer is typically not observing the social media channels during the non-
operational mode but is very active during the operational mode. 
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7.4.9 Localisation of Social Media - Centralised and Decentralised Utilisation  
 
Social media is often seen as a medium that can help break up hierarchies in organisations 
(Riemer et al. 2015b) and that supports the possibility to decentralise. This seems for the 
emergency management case organisations only partially the case. Social media services are 
utilised on several levels in the organisation: On the headquarters level, on the district/region 
level, and as well on the brigade/unit level. On the headquarters level, all of the observed 
organisations have dedicated social media officers, which are responsible for social media 
utilisation in both the operational mode as well as during the non-operational mode. On the 
remaining levels, the social media channels are operated either by volunteers or as an additional 
responsibility for a staff member. During the non-operational mode, there can be social media 
activity on all of these organisational levels.  It could have been expected that a similar pattern 
is visible during the operational mode, that the social media communication for active 
emergency management is decentralised. For example emergency relevant information is 
posted locally from the scene by members of the organisation who are close to the physical 
response to an event. Such behaviour could be observed during the Boston Marathon Bombings 
in 2013 (Ehnis and Bunker 2013) where a police officer was contributing to their Twitter 
channel directly from the scene of the event, however, all of the case organisations showed that 
emergency management relevant information is almost exclusively, distributed centralised 
from the headquarters of the organisations, during the operational mode.  
 
 
Figure 7.13 Levels of Social Media utilisation 
 
The emergency management case organisations broadcast their social media messages in the 
operational mode through the headquarters or the centralised state control centre. In the non-
operational mode, social media is utilised on all of the described organisational levels in the 
case organisations. 
Headquarters
Districts	and	Regions
Brigades/Units
Non-Operational	Mode
Operational	Mode
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As illustrated through Figure 7.13, there are three organisational levels in which the social 
media communication occurs. On a brigade or unit level, on a district or region level, or on the 
headquarters level. The organisational members on the unit level are typically volunteers of an 
organisation (except for case organisation D which as well employs careers firefighters in 
selected brigades); on the region level the coordination is performed by volunteers and paid 
staff members; on the headquarters level, there are currently exclusively paid staff members.   
 
In the case organisations with volunteers, only a fraction of units and brigades are active on 
social media. For the brigades and units which are operating a social media channel, the activity 
varies highly. This is influenced by the skill levels of the different volunteers. All of the case 
organisations started to develop approaches to support their volunteers on utilising social media 
channels, however, the approaches are differently matured. At the current stage, there is no 
formalised training for the volunteers in how to utilise social media, and therefore there is no 
standard in how well the volunteer units are using their social media channels. The 
organisations are still exploring on how they need to standardise the social media utilisation.  
 
A further challenge on the unit level is that some of the brigades or units are building a very 
great local social media listener community with their social media activity, but when there is 
an emergency event they need all of the volunteers responding to the event, and the social 
media communication drops off since there is nobody left who could operate the channels. The 
listening community who would in cases of an emergency event need the information from 
their trusted channel cannot get the information when they would need it the most.  
 
 
Figure 7.14 Centralised Social Media utilisation across all case organisations 
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This pattern is linked to how such an organisation sees their volunteers and what a volunteer is 
in the norms and the structure of an EMO. The volunteer is a fit and highly trained specialist 
who can respond to the emergency types for which the organisation is responsible. The 
organisational practice, structure, and self-understanding does currently not have the ability to 
allow for volunteers who do not fit into exactly this pattern. The specialised volunteers are a 
scarce resource during an emergency event and are highly needed. The case organisations in 
specific, and EMOs in general, could broaden their view on what a volunteer is and allow for 
broader specialists who are not responsible for the core activities the volunteers are performing 
at the moment. Through such a practice there could be volunteer roles created which are 
responsible to purely operate the social media channels.    
 
On a district and region level, social media channels are either operated by volunteers or as an 
additional part of another role. Similar to the brigade/unit level of the organisation, not all 
districts or regions are operating social media channels. If they are operating them, they are not 
necessarily as active as the headquarters level since it is a lower priority. It can be an issue that 
the social media channels are not adequately aligned and coordinated and that there is different 
information distributed through the headquarters level: “We have had cases where you know 
the messages that the brigade is pushing out may differ from what's getting pushed out at the 
state level or the district is saying something a little bit different” (Social Media Officer – Case 
Organisation A). This can be counteracted through training approaches and more integrated 
social media strategies. 
 
The centralised utilisation of social media brings a tension between the social media utilisation 
in operational mode and non-operational mode when it comes to the distribution of information 
towards external parts of the organisation. Not all units of the organisation are necessarily in 
an operational mode during an emergency event. To illustrate this, the responding operational 
units are distributed over a large geographical area and some of the districts, regions 
brigades/units might be in full operational response to an extreme event, while in other areas 
there is not an extreme event present, however, since the social media services are operated 
centralised, and most of it is presented on the social media channels on the state level 
(headquarters), it brings a tension with relevant information for the listening communities. 
Since their volunteers are needed to respond to an event very localised information can with 
the current structure not be provided. 
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To summarise this section, social media is utilised on all organisational levels in the non-
operational mode to interact with social media audiences. However, in the operational mode, 
the social media operations are mostly centralised within the headquarters of the organisations. 
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7.4.10 Formalisation of Social Media utilisation for External Communication – 
Capability Building Blocks of Social Media Alignment  
Not all of the case organisations established the same capabilities in their social media channel 
utilisation. All case organisations utilise their social media channels as a broadcasting medium 
to disperse information to the public and the media. All of the case organisations use their 
social media channels to engage with the general public in a form of interaction. However, only 
Case Organisation A and C use social media services as an active intelligence tool to improve 
the situational awareness within their organisations during an emergency event. This helps 
extract further insights from the communication around an unfolding event. Organisation D is 
in the progress of exploring social media for intelligence purposes and has some social media 
intelligence capabilities. Organisation B and E are not using social media as an intelligence 
tool; these two organisations are only using social media to communicate and engage with the 
general public or members of media organisations.  
 
The case organisations adopted social media services in a similar progression. In the early 
phase of social media adoption they were using their social media channels purely as a 
broadcasting tool to push information towards the general public. Afterwards, the organisations 
developed the capabilities to engage with the general public in a two-way communication 
approach. At the time of the study, three of the case organisations are now exploring the 
possibilities of utilising social media as an intelligence tool. The case informants also outlined 
the potential of using social media for structured additional reporting in further adoption. 
However, this would require additional resources to make it reliable.  
 
In the previous sections, the different forms of social media interaction with the social media 
audiences were discussed. The EMOs are utilising their social media services for different 
functions to interact with their particular listening community, which are shown in Figure 7.15. 
The organisations provide information, distribute warnings, educate their listening community, 
influence the behaviour of different participants in their audience, and use social media as an 
intelligence tool to gather emergency relevant information. These five pillars of social media 
in disaster and emergency management can be condensed into three different capabilities of 
social media utilisation: (1) broadcasting of messages, in which social media is used as an one-
way communication channel to push information to the public; (2) engagement with the 
listening community, through which there is an interaction with the listening community to 
foster a two-way communication practice; and (3) social media intelligence gathering, through 
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which information from the social media services is embedded into EMOs. Furthermore, it was 
revealed through the interview process that some individuals also use social media as a 
reporting channel (see Chapter 6.9 and 7.4.7). Currently, the response to these reports is ad-
hoc, involuntary and therefore not part of the official offerings of the organisations. This is 
indicated in the figure through the dashed and greyed outline. However, the informants 
indicated that this could change in the future and it is a risk the organisations are exploring. An 
additional fourth capability is therefore (4) dispatching.  These four capabilities can be seen as 
building blocks of social media utilisation in EMOs. In the following, I refer to these building 
blocks as: “Broadcasting”; “Engagement”; “Intelligence”; and “Dispatching”. 
 
 
Figure 7.15 Emergency Management Organisation Social Media Utilisation for Community 
Interaction 
 
When exploring the temporal dimension of how these social media capabilities were adopted 
and aligned into the case organisations a similar pattern emerges; all of the observed 
organisations were first using social media as an additional broadcasting medium to broadcast 
or push information towards he general public, or to media organisations. Social media services 
were used as a “megaphone” (Ehnis and Bunker 2012). Some of this ‘push utilisation’ of social 
media is automated as in the form of the automated warnings which can be seen in Case 
Organisation C, D, and E. Organisation A was also using automated warnings in the beginning 
of its social media activity but then abolished this practice as they deemed these types of 
messages not engaging for their listening community. All of the case organisations are now 
using their social media channels to engage and interact with their listening community. This 
means the organisations do not only want their listening social media community as a passive 
receiver of information, they want that their social media community is actively sharing and 
responding to the information. The engagement from the organisations can have different 
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forms, from answering questions, to asking questions, or fostering that their community is 
helping each other through social media.   
 
The analysis of the interviews indicates that the formalisation on what an EMO is able to do 
through their social media channels is linked to the maturity of integration of the 
communication channels into the organisation. In the observed EMOs, which are mainly 
responsible for the management of natural disasters, three stages were prominent: 
“Broadcasting”, “Engagement”, and “Intelligence”. The additional stage “Dispatching” was 
mentioned by the case organisations but none of the organisations were actively or voluntarily 
using their social media channels for this purpose. Within the case organisations, it appeared 
that the adoption capabilities followed this particular order in stages. However, this most likely 
does not need to be the case; an organisation which would adopt social media now would use 
the knowledge from organisations  already utilising social media for emergency management. 
In the following section, the capability building blocks are described in more detail. 
7.4.10.1 Building Block: “Broadcasting”  
 
 
Figure 7.16 Social Media as a One-Way Communication Channel 
 
Broadcasting in this sense refers to a one-directional utilisation of social media where messages 
from the EMO are pushed towards their listening communities. Information and warnings are 
posted through the social media channels, but no or not much interaction takes place on the 
social media platforms with these pieces of information. Social media, and in particular 
microblogging, works as an additional communication channel with the public, amongst the 
more traditional mass broadcasting channels of Print Media, TV, and Radio. To communicate 
with this additional channel towards the public, the same approaches are used as with the 
traditional channels.  
 
As shown in the following quote from the social media manager in Organisation D, the ability 
of social media as a mass broadcasting tool can serve as the initial attraction for EMOs to utilise 
social media services. “So initially the big attraction, the big benefit, was just the reach - the 
ability to reach so many people so quickly including the media.  I mean a lot of it was - often 
in the State Control Centre when there's a major emergency happening the phones are going 
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crazy, the media phones are going crazy with journalists trying to find out information, and 
obviously that's one-on-one conversations” (Social Media Officer - Organisation D). 
   
Little to no interaction with members of the audience can be observed and the channels are 
mostly used for a passive one-way communication to the listening audience. A suitable 
metaphor, which would reflect this type of social media utilisation, would be that of a 
“megaphone”.  
 
7.4.10.2 Building Block: „Engagement“  
 
 
Figure 7.17 Social Media as a Two-Way Communication Channel 
 
The second building block refers to the “engagement” capabilities of the organisation. It is 
present when the organisation is actively using social media channels to interact and engage 
with their listening community. This frequent interaction can be, amongst others, in the form 
of answering specific individual questions or through active requests for information from the 
community. Individuals from the listening community, as well as the traditional media, seem 
to be actively managed by the emergency services agency organisation. The social media 
channels are not only used as a broadcasting channel but also as a two-way communication 
and interaction channel. This capability is present in all of the observed case organisations.  
 
7.4.10.3 Building Block: “Intelligence”  
 
 
Figure 7.18 Social Media as an Intelligence Channel 
 
Social media online communications can accurately discuss about ongoing events, but can also 
include rumours and false information. Furthermore, these discussions can turn into “witch-
hunts”. Therefore, the gathered information can be about the event progression in the physical 
world, but can also include critical information from the virtual world that the organisation 
needs to have knowledge about or might need to react to. 
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The “intelligence” building block refers to case that the social media channels are not 
necessarily only used as a communication channel but are also used as an intelligence tool to 
gather relevant disaster or crisis information from the community. This process requires 
technical resources (see Chapter 6.14) and can increase the need for further human resources 
(see Chapter 6.10.). 
 
Through an “intelligence” capability, social media platform are actively used to feedback 
information into the operations of the organisation. The social media services are becoming 
more embedded into the operational structure of the organisation and the tactical use of these 
services change. 
 
Currently Case Organisation A, C, and to some extend D, have the capabilities to use their 
social media channels as an intelligence tool. However, the organisations use these capabilities 
in different approaches. Organisation A integrates the social media engagement role with the 
intelligence role as an Integrated Social Media Officer. Organisation C and D have separate 
units for social media intelligence and social media engagement. Each of these units have 
specialised social media officers with different skill sets and requirements.  
7.4.10.4 Building Block: “Dispatching”  
 
 
Figure 7.19 Social Media as a Dispatching Channel 
 
All the observed EMOs experienced that individuals requested help through social media 
channels or wanted to report an incident that occurred. EMOs are not prepared for this kind of 
incident reporting since their processes currently cannot allow it. However, some interview 
informants pointed out that it is a moral responsibility to react to an incident report when they 
are aware of it. Social media officers in each of the observed EMOs have informal ad-hoc 
processes about how to follow up on a report through social media. The response to such an 
occurrence at the moment is not standardised.  
 
As established in Chapter 6.9 and 7.4.7, there are two patterns of reporting: Individuals who 
decide not to call the traditional channels, and a large number of individuals who are deciding 
to report incidents and help request through social media because the traditional channels are 
not reachable. Since outside the operational mode social media is only operated from 9-5 in 
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most organisations or even less on the weekend, there is a high risk that an incident report 
through social media is currently not observed in time. Furthermore, in the operational mode, 
there are only a number of social media officers who could operate social media channels. This 
raises the issue that a continuous operating of social media channels can currently not be 
ensured.  
 
This building block has a more future-looking and speculative component. The interview 
informants pointed out that this would be future adoption steps of social media utilisation. This 
building block would be the formalised inclusion of social media channels into the incident 
reporting structure. It would need to be ensured that social media channels are continuously 
monitored so that no reported incident is missed. On the other hand, it needs to be ensured that 
enough surge capacity is available that large amounts of reports can be processed in times that 
there is a large-scale response and the traditional channels are at capacity.  
 
With this building block as indicated in Figure 7.19, information would flow from individuals 
from the public into an EMO. The information would actively influence the operation of an 
organisation since an organisation needs to react on it with its emergency management 
resources.  
7.4.10.5 Progression of Capability Blocks and ongoing formalisation 
The four capabilities can be separated from each other and to some extent integrated 
independently into an EMO. While the case organisations adopted them in a similar temporal 
progression, it does not necessarily mean that they need to be adopted in this way. The 
integration of these social media capabilities into the structure of an EMO does not necessarily 
mean that the progression is linked to the temporal process of adopting social media services 
into the structure of an organisation.  Further, it does not indicate that some of these phases 
cannot be “leapfrogged” by learning from what other organisations in the field are able to 
achieve with social media. Furthermore, the case organisations were utilising social media 
early on and were selected on the basis that they have an active social media program, in other 
organisations the adoption might look rather different. The case organisations started using 
social media services as a broadcasting tool, but in the second phase of adoption, the 
organisations began to interact and engage actively with the general public through their social 
media channels.  
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The utilisation in the case organisations suggests that the capability stages build on each other. 
This would mean an organisation first needs to establish the capabilities of a previous building 
block before it can commence the subsequent building block. At the current point in time this 
is speculation and a descriptive observation based on the case organisations and not a general 
pattern of how EMOs necessarily adopt social media services. 
 
 
Figure 7.20 Capability Progression in Case Organisations 
 
There were two different patterns in the organisations which developed the capabilities for 
social media intelligence in the different Case States. Case Organisation A established 
progression similar to a staircase in which the current capabilities are in the same department 
of the organisation and performed by an Integrated Social Media Officer (see. Chapter 6.10). 
This progression of capability blocks is shown in Figure 7.21. 
 
Figure 7.21 Capability Progression in Case State I 
 
Organisation C in Case State II showed a different pattern again. This organisation has one 
department in which social media is utilised for the communication with the listening 
community, and one department in which social media is utilised as an intelligence channel. 
This progression is shown in Figure 7.22.  
 
These are the different capability blocks and progression of adoption of this block which could 
be observed in the case organisations. Whether similar patterns can be observed in other EMOs 
needs to be investigated through further research. 
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The formalisation in all case organisations is an ongoing progress. The early adoption of social 
media was rather ad-hoc. The knowledge about social media and the progresses which were 
used to utilise the channels was in the heads of the social media officers. This pattern is 
consistent with the literature and the experience in other EMOs (e.g. Latonero and Shklovski 
2013).  
 
 
Figure 7.22 Capabilities in Case Organisation C 
 
The organisations developed guidelines, strategy, and policy documents to formalise this social 
media utilisation over time. The early guideline documents indicated what members of the 
organisations are allowed to do with social media and what not. Now the focus is much more 
on how to use the technology strategically to achieve the aims of the organisation.  
 
All of the organisations are now using or developing formalised training approaches with 
which they can train social media officers and volunteer in using the social media channels 
appropriately for emergency management. 
 
The organisations in Case State II established formalised processes in how they respond on 
social media. This is a necessity as a team consisting of members from multiple organisations 
operate the social media channels when the state control centre and with it organisation C is 
activated. The practices within the case organisations in Case State I are still more ad-hoc and 
based on the experience of the social media operators.  
 
However, a lot of organisational knowledge is hidden in the experience of the social media 
officers and coordinators in all case organisations. If these key social media participants would 
leave their organisations a lot of the knowledge would disappear with them.  
Headquarters
Districts	and	Regions
Brigades/Units
Non-Operational	Mode
Operational	Mode
Broadcasting Engagement Intelligence
Broadcasting
Engagement
Intelligence
Broadcasting
Engagement
Broadcasting
Engagement
Broadcasting
Intelligence
255 
7.5 Intra-Organisational Social Media utilisation – Intra-Agency Social 
Media Interaction Dimension 
The interviews revealed that the public facing social media channels are not just used to interact 
with external entities, but as well with members within an organisation. There was not much 
evidence that organisations are using social media to communicate across departments within 
the organisation in the form of Enterprise Social Networking (Riemer et al. 2015a). However, 
it is used as a channel to communicate with the more isolated members of the organisation, 
which are the volunteers.   
 
Volunteer members are physically separated from the centre of the organisation. Not only are 
they spatially separated, but also emotionally seen as something different than a paid staff 
member of the organisation. Volunteers have different careers outside of emergency 
management, yet are still trained specialists for the tasks they are required to do. The volunteers 
undergo ongoing training. They are an integral component for community preparedness and 
awareness raising for potential emergency events.  
 
The barriers between volunteers and central organisation can negatively influence emergency 
management. For these organisations, it is difficult to find members of the public who want to 
volunteer for these organisations (McLennan and Birch 2005). Social media is one channel 
which is used or can be used to break these barriers and separations down. The case 
organisations use social media channels to interact and engage with their volunteer members 
and the volunteer members are utilising social media to communicate amongst themselves (see 
Chapter 6.12).  
 
The volunteers represent the majority of members in the volunteer organisations (see Chapter 
5). The information flow from the central organisation towards the volunteers can be slow and 
only one-directional. Social media channels are used to support this dissemination of 
information with the ability to receive direct feedback from the volunteer members. Several of 
the heads of the organisations are participating in questions and answer sessions (or “ask me 
anything sessions”) in which they explain decisions about the direction of the organisation or 
discuss with the volunteers current events. This is used to break down silos and barriers, in 
addition, to distribute the relevant information to the volunteers.    
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There are different “philosophies” on how to approach such an approach within the 
organisations. Some of the organisations have private social media groups for this activity 
which cannot be seen by the public. There the idea is to keep a space where the organisational 
members can speak freely without having to worry how the public could perceive this particular 
communication. Other organisations have these channels open to the public as well. The 
thinking behind this is on transparency and the channels are just not seen as relevant to the 
public.  
 
Different volunteer groups, which are as well spatial separated, are utilising social media for 
communication and knowledge transfer. This training and knowledge transfer goes from 
volunteer groups across to other volunteer groups and as well from central organisation to the 
volunteer groups. 
 
This thesis focuses on the social media utilisation for emergency and disaster management. 
The volunteer interaction of organisations is part of it. The organisations are not utilising social 
media to interact with their volunteers during the operational mode, which would be the active 
emergency management, however, social media is used in the non-operational mode for various 
aspects of interaction with the volunteers; this social media interaction is an additional 
component for organisations to break down hierarchies and separations within their 
organisations. Particularly in times of reducing numbers of volunteers, such intra-
organisational social media communication appears to be currently outside of the focus in 
social media research when it comes to emergency and disaster management. How in particular 
social media is used as a channel to bring volunteers together is an area of research which needs 
to be extended. 
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7.6 Inter-Organisational Social Media utilisation – Agency-to-Agency Social 
Media Interaction Dimension 
Ahmed (2011) suggests that EMOs can use social media services for inter-agency 
communication. The assumption is that there are EMOs using these channels as coordination 
and collaboration tools. As shown in Chapter 6.13, there was no support in the data that the 
case organisations are utilising their social media channels to interact with other EMOs for 
emergency management. This is in contrast to the model of Social Media in Disaster 
Management (Ahmed 2011), which suggested such organisations are using social media 
channels for coordination and collaboration purposes during disasters.  
 
The lack of social media utilisation during the operational mode can be explained through the 
already established channels, formal and informal, with other EMOs who are involved in a 
response to a particular extreme event. The channels are well established, and there is, 
therefore, no additional need to extend this collaboration with additional communication 
channels.  
 
The literature does not show much support that microblogging is used for coordination and 
collaboration purposes either, however, some studies show evidence that there is some limited 
social media utilisation during extreme events when there are no prior existing communication 
channels. For example during the Haiti crisis in 2010, Microsoft SharePoint and internal wikis 
were used to support collaboration and knowledge management (Yates and Paquette 2011) and 
were used by EMOs and NGOs. Furthermore, maps created through crowd-mapping were used 
by response organisation during the Hurricane Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 as a shared 
artefact (Shahid and Elbanna 2015). In both cases, the response was supported by international 
organisations which do not have a standing response establishment within the affected country. 
This indicates that on an international level at least some EMOs are utilising social media 
channels for collaboration and coordination purposes when there are no established 
communication channels. It might be possible that organisations which have no established 
channels are open to using social media channels to collaborate with other organisations in an 
ad-hoc response; this needs to be investigated with further research to establish whether such 
patterns exist. 
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The analysis of the data revealed that there is some inter-organisational social media interaction 
during the non-operational mode. These interactions have the form of Facebook groups which 
are used to share knowledge about particular topics. In the case of the social media operators, 
the main purpose of the Facebook groups is to share knowledge about the operation of social 
media channels for the purpose of emergency management. In the non-operational mode, there 
is some social media interaction between the social media officers of different organisations. 
There are a few Facebook groups where social media officers from different organisations 
share their knowledge and show what works well and, on the other hand, which tactics and 
practices were not successful. Therefore, it can be deducted that social media can be utilised as 
a knowledge management tool during the non-operational mode of an organisation. 
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7.7 Framework of Social Media Utilisation in Emergency and Disaster 
Management 
This chapter has discussed aspects of social media utilisation and integration within EMOs and 
has been organised into a framework of Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management 
Organisations for Emergency and Disaster Management. This framework, which is shown in 
Figure 7.23, represents the perspective of an EMO which is utilising social media services for 
emergency and disaster management (The EMO is depicted in Figure 7.23 in the bottom right 
corner). The framework has five major components: The “Mode of Operation”, the “Social 
Media Capabilities” of an EMO, the utilised “Social Media Channels”, the “Organisational 
Level”, and the different “Communication Participants”.  
 
 
Figure 7.23 Framework – Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management 
Organisations for Emergency and Disaster Management 
 
The framework is intended to provide a lens to better understand and analyse the social media 
utilisation within an EMO for the purpose of emergency and disaster management. In the 
following subsections, each of the five components of the proposed framework are expanded 
in detail. All of the framework components interact and influence each other, and this is 
reflected in Section 7.7.6, where the integration and interaction of the different framework 
components are discussed based on an example. 
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7.7.1 Framework Component - Mode of Operation 
EMOs operate in two different modes, the operational mode and the non-operational mode (see 
Chapter 2.3, and 7.3). The mode of operation, as indicated throughout the thesis, influences 
different aspects of social media utilisation within EMOs. Therefore, it is not a surprise that 
the operational mode has a major influence on how an EMO is using its social media channels. 
 
 
Figure 7.24 Mode of Operation and PPRR  
 
Most processes within Australian EMOs are designed around the principles of the PPRR model 
(Bunker 2010), either deliberately or implied. The activities aligned with the components 
Prevent, Prepare, and Recover are predominantly performed during the non-operational mode; 
while other activities that align with Respond and aspects of Recover are performed within the 
bounds of the operational mode. As illustrated in Figure 7.24, this influences the social media 
utilisation within the EMOs.  
 
The phase changes between Response into Recovery is fluid in emergency events and is often 
not a clear cut. The holonic structure of EMOs plays a central role. While some of the holonic 
sub-systems of an organisation are already focusing on recovery others can still be focussed on 
the response phase of an event. Disaster prevention, supporting preparedness, and recovery 
takes place under normal conditions in the non-operational mode of an EMO.  
 
The operational mode in combination with the other components of the framework can help 
understand and explain social media utilisation in an EMO. EMOs have different social media 
capabilities during the operational mode and non-operational mode; organisations have their 
focus on different social media channels at a specific point in time depending in which mode 
of operation they are in; they also interact in different ways with different communication 
partners and audiences depending on the mode of operation. The operational mode is an 
Non-Operational	Mode Operational	Mode
Emergency	Management	Social	Media	
Utilisation
Prevent RecoverPrepare RecoverRespond
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important factor to take into consideration when analysing the social media utilisation in EMOs 
or designing new processes and procedures for these types of organisations.  
7.7.2 Framework Component - Communication Participants 
The relevant communication participants in the social media utilisation in emergency and 
disaster management are: The Public (see Figure 7.23 top left); the Media (see Figure 7.23 
bottom left); (3); the communicating EMO (see Figure 7.23 bottom right); and (4) other 
involved EMOs (see Figure 7.23 top right).  
     
The interplay of these communication participants brings the potential of seven different social 
media interaction dimensions. Three of these interaction dimensions are already known from 
Ahmed’s (2011) framework: the interaction between the community (C-C); the interaction 
between the community and EMOs (A-C); and the interaction between EMOs (A-A), which 
would refer to inter-organisational social media utilisation. The holonic nature of EMOs, with 
internal communication to the volunteers, adds the communication dimension of intra-
organisational social media interaction (Intra-A). The three remaining interaction dimension 
are the interaction between the community and the media (C-M), the interaction between media 
organisations (M-M), and the interaction between EMOs and the media (A-M).   
 
The interaction dimension community-community (C-C), media-community (M-C), or media-
media (M-M), are outside of the scope of this thesis. However, these interaction dimensions 
can be deducted through an analysis of the literature, e.g. Fraustino et al. (2012), Mirbabaie et 
al. (2014), or Stieglitz et al. (2017) and are indicated through the data analysis (see. Chapter 
6.5). The influence of these communication dimensions on emergency management or the 
social media utilisation of EMOs needs to be explored through further research.  
 
The main communication dimensions that are relevant for EMOs are the interactions with the 
public and the media, and respectively the communication dimensions agency-community (A-
C) and agency-media (A-M). When discussing EMO social media utilisation, these two 
interaction dimensions are the main focusses. The majority of social media utilisation of EMOs 
happens currently with the intention to communicate with these two particular communities. 
 
The intra-agency (Intra-A) communication dimension focuses on the internal social media 
utilisation within an EMO. In the bounds of this thesis, this is especially relevant for volunteers 
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within the organisations. The holonic nature of large-scale volunteer organisations physically 
and mentally separates volunteers from the centralised core of these organisations.  This might 
be shown through an organisational culture divide between paid staff members and volunteer 
members in the organisations. Social media can be used and is used to remove and mitigate 
this divide.   
 
Agency-agency interaction (A-A) refers to how social media is utilised for this type of 
communication. A closer look at the case organisations revealed that most communication 
interaction between different EMOs is done through established communication channels and 
not through social media at all. Social media is not used in the operational mode for inter-
organisational collaboration. In the non-operational mode, social media is used for some degree 
of knowledge transfer between organisations. Further research needs to be conducted in order 
to better understand whether social media could improve the interaction between different 
EMOs. This could also include a joint utilisation of resources.  
 
The framework component “communication participants” with the resulting interaction 
dimensions helps to highlights what kind of other entities an EMO is communicating with, and 
how this communication is facilitated.  
7.7.3 Framework Component – Organisational Level  
This framework component focuses on which organisational level social media is being utilised 
at within an EMO. The holonic nature of EMOs allows social media utilisation at different 
organisational levels. In the case of the analysed organisations, this is at a brigade/unit, 
district/region, or on the headquarters level of the organisations, as illustrated in Figure 7.25.  
 
Figure 7.25 Levels of Social Media utilisation 
 
The case organisations are using social media services in a very centralised way when it comes 
to the active emergency management, and the operational mode (see Chapter 6.3 and 7.4.9). 
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There are two reasons which might explain this pattern. First, the necessary resources and 
training are still missing to fully utilise social media in a decentralised manner on the regions, 
districts, or brigades/units level. For example, social media services are operated by volunteers 
on the Brigade or Unit level, and these volunteers are needed on the ground to counter the 
effects of an emergency event during the operational mode and therefore do not have the time 
or opportunity to operate the social media channels. The other major reason why social media 
channels are not utilised more actively during the operational mode on a local level are the 
audience groups. The organisations assume that audience groups which are not local would 
acquire their information from the centralised headquarters social media channel. The 
organisations do not want to exclude audience groups based on the social media channel they 
are following.  
 
During the non-operational mode, social media channels are operated at all organisational 
levels. However, the standards and practices are quite different in the various brigades/units, 
districts or regions. Many of the social media officers on these levels are volunteers and have 
other responsibilities as well as  different levels of training.  
 
In combination with the remaining components of the framework this component allows us to 
understand better where social media is utilised in an EMO and where utilisation is absent. 
7.7.4 Framework Component – Social Media Channels  
Social media is an umbrella term that can refer to entirely different technologies. It is relevant 
to understand exactly what kind of social media channels an organisation is using so that it can 
be used effectively. Since social media channels can be short-lived and are changing depending 
on users who are frequenting these channels, the framework does not focus on particular 
instances of social media channels, but rather on types. The social media channels can be 
separated into the following four types: Main Social Media Channels, Supporting Social Media 
Channels, Placeholder Social Media Channels, and Legacy Social Media Channels (see 
Chapter 6.4 and 7.4.1).  
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Figure 7.26 Types of Social Media Channels 
 
Main social media channel are the channels which an organisation considers central to their 
social media practices. Currently, main communication channels are often the social 
networking site Facebook and the microblogging platform Twitter. Supporting social media 
channels which are in support of the social media strategy. These channels are rarely or not 
used at all for the main social media activities, distribution of warnings or emergency relevant 
information, but rather for supporting activities such as community education (e.g. YouTube 
videos) or creating positive engagement with the organisation (e.g. photos on Instagram). 
Placeholder social media channels are channels which are at a point in time not yet used to full 
effect but have a potential to be relevant for the organisation in the future. The organisation 
may not be using the channel yet but has registered a presence on the channel. Legacy social 
media channels were relevant for the organisation in the past, but through changing platforms 
or user groups, the channels are not relevant for an organisation anymore. An organisation still 
has a registered account for a legacy channel but is not actively using it further. 
 
Social media services can change in priority in an EMO; A communication channel which is 
nowadays considered a main communication channel within an organisation, can at a later 
point in time be considered as a supporting channel or even a legacy channel. This framework 
component helps to understand what the relevant social media channels for an organisation are 
and how they are currently utilised in the organisation. It also helps to understand the dynamic 
nature of social media channels.  
7.7.5 Framework Component – Social Media Capabilities 
This framework component focuses on the different social media capabilities an organisation 
has developed. These different capabilities show how an EMO could utilise or is utilising their 
social media channels. The case analysis showed four different social media capability 
“building blocks”: ‘’Broadcasting”, “Engagement”, “Intelligence”, and “Dispatching” (see 
Chapter 7.4.10). These are the capabilities used in this framework as shown in Figure 7.27.  
Main	Channels Placeholder	Channels
Social	Media	Channels
Supporting	Channels Legacy	Channels
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The broadcasting capability means that the organisation is able to utilise a social media channel 
to distribute information. It is a one-to-many communication in which a particular channel is 
used to send information to the audience on this channel.  
 
Figure 7.27 Social Media Capabilities 
 
Engagement refers to a social media channel that is not only used to distribute information to 
the audience but also to interact and engage with this community. When a social media channel 
is used as an engagement channel, it has the form of a one-to-many and many-to-one 
communication channel. Questions from the audience are answered, and community building 
approaches are put into place. 
 
The intelligence capability means that a social media channel is used to gather information 
from the social media community. There are two forms of information which can be collected 
through social media, which are Communicational Social Media Intelligence (see Chapter 
7.4.6.1) and Operational Social Media Intelligence (see Chapter 7.4.6.1). The 
Communicational Social Media intelligence is utilised to improve the communication with the 
public but does not have a direct influence on the operational side of emergency management. 
Operational Social Media Intelligence is used to improve the situational awareness within the 
organisation and the response towards an emergency event.  
 
The dispatching capability refers to the case that social media can be utilised as a channel where 
the audience can request emergency assistance and report incidents. None of the case 
organisations was officially able to utilise their social media channels for this purpose because 
they did not yet establish the relevant processes and infrastructure.  
 
Within the case organisations, there is some evidence which makes it appear that their 
capabilities might follow the same temporal integration within an organisation. Nevertheless, 
it is likely that capabilities can be leapfrogged and be adopted in a different temporal sequence.  
 
The capabilities are not binary; they can be implemented gradually. Further to that, it might 
depend on the social media channel an organisation is using. An organisation could, in one 
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channel, have different social media capabilities than in another channel. For example, the 
organisation would be able to utilise “social media channel A” as a source of information, 
which would indicate that it has the capability of Social Media Intelligence in this channel, 
however, they could use “social media channel B” as a pure broadcasting medium, which 
would indicate a “Broadcasting” capability.   
7.7.6 Framework Components: Interaction and Influence 
The framework components do not work in isolation; Each of the framework components is 
like a puzzle piece, as shown in Figure 7.28, which is interlinked with another. Each component 
influences and interacts with the other components. While we understand how each of the 
components fit into the framework (See Figure 7.23) they interact and influence each other 
depended on the organisation context as well as the incident context. This interaction and 
influence is illustrated in the following through an example.   
 
  
Figure 7.28 Framework Components are Interlinked 
 
 
Imagine a fictional EMO which is responsible for responding to bushfire related emergency 
events is utilising social media services for the purpose of emergency management. The 
operational area of the organisation is the federal state it is operating in. Furthermore, the 
organisation consists of volunteers and paid staff members.  
 
Each component of the framework is now applied to this scenario to illustrate how it helps as 
a frame to understand the social media utilisation within this fictional organisation. This is done 
by looking at (1) the organisational level, (2) the social media channels, (3) the communication 
participants (4) the mode of operation, and finally (5) the social media capabilities (See Figure 
7.29).  
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Figure 7.29 Social Media Overview of Fictional Fire Organisation 
 
 (1) Organisational Level: 
This fictional organisation is utilising social media services on two organisational levels: 
centralised on the headquarters level and, in addition, in several fire brigades across the 
operational area of the organisation. Only small number of the brigades are utilising social 
media channels. The different regions and districts of the organisation are not utilising social 
media at all. This indicates that there is centralised communication and some localised 
communication by some parts of the organisation.  
 
(2) Social Media Channels: 
The social media channels provide a general overview about the social media communication 
portfolio of an organisation. On the headquarters level, the organisation is using the social 
media channels Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram to support their emergency management 
activities. Furthermore, it previously utilised Flickr before it started to use Instagram. The main 
communication channels are Facebook and Twitter. Currently the organisation is utilising 
Instagram as a supporting social media channel. There are no placeholder channels. However, 
Flickr is a legacy social media channel which is not used any more.  
 
Some of the brigades are utilising Facebook as their main communication channel and 
Instagram as a support channel.  
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(3) Communication Participants 
From the headquarters level, the organisation uses their social media channels to communicate 
with the general public and the media. The brigades which are utilising social media channels 
are targeting their local communities as a communication participant. 
 
Therefore, from a headquarter level, the main communication dimensions with the relevant 
listening audiences are the communication dimensions agency-community (A-C) and agency-
media (A-M). In these two dimensions the mode of operation, the social media capabilities, 
and the social media channels are closely interlinked and can explain how an EMO uses or 
could use their social media communication channels. Facebook is used in the organisation to 
interact with the public. Twitter is also used to interact with the public, but also to communicate 
with the media. Messages which are intended to reach media organisations are shared through 
the communication channel Twitter. 
Instagram is only targeted to communicate with the public (A-C interaction). 
 
The brigade level is only communicating with the public which results in the relevant 
communication dimension agency-community (A-C). 
 
(4) Mode of Operation 
The operational mode impacts the aims and goals of an EMO’s social media utilisation. In the 
operational mode it is relevant to provide information warnings to the general public and to 
support the active response. In the non-operational mode, the organisation has other aims which 
are preparing an organisation towards the response to emergency events. The main 
communication channels are on the headquarters level and used in both modes of operation. In 
the operational mode, social media is used to distribute information and warnings to the public 
and in the non-operational mode to inform and educate the community. The supporting channel 
Instagram is only utilised in the non-operational mode. 
 
On the brigade level the social media channels are used in the non-operational mode, but not 
in the operational mode. The reasons behind this is that the volunteers are needed to respond 
to the effects of the emergency event when they are in the operational mode and there is no 
time or additional resources to also operate the social media channels.  
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(5) Social Media Capabilities 
The social media capabilities describe whether the organisation can use their social media 
channels as a one-way communication channel to just broadcast information to the listening 
audience, or as a two-way communication channel to engage with the general public. Or even 
further, to use social media as an intelligence channel or as a basis for dispatching resources 
based on social media information. The fictional organisation has different capabilities with 
their social media channels. On both relevant organisational levels (headquarters and brigade) 
the organisation is able use their main social media channels for broadcasting and engagement 
capabilities. The supporting communication channel Instagram is currently only used for 
engagement capabilities. The organisation has no intelligence capabilities with their social 
media channels or dispatching capabilities. Generally, the social media utilisation of the 
fictional organisation is rather basic. 
 
This short example has provided an overview of how a fictional organisation has integrated 
social media services into their organisation. It highlights which areas need to be more closely 
investigated to improve the social media utilisation within the organisation. Furthermore, the 
short example has showed that the framework is interconnected and that the different 
framework components influence each other. Each of the different components could have been 
taken as a starting point to analyse the fictional organisation. 
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7.8 Summary 
In this chapter, social media utilisation in EMOs for emergency and disaster management is 
discussed based on the empirical findings from the data analysis shown in Chapter 6 and the 
literature. The discussion explores different aspects of social utilisation for the purpose of 
emergency and disaster management (see Chapter 7.3-7.6), which has resulted in the 
development of a framework of Social Media Utilisation in Emergency Management 
Organisations for Emergency and Disaster Management (see Chapter 7.7). This framework is 
the main contribution of this study and thesis. 
 
Ahmed’s (2011) framework (See Chapter 7.2) on Social Media in Disaster Management was a 
valuable input for this research. However, the model developed as part of this thesis reflects 
the recent evolution in social media tools and their utilisation. In applying this framework, we 
can additionally explain aspects of social media utilisation in disaster management which were 
not possible with Ahmed’s model.  
 
My developed framework consists of five components: 
 
• Mode of Operation (see Chapter 7.7.1) 
• Communication Participants (see Chapter 7.7.2) 
• Organisational Level (see Chapter 7.7.3) 
• Social Media Channels (see Chapter 7.7.4) 
• Social Media Capabilities (see Chapter 7.7.5) 
 
These components can be combined to understand, analyse, explain or develop specific aspects 
of social media utilisation in a particular EMO and situation.  
 
Throughout the chapter, answers are provided to the research questions underlying this study. 
Research Question 1 “How are Social Media Services integrated into the structures of 
Emergency Management Organisations?“ and 2 “How are Social Media Services utilised 
within Emergency Management Organisations for the purpose of emergency and disaster 
management?” are answered in the following way.    
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EMOs can be seen as holonic systems with a clear hierarchy. Holons can operate independently 
of each other, to some degree independently. Social media is integrated at different 
organisational levels, (in the instance of the case organisations on the headquarters level, the 
district/region level, and the brigade/unit level) for emergency management.  
 
The analysis of the case organisations revealed that social media is a central additional 
communication channel with their external audiences during extreme events (see Chapter 7.4). 
The audiences include, amongst others, the general public and the Media. A central reason why 
EMOs utilise social media services is to use these channels to directly communicate and 
interact with the public for the purpose of emergency and disaster management, but also as an 
Intelligence channel through which information can be gathered from the public. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the case organisations revealed that social media potentially needs to be used as 
a channel through which the public requests emergency assistance or reports emergency 
incidents (social media dispatching). Public social media channels are not used to interact with 
other EMOs for inter-organisational collaboration (see Chapter 7.6). However, the data analysis 
showed that social media is used in the volunteer EMOs to interact with volunteers for intra-
organisational interaction in order to reduce hierarchical and spatial barriers (see Chapter 7.5). 
 
Research Question 2.1 “Is there a difference in the Social Media utilisation during the 
operational mode and the non-operational mode of an Emergency Management 
Organisation?” is answered as well throughout the chapter. The short answer is yes; Social 
media is used for different purposes and with different approaches during the operational mode, 
and the non-operational mode.   
 
Research Question 3 “How are Social Media Services used as communication platforms in 
Emergency Management Organisations for the purpose of emergency and disaster 
management to?” consists of three sub-research questions.  
 
Research Question 3.1”… interact with the public?” is answered throughout Chapter 7.4. The 
interaction includes distribution of information, engagement with the audience, social media 
intelligence, and social media dispatching. 
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Research Question 3.2 ”…to interact with their own organisational members?” is answered in 
Chapter 7.5. Social media can be used in EMOs to interact with volunteers to reduce 
hierarchical and spatial barriers and include the volunteers closer into the organisation. 
 
Research Question 3.3 ”…to interact with other Emergency Management Organisations?” is 
answered in Chapter 7.6. From the case analysis, we see that it is not used as a platform for 
collaboration and coordination. However, there is some evidence in the data that individual 
social media officers are sharing their social media practices with social media officers in other 
EMOs.  
 
So, what are the implications and contributions to theory and practice? In the following chapter 
the contributions to the methodological approach, theory, and practice are outlined as they 
relate to this study. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
My analysis of five cases of EMOs explored the integration and utilisation of social media 
services within EMOs for the purpose of emergency and disaster management.  
 
The case EMOs are hierarchical organisations which consist of different units and departments 
which can operate to some extent independently. I used Koestler’s concept of holonic systems 
(Koestler 1967) to better understand this semi-autonomous and independent structure of 
EMOs. Social media is utilised in the organisations on several organisational levels, but for 
active emergency management, its use is centralised. 
 
The operational mode refers to whether an organisation is responding to an emergency event 
or whether an organisation is in its normal day-to-day operation. This factor showed itself as a 
major influence on how and for what purpose emergency organisations utilise their social 
media channels to communicate with their audience.  
 
An interpretivist perspective was taken in order to explore the utilisation of social media within 
the case organisations. Data sources were interview data, workplace observations, observations 
from research site visits, documents, and relevant social media data. The main data sources 
were interviews with social media operators and coordinators in the case organisations. 
 
The iterative analysis of the empirical material revealed twelve themes which each describe an 
aspect of social media utilisation in the case EMOs. These themes then were used to develop a 
framework of Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management Organisations for 
Emergency and Disaster Management. This framework can help us to understand the social 
media utilisation in EMOs better, and to develop approaches of social media utilisation for such 
organisations. 
 
Within this last and final chapter, the methodological, theoretical, and practical contributions 
are outlined. Furthermore, the limitations of the study are discussed, followed by implications 
for further research and some concluding remarks. 
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Figure 8.1 Outline Chapter 8 
8.2 Methodological Contributions and Implications  
The individual components of the methodology are on their own general approaches of case 
study research. The main methodological contribution is how the method was applied. 
 
Social media studies typically consist of an “outside perspective” where social media data is 
collected and analysed. From the data analysis assumptions are made about the stakeholders. 
In this study, both knowledge from social media data and an “inside perspective” are applied 
where social media practitioners within the organisations provide their perspective on the 
utilisation of social media within their organisation. 
 
The focus of this study is on utilisation of social media by EMOs rather that general social 
media use in emergency events. This means that identification of key and relevant 
organisations and informants was critical to the success of the study. This was achieved by way 
of association with agencies through their “communities of practice” rather than the traditional 
“cold calling” techniques of organisational sampling. 
 
The study consists of technology-in-use cases which meant a sensitivity to and understanding 
of 1) organisational context and 2) emergency event context as a driver for social media 
adoption and utilisation. This was key to the development of the resulting framework as a 
dynamic interaction of key components which have an influence on each other and the 
emergency and disaster management adoption landscape within and across EMOs.   
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8.3 Theoretical Contributions and Implications 
The main theoretical contribution is to knowledge about social media utilisation and integration 
in EMOs for emergency and disaster management. Before this study we knew from the 
literature what EMOs communicate via their social media channels through the analysis of 
social media communications in different extreme events (E.g. Bruns et al. 2012; Ehnis and 
Bunker 2012; Ehnis and Bunker 2013; Ehnis et al. 2014; Heverin and Zach 2010; Procter et al. 
2013; Subba and Bui 2017; Sutton et al. 2012). What we did not know was how social media 
is actually integrated into emergency response organisations. In this thesis, the integration and 
utilisation of social media services is explored within EMOs for the purpose of emergency and 
disaster management. By analysing five case organisations, different integration approaches 
were highlighted. It is still too early to say whether one type of integration is better than another, 
however, the data shows that with a specific type of integration some utilisation possibilities 
are enabled, and some are inhibited. The developed framework of Social Media Utilisation of 
Emergency Management Organisations for Emergency and Disaster Management thus helps 
as a framing device to explore the integration and utilisation of social media services in EMOs. 
The five components of the framework help us to understand the phenomena better and include 
several theoretical contributions: (1) importance of operational mode; (2) hierarchical but semi-
autonomous structure of EMO; (3) existence of a diverse group of communication participants; 
(4) importance of different types of communication channels; (5) the social media capabilities 
of EMOs; (6) the integration and interaction of the components within the developed 
framework. 
 
(1) The “Mode of Operation” takes into account the specific nature of EMOs. Social media is 
used for different purposes during the operational mode when an organisation, or parts of the 
organisation, is responding to an emergency event to the non-operational mode when no 
emergency event is present. Furthermore, emergency and disaster management, and the 
accompanying social media communication does not only happen during the response phase 
of an emergency event but all phases of the PPRR model (Cronstedt 2002). 
 
(2) The “Organisational Levels" takes into account the holonic nature of EMOs, in which 
different sub-units of the organisations can operate independently to one another, to some 
extent at least. Social media is used on several levels of the organisation to communicate with 
the audience, but when it comes to active emergency management, social media is used in a 
centralised manner from the headquarters of an organisation. This of course is also influenced 
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by the fact that large-scale volunteer organisations were used as case organisations for this 
study. So as a theoretical contribution it is important to point out that social media is used for 
different purposes at different organisational levels. 
 
(3) The framework highlights the existence of different “Communication Participants" in the 
social media utilisation. These communication participants include but are not solely limited 
to EMOs (A), the General Public (C), and the Media (M). These communication participants 
lead to social media interaction dimensions which were not covered by earlier models. In 
particular this study points to the communication dimension of Organisation – Public (A-C), 
Organisation – Media (A-M), Intra-organisational social media interaction (Intra-A), 
interaction between different organisations (A-A), interaction between the Public and the 
Media (C-M), social media interaction between the Media (M-M), and the social media 
interaction between different groups within the public (C-C). The interplay between these 
communication participants results in different forms of social media utilisation within EMOs. 
 
(4) The research showed that “Social Media Channels" are constantly reviewed by EMOs and 
changed when necessary. The focus is not on particular instances of social media services (e.g. 
Facebook or Twitter), but on the audience and the use for an EMO. Channels which were once 
relevant might be not used anymore, and additional channels might be added to the 
communication portfolio of an organisation. 
 
(5) EMOs have different “Social Media Capabilities" with their social media channels. The 
identified capabilities were broadcasting, engagement, intelligence, and dispatching. 
Broadcasting refers to distributing information through social media, engagement refers to 
engagement and interaction with the audience, intelligence refers to the utilisation of social 
media channels as well as a source of information for the organisation, and dispatching relates 
to the utilisation a social media channel as the basis to dispatch emergency resources to respond 
to an event. It is important to point out that these social media capabilities relates to a particular 
social media channel. EMOs might have different capabilities for their various social media 
channels. 
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(6) The framework components do not exist in isolation they are interlinked and influence each 
other. The framework helps to analyse, understand and explain the social media utilisation 
within an EMOs. Furthermore. It can be utilised to develop new approaches of social media 
utilisation and integration. 
8.4 Practical Contributions and Implications  
The research also has practical contributions which are outlined in the following way. The 
framework of Social Media Utilisation of Emergency Management Organisations for 
Emergency and Disaster Management can help EMOs to analyse their social media utilisation 
more effectively and assist them in improving their processes. Furthermore, the framework can 
help EMOs which have not yet adopted social media services within their organisations to 
commence the adoption of social media services. Some of the practical contributions are 
highlighted through each component of the framework. 
 
The "Mode of Operation" shows that social media utilisation for emergency and disaster 
management is not only relevant when an organisation is responding to an emergency event, 
but around all phases of the Prevent, Prepare, Respond, and Recover model. Most social media 
channels work well when an organisation has already established a "listening audience" which 
is actively following the organisation. It takes time to establish such an audience, and it cannot 
easily be done when a disaster event suddenly happens. 
 
The analysis of the data showed that the case organisations are utilising social media at different 
“Organisational Levels", however, for active emergency and disaster management, social 
media is centralised at the headquarters level. The remaining relevant holons in the 
organisations are using social media outside the operational mode for support activities, but 
not for active emergency management. Localised information could be valuable for affected 
communities and for intelligence gathering purposes within an EMO. By highlighting these 
aspects, this research is relevant for EMOs to rethink their social media utilisation on different 
organisational levels. For example, EMOs can think about forms of non-traditional volunteers. 
EMOs often have a basis of highly skilled volunteers which are involved in the groundwork of 
the organisation. These volunteers are essential for the operation of the organisations, however, 
the EMOs could start to train and establish skilled social media volunteers on all levels of the 
organisation; i.e. state and local level. These types of volunteers could prevent the effect that 
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social media channels “going silent” when the traditional volunteers are in the operational 
mode. 
 
This research also showed that it makes a difference in the information flow from where the 
social media officers are operating their social media channels. The organisations which have 
their social media officers within the command centre while they are operational have a 
different information flow in comparison to the social media officers which are operating the 
social media channels from outside the command centres. 
 
There are different “Communication Participants” in the social media audiences. The 
identification of different audience groups can help emergency management practitioners to 
foster their social media communication towards the relevant audiences.  
 
Social media is more than just the service Facebook or Twitter; there are different "Social 
Media Channels". The research identified main social media communication channels; support 
social media communication channels; placeholder social media channels; and legacy social 
media channels. The research can help organisations which utilise their social media channels 
to reconsider whether they are utilising relevant channels for the task they are trying to achieve. 
 
Furthermore, there are different “Social Media Capabilities” for a social media channel. The 
capabilities identified in this research are broadcasting, engagement, intelligence and 
dispatching.  
 
In the case organisations, the majority of social media operators are still social media 
evangelists (Latonero and Shklovski 2013) and knowledge is retained within the experience of 
these social media officers. Formalisation is in progress. This research is relevant because 
social media is of increasing importance to EMOs, however, so far the practical processes or 
routines are lagging behind as social media operators are still in the stage of learning what is 
effective. Formalisation is relevant to train more social media operators as a surge capacity 
when there is the need for increased social media communication during a disaster. 
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8.5 Limitations 
All research is set in a particular background and has, therefore, limitations about which the 
researchers and the audience need to be aware of. Amongst others, the main constraints of this 
research are based on the research design, selection of case organisations, domain, access to 
participants, and also the temporal constraints of PhD studies. 
 
The research design of this study is the interpretivist exploration of social media technology 
appropriation in EMOs for emergency and disaster management. As a method, five 
comparative case studies were approached. A common critique of case studies is the lack of 
generalisability of cases (Walsham 1995). Generalisability is a concept from positivist research 
which is not suitable and aimed for in the interpretivist research paradigm (Lee and Baskerville 
2003). The underlying ontology for this thesis is a ‘weak’ social constructivism (Urquhart 
2012). This means that social realities are the result of the intersubjective meaning making 
between the particular individuals within these realities, in the case of this thesis the members 
of the EMOs. The knowledge we can derive from these realities is always highly context bound. 
This does not mean that this knowledge cannot be applied in a similar setting, however, in such 
a knowledge transfer one needs to make oneself aware of the different social realities, such as 
culture or norms. 
 
The selected case organisations are situated in Australia and this brings with it several 
implications which are not necessarily transferable to EMOs in different countries. There is the 
geographical surrounding of Australia which results in the specific event types, such as 
frequent bushfires, and organisations operating across geographically large areas. Furthermore, 
there are implications which come with norms and culture, both organisational and country 
specific. 
 
This research focuses on EMOs which are responding to natural emergency and disaster events, 
such as earthquakes, floods, or bushfire. This particular selection of case organisations makes 
it possible to not focus on some of the problems, which organisations, such as police forces, 
have that are utilising social media to communicate information during human-caused types of 
extreme events, such as terror attacks. In human-caused events where there are perpetrators, 
social media might need to be operated with a different approach, since the communication 
might directly influence the strategy and approaches of the actors.    
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The case organisations consist of a very specific type of EMO which are large volunteer 
organisations. The majority of members in the Case Organisation A, B, D, and E are trained, 
specialised volunteers. When transferring the findings to a different context, these constraints 
need to be taken into consideration. 
 
Further limitations result from the access to interview participants. As highlighted through this 
research the group of social media operators and coordinators in each organisation are very 
limited.  
 
Social media in emergency management has a volatile and fast-changing nature as highlighted 
throughout this thesis. This means that social media undoubtedly will change over time. This 
might have an influence when applying the framework or other findings of this thesis.  
 
A fully embedded longitudinal multiple-case study design would be optimal to identify and 
analyse the different aspects of social media utilisation in emergency management for 
emergency and disaster management, however, this was not feasible through resource and time 
constraints of a PhD journey. 
8.6 Implications for further Research 
Research, in general, raises more questions than it answers. This is also the case for this 
particular thesis. I answered relevant questions, but on the way to achieving this objective, the 
research opened up a myriad of further questions which need to be answered in further research.  
 
The framework needs to be transferred to an additional context in order to increase its 
relevancy. In this research, the case organisations were large-scale volunteer organisations 
(except for Case Organisation C) we need to explore whether similar patterns can be found in 
non-volunteer organisations.     
 
Furthermore, the events were limited to natural disaster events. The research can be extended 
to all forms of emergency events, including human-caused events, such as terror attacks, as 
these events do show different characteristics which might require a different form of social 
media utilisation. 
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The context of this thesis were organisations in Australia; the research could be extended to 
different countries which of course include different forms of infrastructure and culture. 
 
This thesis does not provide a longitudinal view of the social media communication system 
within the case organisations; Rather it gives a snapshot and explores how the current members 
of these organisations are viewing their social media channels for their normal day to day 
operations (non-operational mode) and when the organisations are presented with a crisis 
(operational mode). Over time these practices will change, and this change can be explored 
through a longitudinal exploration on EMOs. 
 
Through this research, we now know much more about how EMOs have embedded and 
integrated social media services into their organisations. In further research, we need to learn 
more about the other perspective; how does the public and the media perceive social media 
services when they are interacting with EMOs during disasters and other extreme events. 
 
The study highlighted that social media is used to communicate with volunteers within an 
organisation. Further research can explore how this interaction can be improved and how 
volunteers can be better integrated into the social media activities for emergency management.  
 
The study showed that the case EMOs are struggling to use social media channels as a source 
to gather meaningful information from the emerging social media communication networks 
during an extreme event. Further research can explore how social media can be integrated into 
EMOs for meaningful social media intelligence gathering.  
 
The study showed several preconceptions within the literature and in the case organisations 
which guide what it means to utilise social media in EMOs. There is a research opportunity to 
challenge some of these preconceptions in future work as the usage of particular language and 
concepts influence how a technology can be used. One example is the concept of the 
“operational” and “non-operational” mode. This language guides the importance of the social 
media operations within the operational mode, when an active emergency event is present, and 
indicates that social media utilisation in the non-operational mode might be less important. 
However, the key goal of EMOs, keeping the public safe, is something that happens in both 
operational modes and all phases of the PPRR model. Another example is the concept of the 
“listening audience” and “listening community”. This terminology keeps the unidirectional 
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connotations from traditional mass media and downplays an active community that is 
“interacting”, “contributing” and “co-producing”. We need to challenge these existing 
preconceptions in future research which will help EMOs in a long-term shift in seeing the value 
of social media in all modes of operations, as well as the public as an active participant in 
mitigating the effects of extreme events. 
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8.7 Concluding Remarks  
Social media influenced the communication around emergency and disaster events with 
beneficial but as well with negative consequences. EMOs, in general, are still learning and 
experimenting on how to utilise these services to support their efforts to keep the communities 
they are serving safe. This study might help to contribute to the development of new approaches 
in the emergency management domain or to better understand the existing social media 
utilisation within such organisations. 
 
Social media with its ability to enable one-to-many and many-to-many communication with a 
minimal cost is a relatively recent phenomenon which will further influence our societies over 
time when new technology is developed. Already now it is the case that “people today can use 
social media to organise in ways that were difficult, if not impossible, just a few years ago, 
which has substantial implications for business, and society” (Kane et al. 2014). 
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